Opinions of the Justices to the Senate

326 Mass. 781
CourtMassachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
DecidedJuly 1, 1951
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 326 Mass. 781 (Opinions of the Justices to the Senate) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 326 Mass. 781 (Mass. 1951).

Opinion

[784]*784To the Honorable the Senate of the Commonwealth df Massachusetts:

The undersigned Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court submit this answer to the question set forth in an order adopted by the Senate on May 8, 1950, and transmitted to the Justices on May 10, 1950. A copy of the order with the documents referred to therein is hereto annexed.

The question submitted relates to the status of an initiative petition filed under art. 48 of the Amendments to the Constitution for a law providing that the classifications of risks and premium charges under the compulsory motor vehicle liability insurance law shall be uniform throughout the Commonwealth. From the recitals in the order and the documents referred to therein it appears that the petition signed by the required ten qualified voters with the certificate of the Attorney General required by art.. 48, The Initiative, II, § 3, as appearing in art. 74 of the Amendments, was filed with the Secretary of the Commonwealth on September 8, 1949; that on December 7, 1949, thirty-four thousand thirty-four subsequent signatures of qualified voters had been filed; that on January 4, 1950, the Secretary of the Commonwealth transmitted the petition with the accompanying bill to the clerk of the House of Representatives as required by The Initiative, II, § 4; that in his letter of transmittal he stated that the “34,034 subsequent signatures of qualified voters had been filed ” but did not indicate how many of them were of any one county; that after reference to a committee the members of which filed majority and minority reports, the House, voting by yeas and nays as required by V, § 1, refused to pass the bill to be enacted; that the bill was sent to the Senate indorsed accordingly; and that from an inspection of said initiative petition “as on file with the Secretary of the Commonwealth” it appears that the county of Middlesex has eight thousand nine hundred sixty-four certified signatures and [785]*785the county of Suffolk eight thousand nine hundred twenty-eight, each number being more than one fourth of the certified signatures on the petition.

The question submitted is this: “Is said initiative petition valid and said measure introduced and pending when the number of certified signatures from the counties of Suffolk and Middlesex is in excess of the number of certified signatures prescribed by ‘General Provisions. II. Limitation on Signatures’ of said Article XLVIII of the Amendments to the Constitution of the Commonwealth? ”

Article 48 of the Amendments under the heading The Initiative in V, § 1, prescribes that the number of signatures of qualified voters on such a petition shall be “not less than twenty thousand.” Part II, § 3, as appearing in art. 74 of the Amendments, relates to the signing of initiative petitions and to their filing with the Secretary of the Commonwealth. Section 4, immediately following, reads, “Section 4. Transmission to the General Court. — If an initiative petition,'signed by the required number of qualified voters, has been filed as aforesaid, the secretary of the commonwealth shall, upon the assembling of the general court, transmit it to the clerk of the house of representatives, and the proposed measure shall then be deemed to be introduced and pending.” If § 4 stood alone it would seem that any initiative petition signed by the required number of qualified voters and transmitted by the Secretary of the Commonwealth would be legally “introduced and pending.” But under the heading General Provisions, II reads: “Not more than one-fourth of the certified signatures on any petition shall be those of registered voters of any one county.” It is plain that the general provision last quoted is intended to qualify the portions of the amendment that have gone before. The reason for this was stated in Commonwealth v. Littleton, 260 Mass. 423, at page 425, to be “to make certain that the petition has substantial support throughout the Commonwealth before submitting the question to popular vote.” This purpose appears from [786]*786Debates in the Massachusetts Constitutional Convention of 1917-1918, at Volume II, pages 863-870.

The real question here involved seems to us in substance to be whether the words of this provision that not more than one fourth of the certified signatures “on any petition” shall be those of registered voters of any one county are to be read literally to mean exactly what they say, or whether it is permissible to disregard signatures in excess of the minimum number absolutely required, choosing the signatures to be disregarded from the several counties in such a manner as to leave the remaining minimum number of signatures so divided that not more than one fourth of them shall be of the voters of any one county. It would seem strange if such simple words should be construed as calling for such computation. The question is one of the construction of the words of the Constitution. If the meaning of these words is plain and they are not controlled by other words or by some clear demonstration that they are not to be taken in a literal sense, the plain literal meaning must prevail. Attorney General v. Methuen, 236 Mass. 564, 572-573. The undersigned Justices are unable to discover any other controlling words or to perceive any clear demonstration that the literal meaning is not the true meaning. It is beyond doubt that when art. 48 was adopted it was contemplated that an initiative petition for a law might contain more than the required number of names. The Initiative, V, § 1, Speaks of “not less than twenty thousand qualified voters” . and “not less than five thousand signatures of qualified voters.” Similar language is found in IV, § 2, relating to legislative action on amendments to the Constitution, in V, § 2, relating to amendments to measures, and in The Referendum, III, §§ 3 and 4, relating to referendum petitions. In spite of this recognition that a petition might contain more than the required number of names the draftsman inserted in II of General Provisions, and the people adopted, the provision that “Not more than one-fourth of the certified signatures on any petition shall be those of registered voters of any one county.” The words “the certified sig[787]*787natures on any petition” necessarily refer to the signatures actually “on” any petition — that is, those actually certified and filed. Those words are incapable of meaning any lesser number than the number of those certified and filed, even though a lesser number might have been sufficient. The word “any” cannot be construed out of the sentence. Meaning must be given to it. It admits of no exceptions. It refers to a petition that contains more than the required number of names as well as to one that contains only the required number, if a petition containing only the required number is practically possible at all. Indeed it must have been anticipated that most petitions would contain some names in excess of the number required.

The literal construction may render the provision slightly more difficult of compliance, but it does not render compliance impossible or impractical. There may well have been reasons why the requirement of dispersion should have been applied proportionately to all petitions alike. It might have been thought that if proponents of measures desired to avail themselves of the impression upon legislators and the public of massive petitions they should demonstrate a corresponding breadth of demand among the counties of the Commonwealth, and that in no case should a petition be overweighted with the special interests of a particular locality. At any rate, we cannot say that this was not so.

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