Opinion of the Attorney-General

1 Rep. Cont. Elect. Case. 47
CourtMassachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
DecidedJuly 1, 1891
StatusPublished

This text of 1 Rep. Cont. Elect. Case. 47 (Opinion of the Attorney-General) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Opinion of the Attorney-General, 1 Rep. Cont. Elect. Case. 47 (Mass. 1891).

Opinion

First. Can a voter legally “ insert” or “ fill in,” in the space left at the end of the list of candidates on the official ballot, the name of the candidate for whom he would vote, by means of pasting thereon a printed slip bearing the name of such candidate and making the x mark in the space to the right of such name so pasted on said official ballot, and should such ballot be counted for the candidate whose printed name is thus pasted on ?

Answer. A voter can legally “insert” or “fill in,” in the space left at the end of the list of candidates on the official ballot, the name of the candidate for whom he would vote, by pasting thereon a printed slip bearing the name of such candidate and making the X mark in the space to the right of such name so pasted on the official ballot, and such ballot should be counted for the candidate whose printed name is thus pasted on. The blank space is as appropriate to the reception of a pasted slip as of a written name, and the language of the statute, to “insert” or “ fill in ” the name, applies as well to the one case as to the other; and it must be presumed that the Legislature was aware of the general use of “ pasters,” so called, and did not intend to forbid their use by provisions which, taken as they read, clearly permit it.

Second. At a special election for representative to the General Court, where the official ballot bears only one name and some official ballots are cast bearing such name and none other, but without any X or other mark on such ballot, can the ballots so cast be counted for such candidate ?

Answer. At a special election for representative to the General Court, where the official ballot bears only one name and some official ballots are cast bearing such name and none other, but without any X or other mark on such ballot, the ballot so cast can be counted for such candidate. In such a case, which would very rarely arise, there is no “ choice” of the voter, in the sense of the statute, to be indicated by the statutory mark. “ Choice ” implies a selection of one out of two or more names, and if the ballot bears but one name there is nothing upon which this right of choice is to be exercised. Any other construction would deprive the act of the voter in such a case of all significance or legal effect, and this result is to be avoided if possible. But in my opinion, as will appear below, this applies only to a ballot bearing but a single name.

[49]*49Third. At a special election for representative to the General Court, where the official ballot bore only the name of one candidate and the printed name of another candidate had been pasted in the blank space left at the end of the list of candidates, but without a X mark or other mark in the space at the right of either name, can such ballot be counted for either candidate, and if so for which ?

Answer. At a special election for representative to the General Court, where the official ballot bore only the name of one candidate and the printed name of another candidate had been pasted in the blank space left at the end of the list of candidates, but without a X mark or other mark in the space at the right of either name, or elsewhere upon the ballot, as I understand the question, such ballot cannot be counted for either candidate. This involves the important and difficult question how far the statutory requirement of the mark, as the means of designating the voter’s choice, is mandatory. The form of the provision (Acts of 1889, chap. 413, sect. 23), that the voter “ shall prepare his ballot by marking in the appropriate margin or place a cross (X) opposite the name of the candidate of his choice,” does not settle the question, as such language, though in form mandatory, may be and often is construed as directory, and doubtless is to be so construed in various other provisions of this act; but there are other general considerations which seem to determine the matter. The great purpose of this act is, unquestionably, to promote the purity of the ballot, by insuring a free and intelligent expression of the voter’s choice, in secret and on the spot; and the intent of the act, so far as it concerns the question now under consideration, seems clearly to be that he shall indicate his choice by the affirmative act of marking the ballot, under the circumstances of secrecy and security against interference or molestation with which the act surrounds him at the polls ; and while it is a general rule of election law that statutes in derogation of the right to vote are ordinarily to be construed liberally in favor of the exercise of the right, it is also a settled rule that a statute is to be construed, so far as may be, in the light and in the direction of its leading and obvious purposes; and this warrants, if it does not require, in this case a somewhat stricter construction in favor of the purity, the secrecy, and the intelligence of the ballot, than has ordinarily been applied to election laws. It is to be observed also that the act imposes many other express restrictions upon the right to vote which are obviously peremptory, and which, though in derogation of the right, the Legislature must be supposed to have considered [50]*50essential to the main purposes of the act. There is no direct authority, so far as I am aware, upon the question whether the requirement of the mark is mandatory, but it is significant and is not to be overlooked that in the cases in our House of Representatives, in the English cases under the Ballot Act of 1872, the material provisions of which are substantially like our own, in the Scotch and Canadian cases and all others which have come to my notice, it seems to be assumed that the requirement of a mark of some sort, sufficient to indicate the voter’s choice, is a peremptory requirement, though there is considerable liberality of construction as to the position and character of the mark. An argument to the contrary may perhaps be drawn from section 26, which contains the only express prohibitions in the act against counting ballots, among which it is provided that “if a voter marks more names than there are persons to be elected to an office, or if for any reason it is impossible to determine the voter’s choice for any office to be filled, his ballot shall not be counted for such office.” It might be said that this makes the possibility of determining the voter’s choice, by any means, a test of the validity of the vote ; but this construction would open the door to many irregularities which the act seems carefully designed and intended to prevent and to forbid ; and under an act of this general character it does not necessarily follow, and it does not seem a reasonable construction, that every vote shall be counted if it is possible by any method to determine the voter’s choice, for the reason alone that the statute forbids a vote to be counted if it is impossible to determine the voter’s choice; especially as there are many other cases to which this language may be applied consistently with the strict observance of the requirement to mark the ballot. And the argument from section 26 appears to me to be met by the provision of section 23 that even when a voter inserts the name of a candidate not upon the ballot, thereby, as it would seem, indicating unmistakably his choice for that office, the X mark is still to be made opposite the name so inserted. From this it is clear that the act does not make or intend to make the possibility of determining the voter’s choice the sole or sufficient test of the validity of the vote.

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