Opinion No. Oag 96-76, (1976)

65 Op. Att'y Gen. 282
CourtWisconsin Attorney General Reports
DecidedNovember 26, 1976
StatusPublished

This text of 65 Op. Att'y Gen. 282 (Opinion No. Oag 96-76, (1976)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Wisconsin Attorney General Reports primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Opinion No. Oag 96-76, (1976), 65 Op. Att'y Gen. 282 (Wis. 1976).

Opinion

DR. BARBARA THOMPSON, State Superintendent Department of PublicInstruction

You ask my opinion on the following questions:

"(1) Is there authority under the constitution and laws of Wisconsin and of the United States for the state superintendent of public instruction to determine whether a school is desegregated?

"(2) May the state superintendent order compliance with desegregation procedures and take legal action to secure compliance therewith?

"(3) Is the state superintendent authorized by Wisconsin statutes to promulgate `Guidelines For Equal Educational Opportunity' as administrative rules under Chapter 227, Stats., as amended by Chapter 162, Laws of Wisconsin, 1973?

"(4) Would your answers to questions 1, 2 and 3 above be changed considering the new desegregation procedures contained in Public Law 93-380 signed August 21, 1974, Copy of which is attached?"

You indicate that these questions arise because, among other things, the Department of Public Instruction published at your predecessor's request Bulletin No. 3356 entitled "Guidelines For Equal Educational Opportunity." The bulletin sets out:

". . . methods of identifying segregative procedures . . . along with suggestions for elimination and prevention of segregation. There is also information required to be submitted by the district concerned with identifying segregative procedures and corrective action taken and future action to be taken. The procedures outlined on page 5 of the `Guidelines' require the state superintendent to determine whether the district is in compliance with the desegregation guidelines and to notify any district in noncompliance with such guidelines to prepare a plan of compliance therewith."

You further indicate that the "Guidelines" provide: *Page 284

"If there is failure to comply with the suggested guidelines on page 6 . . . the state superintendent will:

"(1) Notify in writing the United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare that, effective immediately and continuing until further notification to the contrary, said school district is in a state of noncompliance.

"(2) Notify the Wisconsin State Attorney General of the affected school district's failure or refusal to comply with these guidelines and request the Attorney General to take legal action to secure compliance."

In order to provide meaningful answers to your questions, it is appropriate to first discuss briefly the law relating to equal educational opportunity.

In Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686,98 L.Ed. 873 (1954) (Brown I), the U.S. Supreme Court held that segregation of children in public schools on the basis of race deprives minority group children of equal educational opportunities and therefore denies them equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment. This case clearly declaresde jure segregation, i.e., segregation initiated and perpetuated by a state agency, unconstitutional.

In Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 75 S.Ct. 753,99 L.Ed. 1083 (1955) (Brown II), and in Green v. County SchoolBoard, 391 U.S. 430, 88 S.Ct. 1689, 20 L.Ed.2d 716 (1968), the U.S. Supreme Court placed the burden directly on the school board to act affirmatively to eliminate segregation. In Green, which involved a southern rural school district, the court held that a plan of desegregation which merely gave the pupils a choice of schools was insufficient to eliminate a de jure dual school system. In that case the court at 391 U.S. 437-438, citing Brown II, wrote that school boards operating state compelled dual systems are "clearly charged with the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch . . . ." This affirmative obligation of local school boards was affirmed in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board ofEducation, 402 U.S. 1, 91 S.Ct. 1267, 28 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971), a case involving an urban school district. Your attention is also directed to the recent *Page 285 order of the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin in the Milwaukee School District segregation case.Kevin Armstrong, et al. v. Donald J. O'Connell, et al.,408 F. Supp. 765, 825 (1976). The obligation of state school officials to eliminate school desegregation is less well recognized. Courts have uniformly relied on local, as opposed to state, efforts to desegregate, except where state authorities had assumed virtually total control of statewide school operations, see Lee v. MaconCo. Board of Education, 267 F. Supp. 485 (M.D. Ala. 1967), or where an effective remedy for local segregative practices absolutely required the participation of state officials, seeMorgan v. Hennigan, 397 F. Supp. 410 (Mass. 1974), the Boston school desegregation case. Voluntary action by state school officials to remedy segregation in the public schools has been upheld where statutory authorization existed for them to take such steps. See, e.g., Vetere v. Allen, 15 N.Y.2d 259, 258 N.Y. So.2d 77, 206 N.E.2d 174, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 825 (1965);Booker v. Board of Education, 45 N.J. 161, 212 A.2d 1 (1965).

Since the question appears to turn on either the powers of the state superintendent or direct involvement in fostering segregation, it is necessary to examine the state Constitution and state statutes governing to see whether a duty is imposed or a right is conferred on the superintendent to eliminate segregation in the local school districts.

There is no specific statutory authority granting the state superintendent authority to investigate, make findings of law or order changes in allegedly segregated school districts. It is therefore necessary to determine whether the more general grants of power may be interpreted as permitting the state superintendent to become involved in altering the practices of segregated school districts.

Wis. Const. art. X, sec. 9, provides in part:

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Related

Brown v. Board of Education
347 U.S. 483 (Supreme Court, 1954)
Brown v. Board of Education
349 U.S. 294 (Supreme Court, 1955)
Green v. County School Board of New Kent County
391 U.S. 430 (Supreme Court, 1968)
Southard v. United States
397 F. Supp. 409 (E.D. Pennsylvania, 1975)
Amos v. Board of School Directors of City of Milwaukee
408 F. Supp. 765 (E.D. Wisconsin, 1976)
Lee v. MacOn County Board of Education
267 F. Supp. 458 (M.D. Alabama, 1967)
Booker v. Board of Education of City of Plainfield
212 A.2d 1 (Supreme Court of New Jersey, 1965)
Vetere v. Allen
206 N.E.2d 174 (New York Court of Appeals, 1965)

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