Opinion No. Oag 63-77, (1977)

66 Op. Att'y Gen. 226
CourtWisconsin Attorney General Reports
DecidedJuly 29, 1977
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 66 Op. Att'y Gen. 226 (Opinion No. Oag 63-77, (1977)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Wisconsin Attorney General Reports primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Opinion No. Oag 63-77, (1977), 66 Op. Att'y Gen. 226 (Wis. 1977).

Opinion

DOUGLAS E. BREISCH, News Director WIZM, La Crosse

Pursuant to sec. 19.98, Stats., you request my advice whether a city council can reimburse a council member for legal expenses incurred in defending an action in which such member has been charged with a violation of the open meeting law. *Page 227

I am of the opinion that no reimbursement can be made where a judgment of forfeiture is entered except in a case where the certificate of the trial judge states that the action invokes the constitutionality of a statute, not theretofore construed by a court of record, which relates to the performance of the official duties of such officer. In such latter case, payment is at the discretion of the council. Where action for forfeiture has been commenced and discontinued or dismissed or determined favorably to such officer, the city council may in its discretion pay all reasonable expenses of such officer in defense of said officer. I am of the opinion that sec. 895.35, Stats., would be applicable to a forfeiture action brought under sec. 19.96, Stats., but that sec. 895.46, Stats., would not be applicable. By reason of theexpress language of sec. 19.96, Stats., I am of the opinion that a city council could not directly pay a forfeiture incurred by a member for violation of such section and could not reimburse such member for any forfeiture incurred. The specific statute governs over the general reimbursement statute, sec. 895.35, Stats., and would govern over the other general reimbursement statute, sec.895.46(1), Stats., even if the latter were applicable to forfeiture actions; and I conclude it is not.

Section 19.96, Stats., provides in material part:

"19.96 Penalty. Any member of a governmental body who knowingly attends a meeting of such body held in violation of this subchapter, or who, in his or her official capacity, otherwise violates this subchapter by some act or omission shall forfeit without reimbursement not less than $25 nor more than $300 for each such violation . . . ." (Emphasis added.)

Section 19.97(1) and (4), Stats., provides in material part:

"(1) . . . In actions brought by the attorney general, the court shall award any forfeiture recovered together with reasonable costs to the state; and in actions brought by the district attorney, the court shall award any forfeiture recovered together with reasonable costs to the county."

"(4) If the district attorney refuses or otherwise fails to commence an action to enforce this subchapter within 20 days after receiving a verified complaint, the person making such complaint may bring an action under subs. (1) to (3) on his or her relation in the name, and on behalf, of the state. In such *Page 228 actions, the court may award actual and necessary costs of prosecution, including reasonable attorney fees to the relator if he or she prevails, but any forfeiture recovered shall be paid to the state." (Emphasis added.)

A suit to compel payment of a forfeiture is a civil action. Where not set forth in sec. 19.97(1) and (4), Stats., procedure is controlled by ch. 288, Stats. Also see State v. Roggensack,15 Wis.2d 625, 113 N.W.2d 389 (1962).

Section 895.35, Stats., would be applicable to an action against a council member for violation of the open meeting law, and provides:

"895.35 Expenses in actions against municipal and other officers. Whenever in any city, town, village, school district, vocational, technical and adult education district or county charges of any kind are filed or an action is brought against any officer thereof in his official capacity, or to subject any such officer, whether or not he is being compensated on a salary basis, to a personal liability growing out of the performance of official duties, and such charges or such action is discontinued or dismissed or such matter is determined favorably to such officer, or such officer is reinstated, or in case such officer, without fault on his part, is subjected to a personal liability as aforesaid, such city, town, village, school district, vocational, technical and adult education district or county may pay all reasonable expenses which such officer necessarily expended by reason thereof. Such expenses may likewise be paid, even though decided adversely to such officer, where it appears from the certificate of the trial judge that the action involved the constitutionality of a statute, not theretofore construed, relating to the performance of the official duties of said officer."

It is my opinion that the provision of sec. 895.46(1), Stats., would not require or authorize a city council to reimburse a member for the forfeiture or reasonable expenses incurred in the defense of a forfeiture action brought pursuant to sec. 19.96, Stats.

Section 895.46(1), Stats., is only applicable where the action or special proceeding is brought for the purpose of securing a judgment for damages. Section 895.46(1), Stats., was formerly sec. 270.58, Stats. (1973). *Page 229

In Cords v. Ehly, 62 Wis.2d 31, 37, 38, 214 N.W.2d 432 (1974), it was stated:

". . . it is clear that in enacting sec. 270.58, Stats., the legislature contemplated that state employees were subject to suit in tort under the law of Wisconsin and wished gratuitously to shield them from monetary loss in such suits.

"* * *

". . . Sec. 270.58 does not become applicable until after a judgment of liability is entered."

By the latter statement the court means that any liability on the part of the state to pay a claim for damages did not arise until after entrance of a judgment of liability on the part of the officer or employes.

A judgment imposing a forfeiture is not a judgment of damages as that term is used in sec. 895.46(1), Stats. A forfeiture does not constitute damages any more than does a criminal fine. A forfeiture, as used in sec. 19.96, Stats., and a criminal line are both in the nature of a penalty. Any forfeiture recovered under sec. 19.96, Stats., is payable, by reason of sec. 19.97(1) and (4), Stats., to the state or county. It never goes to a private person who may sue to enforce its collection.

Section 288.01, Stats., provides:

"Where a forfeiture imposed by statute shall be incurred it may be recovered in a civil action unless the act or omission is punishable by fine and imprisonment or by fine or imprisonment. The word forfeiture

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