Opinion No. Oag 39-86, (1986)

75 Op. Att'y Gen. 200
CourtWisconsin Attorney General Reports
DecidedOctober 21, 1986
StatusPublished

This text of 75 Op. Att'y Gen. 200 (Opinion No. Oag 39-86, (1986)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Wisconsin Attorney General Reports primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Opinion No. Oag 39-86, (1986), 75 Op. Att'y Gen. 200 (Wis. 1986).

Opinion

TIM CULLEN, Chairman Senate Organization Committee

As chair of the Senate Organization Committee you have requested this office's opinion on whether Wisconsin's statutes allow for-profit business corporations to charge fees for services provided by licensed professional employes. Your request includes four specific questions. These questions can best be answered after a brief explanation of the policy reasons why states have historically restricted the practice of the medical and legal professions.

In 53 Op. Att'y Gen. 35 (1964), this office stated that in general a corporation may not practice medicine, surgery or dentistry. The opinion pointed out that state statutes only permit individuals to obtain licenses to practice in these areas. 19 C.J.S. Corporations § 956 (1940) states the same general rule:

It is not within the power of a corporation to carry on the business of practicing one of the learned professions . . . .

. . . .

The lack of capacity of a corporation to practice a learned profession extends to its hiring practitioners to carry on the business of practicing for it.

This prohibition against corporate practice applies to all of the learned professions: law, medicine and dentistry. Many states have also applied this prohibition to the practice of optometry.

The number of statutes which have been construed to prohibit corporate practice of the professions and the length of time these statutes have been in effect suggest that there are some important public policy concerns behind the prohibition against corporate practice. Some reasons for prohibiting a corporation from practicing law were discussed by the court in In reEducation Law Center, Inc., 86 N.J. 124, 429 A.2d 1051, 1056-57 (1981):

[T]he relationship of confidentiality, trust and undivided loyalty which must exist between a lawyer and his client could be impaired if the lawyer is employed by a corporation . . . .

*Page 201

. . . . [T]he corporation may place its own interests, whether political goals or profits, ahead of the interests of its clients . . . .

The court also noted that corporations, unlike attorneys, are not subject to the control and discipline of state courts.

Similar concerns are the basis for prohibiting the corporate practice of medicine. For-profit corporations have traditionally been prohibited from practicing medicine because corporate control could interfere with the personal relationship between physician and patient. 61 Am Jur. 2d Physicians and Surgeons § 154 (1981). In Bartron v. Codington County, 68 S.D. 309,2 N.W.2d 337 (1942), the court concluded that contracts executed by a for-profit corporation to provide medical services were unenforceable and against public policy. The court determined that the corporate practice of medicine was against public policy because it placed "undue emphasis on mere money making, and commercial exploitation of professional services." Bartron,2 N.W.2d at 346.

The prohibition against the corporate practice of medicine includes a prohibition against the corporate practice of dentistry. In State v. Boren, 36 Wash. 2d 522, 219 P.2d 566 (1950), the court held that a corporation was illegally practicing dentistry by employing a licensed dentist. The court stated:

The general rule throughout the country is that no unlicensed person or entity may engage in the practice of medicine, surgery, or dentistry through licensed employees. . .

. . . Experience has shown that the care and treatment of the teeth requires, not only skill, but the personal relationship between dentist and patient.

Boren, 219 P.2d at 572.

In some states, the prohibition against the corporate practice of medicine has also historically prohibited the corporate practice of optometry. See Kendall v. Beiling, 295 Ky. 782,175 S.W.2d 489 (1943), and State v. Standard Optical Co. of Oregon,182 Ore. 452, 188 P.2d 309 (1947). In these states, the courts or the Legislature determined that the same important public health concerns behind regulation of medicine required that the practice of optometry be limited only to licensed individuals. *Page 202

This general historic prohibition against the corporate practice of professions was intended to protect the public, but the prohibition also had the effect of preventing professionals from taking advantage of certain benefits of corporate form. Most importantly, professionals could not benefit from federal tax treatment as a corporation. To allow professionals to obtain corporate tax benefits while at the same time preventing the perceived problems which gave rise to the historic prohibition against corporate practice by professionals, states promulgated professional service corporation statutes.

Wisconsin first promulgated a professional service corporation law in 1961. The law allowed professional persons licensed in the same field to form professional service corporations. The act specifically preserved the professionals' responsibility to patients or clients, and it expressly provided that licensing or disciplinary bodies would retain their control over professionals, despite the fact that the professionals might be corporate shareholders or employes.

A draft of section 180.99, Stats., submitted on April 15, 1961, by the State Medical Society contains an introductory note and comments which explain the purpose and function of the act:

Two points are strongly emphasized. First, the legislation is designed to do nothing more than provide a legal device which will give self employed persons the same tax treatment enjoyed since 1942 . . . by those who could qualify as "employees" under the Internal Revenue Code. Second, it is intended that service corporations authorized by such legislation not practice a profession. . . but that they serve as a convenience to shareholders so as to enable them to meet a technical and substantial tax problem. The professional . . . would continue to render service as if the corporation were not in existence, and would incur the same legal liability and continue the same contract and other relationships with the person served which have been established previously by general law.

In addition, the draft specifically recognizes the historical prohibition against the corporate practice of professions, and the introductory note refers to the prohibition as a matter of "sound public policy." It, therefore, appears that Wisconsin's service corporation law was intended to provide corporate tax benefits to professionals *Page 203

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Related

State v. Boren
219 P.2d 566 (Washington Supreme Court, 1950)
State Ex Rel. State Bar of Wisconsin v. Bonded Collections, Inc.
154 N.W.2d 250 (Wisconsin Supreme Court, 1967)
In Re Education Law Center, Inc.
429 A.2d 1051 (Supreme Court of New Jersey, 1981)
Kendall v. Beiling
175 S.W.2d 489 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976), 1943)
State Ex Rel. Sisemore v. Standard Optical Co.
188 P.2d 309 (Oregon Supreme Court, 1947)
Bartron v. Codington County
2 N.W.2d 337 (South Dakota Supreme Court, 1942)
Nelson v. Smith
154 P.2d 634 (Utah Supreme Court, 1944)
State Ex Rel. Harris v. Kindy Optical Co.
292 N.W. 283 (Wisconsin Supreme Court, 1940)
United Calendar Manufacturing Corp. v. Huang
94 A.D.2d 176 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1983)

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