Opinion No. Oag 36-76, (1976)

65 Op. Att'y Gen. 102
CourtWisconsin Attorney General Reports
DecidedJune 23, 1976
StatusPublished

This text of 65 Op. Att'y Gen. 102 (Opinion No. Oag 36-76, (1976)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Wisconsin Attorney General Reports primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Opinion No. Oag 36-76, (1976), 65 Op. Att'y Gen. 102 (Wis. 1976).

Opinion

BRUCE E. SCHROEDER, District Attorney, Kenosha County

You ask whether judges and court commissioners have power, prior to the filing of a criminal complaint, to release on bail persons arrested for commission of a felony.

I have concluded that they do.

In order to act in criminal proceedings judicial officers must have jurisdiction both of the subject matter and of the person of the defendant. Cf. State v. Weidner (1970), 47 Wis.2d 321, 323,324, 177 N.W.2d 69.

Jurisdiction of the subject matter is the power to hear and determine matters of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong. Id., 324. That power derives from the constitution and statutes of this state. Id., 325.

Section 969.03 (1), Stats., grants to judges1 the power to release on bail a "defendant charged with a felony." Section969.02 (1), Stats., similarly provides that a "judge may release a defendant charged with a misdemeanor . . ." *Page 103

On first reading these statutes might seem to empower judicial officers to hear and determine requests for release on bail only after an arrestee has been formally charged by complaint or other process with a crime of a particular grade.

In the criminal law, however, "charge" can mean an accusation or oral charge as well as a formal complaint, indictment or information. Black's Law Dictionary (Rev. 4th Ed.), "charge," pp. 294, 295. It is apparent from the bail provisions as a whole that, as used in the above subsections, "charged" means an accusation or oral charge as well as a formal complaint, indictment or information.

Both statutes establishing the power of judicial officers to release on bail further provide in part that

"Once bail has been given and a charge is pending or is thereafter filed or transferred to another court, the latter court shall continue the original bail in that court subject to s. 969.08." (Emphasis added.) Secs. 969.02 (3) and 969.03 (2), Stats.

The legislature thus contemplated and dealt with the situation in which the charge is filed after bail has been given. This indicates an intent that bail is proper prior to the filing of charges.

Additional evidence of such intent is found in sec. 969.01 (1), Stats., which mandates that:

"Before conviction, a defendant arrested for a criminal offense shall be admitted to bail, except as provided in s. 971.14 (1)." (Emphasis added.)

The supreme court has indicated, albeit in dictum, that an accused otherwise entitled to bail is entitled to bail upon his arrest. Gaertner v. State (1967), 35 Wis.2d 159 165,150 N.W.2d 370. It would be anomalous if an accused were entitled to be admitted to bail on arrest but no judicial officer had power to admit to bail prior to a complaint being filed where the arrest is effected without a complaint-based warrant. See gen. sec.968.04 (1) (a), Stats.

Statutes should be construed to avoid such anomalies, and to accomplish the object of the bail provisions, see gen. Ortman v.Jensen and Johnson, Inc. (1975), 66 Wis.2d 508, 520,225 N.W.2d 635. The phrase "charged with a felony," or misdemeanor, in *Page 104 the statutes establishing the power of judicial officers to set bail, must be construed to mean, not formally charged, but simply, in accord with an accused's right to bail, "arrested for a criminal offense," i.e., accused or orally charged with a crime, of the specified grade.

Since the legislature intended that bail could be given prior to the filing of charges, it follows that it also intended that judicial officers have power, prior to the filing of charges, to set bail, and release a defendant informally charged with, i.e., arrested for, a felony. Cf. Hoeffner v. United States (8th Cir. 1898), 87 F. 185, 187, 30 C.C.A. 60; 8 C.J.S., Bail, sec. 39b (4), p. 107.

Failure to file a complaint does not otherwise affect a judicial officer's subject matter jurisdiction, derived from statute. Gaertner v. State, supra, 164.

Personal jurisdiction attaches in a criminal proceeding when an accused appears before a judicial officer voluntarily or pursuant to a properly issued warrant or summons, or is lawfully arrested without warrant. Cf. State v. Chabonian (1972), 55 Wis.2d 723,726, 201 N.W.2d 25; sec. 968.04 (1), (2), Stats.

When a defendant is arrested on a warrant or summons, a complaint already will have been filed, and the question of jurisdiction you present will not arise, see secs. 968.02 (2) and968.04 (1), (2), Stats. Lack of probable cause for arrest goes to the question of jurisdiction over the person. Thus, if there is lack of probable cause a problem of jurisdiction over the person might arise. See Lampkins v. State (1971), 51 Wis.2d 564, 570,187 N.W.2d 164; State ex rel. La Follette v. Raskin (1966),30 Wis.2d 39, 45, 139 N.W.2d 667.

A complaint plays no part in the attachment of personal jurisdiction when the arrest is effected without a warrant. SeePillsbury v. State (1966), 31 Wis.2d 87, 91, 92, 142 N.W.2d 187; sec. 968.04 (1) (a), Stats. Nor does it play any part when personal jurisdiction is acquired by the voluntary appearance of the accused. Failure to file a complaint in these situations, therefore, is immaterial to the judicial officer's acquisition of jurisdiction of the person of the accused.

"Bail is the by-product of custody. The power to admit to bail is inherent in the court so long as the prisoner is in its custody." State v. Chisholm (1971), 29 Conn. Sup. 339, 287 A.2d 389, 390.

*Page 105

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Related

Pillsbury v. State
142 N.W.2d 187 (Wisconsin Supreme Court, 1966)
State Ex Rel. La Follette v. Raskin
139 N.W.2d 667 (Wisconsin Supreme Court, 1966)
Gaertner v. State
150 N.W.2d 370 (Wisconsin Supreme Court, 1967)
State v. Chabonian
201 N.W.2d 25 (Wisconsin Supreme Court, 1972)
Ortman v. Jensen & Johnson, Inc.
225 N.W.2d 635 (Wisconsin Supreme Court, 1975)
State v. Weidner
177 N.W.2d 69 (Wisconsin Supreme Court, 1970)
Whitty v. State
149 N.W.2d 557 (Wisconsin Supreme Court, 1967)
Lampkins v. State
187 N.W.2d 164 (Wisconsin Supreme Court, 1971)
State v. Chisolm
287 A.2d 389 (Connecticut Superior Court, 1971)
Hoeffner v. United States
87 F. 185 (Eighth Circuit, 1898)

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