Opinion No. Oag 19-75, (1975)

64 Op. Att'y Gen. 49
CourtWisconsin Attorney General Reports
DecidedJune 23, 1975
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 64 Op. Att'y Gen. 49 (Opinion No. Oag 19-75, (1975)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Wisconsin Attorney General Reports primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Opinion No. Oag 19-75, (1975), 64 Op. Att'y Gen. 49 (Wis. 1975).

Opinion

THE HONORABLE, THE ASSEMBLY Legislature

By 1975 Assembly Resolution 27, you have requested my opinion whether the Secretary of State has authority to issue the proposed rules relating to the administration of the Wisconsin lobbying laws which were submitted to members of appropriate standing committees of the legislature on April 30, 1975, pursuant to sec. 227.018 (2), Stats.

As a constitutional officer, the Secretary of State has certain duties which are prescribed by the Constitution and set forth in Art. VI, sec. 2, Wis. Const. The same section provides that ". . . He shall perform such other duties as shall be assigned him by law . . . ." As head of his department, sec. 15.04 (1), Stats., empowers him to "plan, direct, co-ordinate and execute the functions vested in his department." Section 14.361, Stats., provides that the office of Secretary of State shall have the program responsibilities specified under subch. III of ch. 13, Stats., which is concerned with regulation of lobbying.

Every administrative agency must conform precisely to statutes from which it derives its power. Mid-Plains Tel. Inc. v. P.S.C. (1973), 56 Wis.2d 780, 202 N.W.2d 907 As an administrative officer, the Secretary of State has only those powers which are expressly granted by the Constitution or statute or which are necessarily implied. State ex rel. Martin v. Zimmerman (1939),233 Wis. 16, 20, 288 N.W. 454; American Brass Co. v. State Bd. ofHealth (1944), 245 Wis. 440, 15 N.W.2d 27.

With the exception of the power to hold hearings under sec.13.63 (1), Stats., on the denial of applications for lobby licenses, *Page 50 the responsibilities of the Secretary of State with respect to the administration of the lobby laws (secs. 13.60-13.73, Stats.) are, in large part, ministerial. This is in keeping with the primarily ministerial character of the office and its duties. See sec. 14.361, Stats.; State ex rel. Martin v. Zimmerman (1939),233 Wis. 16, 17, 288 N.W. 454; State ex rel. Attorney General v.Cunningham (1892), 81 Wis. 440, 486, 51 N.W. 774. As an officer with ministerial duties, the Secretary of State has powers considerably narrower than those of an officer invested with broad responsibilities requiring the exercise of discretion.

Section 13.63 (1), Stats., however, does provide that the Secretary of State shall provide a form of application for license, prescribes fees for such licenses and secs. 13.60-13.73, Stats., do provide for the filing of certain reports and statements by lobbyists and their principals. These sections and sec. 227.014 (2), Stats., would permit the Secretary of State to adopt standard forms to aid in his administration of the statutes and to promulgate rules to interpret provisions of the statutes which might otherwise be unclear. Section 227.08, Stats., requires the Secretary of State to adopt rules of procedure for any necessary hearings. The proposed rules do not cover the latter subject matter.

Section 227.014 (1), (2), Stats., provide in part:

"Extent to which the administrative procedure act confers rule-making authority. (1) Except as provided in sub. (2) and s. 227.08 . . . nothing in this chapter confers rule-making authority upon or augments the rule-making authority of any agency.

"(2) Rule-making authority hereby is expressly conferred as follows:

"(a) Each agency is authorized to adopt such rules interpreting the provisions of statutes enforced or administered by it as it considers to be necessary to effectuate the purpose of the statutes, but such rules are not valid if they exceed the bounds of correct interpretation.

"(b) Each agency is authorized to prescribe such forms and procedures in connection with statutes to be enforced or administered by it as it considers to be necessary to effectuate the purpose of the statutes, but nothing in this paragraph *Page 51 authorizes the imposition of substantive requirements in connection with such forms or procedures." (Emphasis added.)

Section 227.013, Stats., provides:

"FORMS. A form which imposes requirements which are within the definition of a rule shall be treated as a rule for the purpose of this chapter, except that:

"(1) Its adoption, amendment or repeal need not be preceded by notice and public hearing; and

"(2) It need not be adopted, amended or repealed by the board or officer charged with ultimate rule-making authority but may be adopted, amended or repealed by any employe of the agency to whom such board or officer has delegated the authority; and

"(3) It need not be published in the administrative code or register in its entirety, but may be listed by title or similar description together with a statement as to how it may be obtained."

By reason of sec. 227.01 (5) (j), (q), Stats., a rule is not involved where the action of the agency:

"(j) Relates to the form and content of reports, records, or accounts of state, county or municipal officers, institutions or agencies;

"* * *

"(q) Is a form the content or substantive requirements of which are prescribed by a rule or a statute;"

The adoption of forms and the promulgation of rules are subject to certain limitations. The forms or procedures adopted cannot impose substantive requirements beyond those included in the relevant statute. Rules must be limited to correct interpretation of provisions of statutes which need interpretation to effectuate the purpose of such statutes but cannot impose substantive requirements which are broader than the statutory language.

State v. Grayson (1958), 5 Wis.2d 203, 92 N.W.2d 272 contains an example of proper use of the rule-making power. The *Page 52 Chiropractic Examining Board was charged with the duty of licensing and regulating chiropractors, but the legislature had failed to define the term "chiropractic." The board proceeded to do so under sec. 227.014 (2) (a), Stats. The court held that it was proper for the board to adopt the rule to effectuate the purpose of the statutes and that the definition adopted did not exceed the bounds of correct interpretation.

Where the provisions of a statute are clear and unambiguous, however, so that the intent of the legislature is clear, there is no need for interpreting such provisions by rule. Proper interpretation does not in any event permit the addition of substantive requirements.

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Related

Opinion No. Oag 52-78, (1978)
67 Op. Att'y Gen. 193 (Wisconsin Attorney General Reports, 1978)

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