Opinion No. Oag 17-85, (1985)

74 Op. Att'y Gen. 78
CourtWisconsin Attorney General Reports
DecidedMay 9, 1985
StatusPublished

This text of 74 Op. Att'y Gen. 78 (Opinion No. Oag 17-85, (1985)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Wisconsin Attorney General Reports primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Opinion No. Oag 17-85, (1985), 74 Op. Att'y Gen. 78 (Wis. 1985).

Opinion

LA VERNE AUSMAN, Secretary Department of Agriculture, Trade andConsumer Protection

You ask whether the Land Conservation Board (Board) may revoke or rescind an exclusive agricultural zoning ordinance certification previously granted under sections 91.06 and 91.78, Stats., and inquire as to the procedure which should be followed if the Board has such power.

In my opinion, the Board has authority to prospectively revoke or rescind a certification granted under sections 91.06 and91.78, if the Board provides notice and an opportunity to be heard to the local governing body having jurisdiction and to landowners who might be affected by such a decertification decision.

Pursuant to chapter 91, the Board, which is created under section 15.135(4), certifies county agricultural preservation plans and exclusive agricultural zoning ordinances enacted by local units of government. Such certifications affect the amount of the farmland *Page 79 preservation tax credit determined by the Department of Revenue pursuant to section 71.09(11). The Board also possesses certain appellate functions which are not at issue here. Chapter 91 also grants extensive powers to the Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer Protection (Department) in connection with the administration of the Farmland Preservation Act. In general, the Department possesses administrative and fact-gathering powers which are to be used to assist the Board in performing its decision-making functions.

You indicate that the Board and the Department have recently become aware that two exclusive agricultural zoning ordinances which the Board has certified under sections 91.06 and 91.78 have been amended so as to remove large tracts of land from exclusive agricultural zoning status. This information, presumably acquired pursuant to section 91.77(3), indicates that a majority of the land formerly zoned exclusive agricultural has been rezoned to other classifications. You indicate that, based upon the information acquired, the two zoning ordinances apparently no longer meet the standards contained in section 91.75 and, therefore, could not have been certified by the Board in whole or in part had the entire zoning ordinances initially been submitted to the Board in their present form. You therefore inquire as to the Board's power to remedy such situations.

Your inquiry arises under subchapter V of the Farmland Preservation Act, which is entitled "Exclusive Agricultural Zoning." Section 91.78 of that subchapter provides that "COPIES OF EXCLUSIVE AGRICULTURAL ZONING ORDINANCES MAY BE SUBMITTED TO THE BOARD FOR REVIEW AND CERTIFICATION UNDER s. 91.06."

Section 91.06 provides as follows:

Certification. The board shall review farmland preservation plans and exclusive agricultural use zoning ordinances submitted to it under ss. 91.61 and 91.78 and shall certify to the appropriate zoning authority whether the plans and ordinances meet the standards of subchs. IV and V, respectively. Certifications may be in whole or in part.

The minimum standards which are to be applied by the Board in deciding whether to certify an exclusive agricultural zoning ordinance are contained in section 91.75. Under various provisions contained in section 71.09(11)(b)3., an exclusive agricultural zoning *Page 80 ordinance certification must be in effect "at the close of the year for which credit is claimed" to entitle the land owner to a property tax credit under section 71.09(11)(b)2. in connection with such certification.

Rezoning is covered by section 91.77, which provides as follows:

Ordinance revisions. (1) A county, city, village or town may approve petitions for rezoning areas zoned for exclusive agricultural use only after findings are made based upon consideration of the following:

(a) Adequate public facilities to accommodate development either exist or will be provided within a reasonable time.

(b) Provision of public facilities to accommodate development will not place an unreasonable burden on the ability of affected local units of government to provide them.

(c) The land proposed for rezoning is suitable for development and development will not result in undue water or air pollution, cause unreasonable soil erosion or have an unreasonably adverse effect on rare or irreplaceable natural areas.

(2) Land which is rezoned under this section shall be subject to the lien provided under s. 91.19(8) to (10) for the amount of tax credits paid on the land rezoned. If the rezoning occurs solely as a result of action initiated by a governmental unit, any lien required under s. 91.19(8) to (10) shall be paid by the governmental unit initiating the action.

(3) The department shall be notified of all rezonings under this section.

Your inquiry requires an analysis of the inter-relationship between the certification provisions of sections 91.06 and 91.78, the tax credit provisions of section 71.09(11)(b)3. and the rezoning provisions of section 91.77. Such an analysis is required because section 91.06 does not specifically state that ordinance revisions submitted to the Department pursuant to section 91.77(3) may be considered by the Board in making certification decisions.

The powers that may be exercised by the Board include not only those powers expressly granted by statute, but also those powers necessarily implied as essential to the accomplishment of its duties. See Kasik v. Janssen, 158 Wis. 606, 609-10, 149 N.W. 398 (1914). For example, it has long been held that the power to correct clerical *Page 81 errors which plainly appear of record is a necessary power in the administration of every agency. Bell v. Hearne et al., 60 U.S. 614 (1856). The United States Supreme Court has stated that:

To hold otherwise would be to say that once an error has occurred the [agency] is powerless to take remedial steps . . . . In fact, the presence of authority in administrative officers and tribunals to correct such errors has long been recognized — probably so well recognized that little discussion has ensued in the reported cases.

American Trucking Ass'n v. Frisco Transp. Co., 358 U.S. 133, 145 (1958) (footnote omitted). Although policy considerations similar to those identified by the Supreme Court in American Trucking

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74 Op. Att'y Gen. 78, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/opinion-no-oag-17-85-1985-wisag-1985.