Opinion No. Oag 15-90, (1990)

79 Op. Att'y Gen. 89
CourtWisconsin Attorney General Reports
DecidedApril 24, 1990
StatusPublished

This text of 79 Op. Att'y Gen. 89 (Opinion No. Oag 15-90, (1990)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Wisconsin Attorney General Reports primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Opinion No. Oag 15-90, (1990), 79 Op. Att'y Gen. 89 (Wis. 1990).

Opinion

DARWIN L. ZWIEG, District Attorney, Clark County

You ask whether the Clark County Sheriff's Department may, when evaluating an individual for the position of reserve officer, consider information in the possession of the sheriff's department concerning the individual's "juvenile record." Your question is answered by the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act (the "WFEA").

The WFEA prohibits an employer from requesting an applicant to provide information regarding the applicant's "arrest record," except a record of a pending charge. Sec. 111.335 (1)(a), Stats. The WFEA also prohibits an employer from refusing to employ an individual because of an arrest record, unless the circumstances of a pending charge against the individual substantially relate to the circumstances of the particular job. Secs. 111.322 (1) and 111.335 (1)(b), Stats. The term "arrest record" includes, but is not limited to, "information indicating that an individual has been questioned, apprehended, taken into custody or detention, held for investigation, arrested, charged with, indicted or tried for any felony, misdemeanor or other offense pursuant to any law enforcement . . . authority." Sec. 111.32 (1), Stats. The term "arrest record" does not distinguish between juvenile and adult individuals. Id.

The WFEA prohibits an employer from refusing to employ an individual because of a conviction record unless the circumstances of the offense substantially relate to the circumstances of the job. Secs. 111.322 (1) and 111.335 (1)(c)1., Stats. The term "conviction record" specifically includes *Page 90 information that an individual "has been adjudicated delinquent." Sec. 111.32 (3), Stats.

Considering the prohibition against arrest record discrimination first, and assuming that the sheriff's department refuses to employ an individual because of information in the possession of the sheriff's department concerning the individual's "juvenile record," the initial inquiry is whether the individual has been denied employment because of an "arrest record." Although the term "arrest record" does not expressly apply to juveniles, the requirement that the WFEA be "liberally construed," section111.31 (3), suggests that juveniles receive the same protection as adults. If the sheriff's department would refuse to employ an individual because of information in its possession which indicates that the individual "has been questioned, apprehended, taken into custody or detention, held for investigation, [or] arrested . . . for any . . . offense," then the sheriff's department would commit an act of unlawful arrest record discrimination. On the other hand, if the sheriff's department refuses to employ the individual because it concludes from its own investigation and questioning of the individual or others that the individual has committed an offense, City of Onalaska v. LIRC, 120 Wis.2d 363,367, 354 N.W.2d 223 (Ct.App. 1984), and not merely because of the fact of the individual's "arrest record," then the sheriff's department does not act unlawfully.

In City of Onalaska, the court of appeals reasoned that because a discharge based on information that an individual has been arrested by a law enforcement agency relies upon an assertion by another person or entity, an employer does not rely on information that the individual has been arrested (and therefore does not act unlawfully) when it discharges the individual because the employer concludes from its own investigation and questioning of the individual that he or she has committed an offense. Although City of Onalaska may be read narrowly as protecting an employer from a finding of arrest record discrimination only where the employer conducts its own investigation of an individual's conduct and only where it *Page 91 questions the individual about such conduct, it is my opinion that the employer is protected if it bases its employment decision on the individual's conduct (as opposed to the individual's status as an arrested person), even if the employer bases its conclusion concerning the individual's conduct upon information which the employer receives from others (even including law enforcement agencies). The purpose of the WFEA prohibition against arrest record discrimination is to protect individuals from employment discrimination based upon the stigma of an arrest record per se,cf. Miller Brewing Co. v. ILHR Department, 103 Wis.2d 496,504, 308 N.W.2d 922 (Ct.App. 1981); it was not intended to prevent an employer from reaching its own conclusion as to whether the employe engaged in the conduct underlying the charge and from basing employment decisions upon such conclusion. Thus, my opinion that the sheriff's department acts unlawfully if it refuses to employ an individual because of that individual's "arrest record" status, and that it does not act unlawfully if its refusal is based on the underlying conduct, applies equally to the situation where the information in the possession of the sheriff's department concerning the individual's "juvenile record" results from the sheriff's department's own investigation or from records obtained from another law enforcement agency pursuant to section 48.396 (1).

Where the "arrest record" involves a pending charge, the sheriff's department may inquire about the charge and may refuse to employ an individual if the circumstances of the pending charge substantially relate to the circumstances of the particular job. Sec. 111.335 (1)(b), Stats. I note, parenthetically, that law enforcement agencies have access to juvenile records under section 48.396 which is unavailable to most other employers, and that law enforcement agencies (as employers) therefore may determine the existence and circumstances of pending charges *Page 92 (and, for that matter, adjudications of delinquency) where other employers would be barred from acquiring the same information. Although the Legislature, in the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act, envisioned an employer's right to inquire about pending charges (and convictions), Miller Brewing Co., 103 Wis.2d at 504, this inequality between law enforcement agencies and other employers undoubtedly reflects a balancing of employers' rights and the necessity of confidentiality in the administration of the juvenile justice system. State ex rel. Herget v. Waukesha Co. Cir. Ct.,84 Wis.2d 435, 451, 267 N.W.2d 309 (1978). An individual, however, who falsely denies the existence of a pending charge (or an adjudication of delinquency) on an employment application or other pre-employment inquiry may be terminated lawfully for the falsification and may even be denied unemployment compensation.

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Related

County of Milwaukee v. Labor & Industry Review Commission
407 N.W.2d 908 (Wisconsin Supreme Court, 1987)
City of Onalaska v. State Labor & Industry Review Commission
354 N.W.2d 223 (Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 1984)
Miller Brewing Co. v. Department of Industry, Labor & Human Relations
308 N.W.2d 922 (Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 1981)
State Ex Rel. Herget v. Circuit Court for Waukesha County
267 N.W.2d 309 (Wisconsin Supreme Court, 1978)

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79 Op. Att'y Gen. 89, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/opinion-no-oag-15-90-1990-wisag-1990.