Opinion No. Oag 12-85, (1985)

74 Op. Att'y Gen. 59
CourtWisconsin Attorney General Reports
DecidedApril 11, 1985
StatusPublished

This text of 74 Op. Att'y Gen. 59 (Opinion No. Oag 12-85, (1985)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Wisconsin Attorney General Reports primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Opinion No. Oag 12-85, (1985), 74 Op. Att'y Gen. 59 (Wis. 1985).

Opinion

TIMOTHY F. CULLEN, Chairperson Senate Organization Committee

You have requested my opinion on several questions regarding the acquisition of mineral interests by counties in tax delinquency proceedings. You first ask whether a county acquires the mineral interests in property in tax delinquency proceedings in two instances: (a) where one person owns both the surface and mineral rights; and (b) where one person owns the land's surface and, by reservation or separate conveyance, another person owns the mineral interests in the same land. If the answer to (b) is yes, you further ask whether a county's acquisition of such mineral interests in a tax delinquency proceeding without any notice to the owner of such interests constitutes a deprivation of due process of law. Finally, you ask whether section 70.32(1). Stats., is determinative of the treatment of severed mineral interests in tax delinquency proceedings, or is at odds with the ownership of a mineral interest as a fee simple estate, particularly in light of the provisions of 1983 Wisconsin Act 455, which deals with the preservation or lapse of such interest.

Your first question has already been addressed and answered by this office in several prior opinions. Those opinions have guided the decisional processes of local tax authorities without dissenting voice, either legislative or judicial, for many years. Based on those *Page 60 opinions, the answer to your first question in both instances (a) and (b) is yes. In tax delinquency proceedings, a county acquires fee simple title to land, including mineral interests therein, whether severed or not.

In 25 Op. Att'y Gen. 630 (1936), an opinion which relied in part on section 70.32(1), the general statute dealing with the valuation of real estate, the attorney general concluded that, with certain noted exceptions, where ownership of the surface of lands and the ownership of the minerals underneath are in different persons, it is very doubtful that the law permits the separate assessment of the mineral rights. Other opinions have generally concluded that when the county acquires title to lands either by a tax deed issued pursuant to section 75.14 or by a judgment in a foreclosure in rem proceeding under section 75.521, the reservation of mineral rights by a former owner is cut off and the title of the county is no longer subject to such reservation. 49 Op. Att'y Gen. 77 (1960); 49 Op. Att'y Gen. 130 (1960). Although the above opinions made no reference to mineral interests severed by separate conveyance, the necessary implication is that such opinions apply to severed mineral interests in general.

The latter opinions rest in part on the general proposition that: "The law is well settled that a valid tax deed cuts off all former titles and liens. Sec. 75.14(1), Stats.; XX Op. Att'y Gen. 409; Jarvis v. Peck, 19 Wis.* 74; Cole v. Van Ostrand,131 Wis. 454, 465; Doherty v. Rice, 240 Wis. 389." 35 Op. Att'y Gen. 429 (1946). By virtue of sections 75.14(1) and 75.36(2), a county acquires an "absolute estate in fee simple in such land subject, however, to all unpaid taxes and charges which are a lien thereon . . . ." As discussed in Leciejewski v. Sedlak,110 Wis.2d 337, 348, 329 N.W.2d 233 (Ct.App. 1983):

It has been held that the effect of a tax deed is not limited to passing that person's title in whose name the land was taxed, but is to divest all interests in the land and to vest in the grantee an independent and paramount title. [Citation.] A tax title does not connect itself with the previous chain of title, but breaks up all previous titles. [Citation.] A tax deed is not derivative, but creates a new title that extinguishes all former titles and liens not expressly exempted from its operation. [Citations.]

*Page 61

See also Leciejewski v. Sedlak, 116 Wis.2d 629, 639,342 N.W.2d 734 (1984); In Matter of Foreclosure of Tax Liens,106 Wis.2d 244, 251-52, 316 N.W.2d 362 (1982). Similarly, under section75.521, a foreclosure judgment vests in the county a fee simple absolute and cuts off any "right, title, interest, claim, lien or equity of redemption . . ." of any person in the land. Sec.75.521(8), Stats. Such a provision is inconsistent with the idea that foreclosure may grant a county good title as to one person but not as to another. In Matter of Foreclosure of Tax Liens,106 Wis.2d at 252; Leciejewski, 110 Wis.2d at 347. Section75.521(13)(b) contains a virtually identical provision applying to the judgment entered in any contested foreclosure in rem proceeding. See 62 Op. Att'y Gen. 234 (1973).

Your second question inquires as to the due process rights of the owner of a mineral interest to notice of the taking of that interest through tax delinquency proceedings.

The answer to your second question requires an examination of 1983 Wisconsin Act 455 and the recent decision in Mennonite Bd.of Missions v. Adams, 103 S. Ct. 2706 (1983), regarding notice in tax delinquency proceedings. 1983 Wisconsin Act 455 requires that severed mineral interests be registered or otherwise used within specified time periods. If the mineral interests are not registered or otherwise used, they lapse. Newly created section706.01(7m) reads:

"Interest in minerals" means any fee simple interest in minerals beneath the surface of the land which is:

(a) Separate from the fee simple interest in the surface of the land; and

(b) Created by an instrument transferring, granting, assigning or reserving the minerals.

This legislation is in accord with the Wisconsin Supreme Court's recognition that mineral rights are an interest in land which may be created or transferred as any other estate in land. Chicago N.W. Transp. Co. v. Pedersen, 80 Wis.2d 566 259 N.W.2d 316 (1977).

1983 Wisconsin Act 455 provides for the recording of mineral interest claims to reflect an estate separate from the surface fee. Newly created section 706.057(7) provides:

Upon receipt of a statement of claim . . . [under that section] in the office of the register of deeds, the register of deeds shall record the claim in a manner which will permit the existence of *Page 62

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Related

Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.
339 U.S. 306 (Supreme Court, 1950)
Schroeder v. City of New York
371 U.S. 208 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams
462 U.S. 791 (Supreme Court, 1983)
Chicago & North Western Transportation Co. v. Pedersen
259 N.W.2d 316 (Wisconsin Supreme Court, 1977)
Leciejewski v. Sedlak
342 N.W.2d 734 (Wisconsin Supreme Court, 1984)
Leciejewski v. Sedlak
329 N.W.2d 233 (Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 1982)
(1973)
62 Op. Att'y Gen. 234 (Wisconsin Attorney General Reports, 1973)
Doherty v. Rice
3 N.W.2d 734 (Wisconsin Supreme Court, 1942)
Potts v. Cooley
8 N.W. 153 (Wisconsin Supreme Court, 1881)
Cole v. Van Ostrand
110 N.W. 884 (Wisconsin Supreme Court, 1907)
Schmidt v. Town of Almon
194 N.W. 168 (Wisconsin Supreme Court, 1923)

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