Opinion No. 76-145 (1976) Ag

CourtOklahoma Attorney General Reports
DecidedMarch 25, 1976
StatusPublished

This text of Opinion No. 76-145 (1976) Ag (Opinion No. 76-145 (1976) Ag) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Oklahoma Attorney General Reports primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Opinion No. 76-145 (1976) Ag, (Okla. Super. Ct. 1976).

Opinion

SCHOOL DISTRICTS — BOND ISSUES SPECIFICITY AS TO PROJECTS UPON WHICH BOND PROCEEDS ARE TO BE EXPENDED The language of Article X, Section 26 of the Oklahoma Constitution does not legally bind school districts to specific projects for which the monies of a bond issue must be expended, and Tulsa School District No. 1 was not bound by the language of the special bond election conducted November 4, 1969, to expend the bond proceeds on specific projects. However, official acts of a school board as reflected in resolutions and minutes of the board leading up to and inhering in the bond election can be relied on as disclosing the purposes for which the funds are to be used and be binding on the school board. A school board may issue school bonds for a more specific purpose or project than those enumerated in Article X, Section 26 of the Constitution, provided the specific purpose or project falls within the general purposes provided by law. Pursuant to Enrolled House Bill No. 1172, Second Regular Session. Thirty-fifth Oklahoma Legislature, effective January 1, 1977, school boards will be required to specify in the call of election for a bond issue the purposes and specific projects for which 70 percent of the bond proceeds are to be expended. The Attorney General has considered your request for an opinion wherein you ask the following questions: "1. Does the language of Article X, Section 26 the Oklahoma Constitution legally bind school districts to specific projects for which the monies of a bond issue must be expended, and, specifically was Tulsa Independent District No. 1 bound to particular projects within the language of the special bond election conducted November 4, 1969? "2. May a school board issue school bonds for a more specific purpose than that provided in Section 26? "3. Does any action, communication, statement, pledge or promise by the governing board of a school district legally bind said board to specific projects if a bond issue is voted and the ballot contains the general purposes set out in Section 26?" Article X, Section 26 of the Oklahoma Constitution makes provision for political subdivisions to become indebted in an amount exceeding the revenue produced for that year and provides, in part: "Except as herein otherwise provided, no county, city, town, township, school district, or other political corporation, or subdivision of the state, shall be allowed to become indebted, in any manner, or for any purpose, to an amount exceeding, in any year, the income and revenue provided for such year without the assent of three-fifths of the voters thereof, voting at an election, to be held for that purpose, nor, in cases requiring such assent, shall any indebtedness be allowed to be incurred to an amount, including existing indebtedness, in the aggregate exceeding five percent (5%) of the valuation of the taxable property therein, to be ascertained from the last assessment for state and county purposes previous to the incurring of such indebtedness: Provided, that if a school district has an absolute need therefor, such district may, with the assent of three-fifths of the voters thereof voting at an election to be held for that purpose, incur indebtedness to an amount, including existing indebtedness,.in the aggregate exceeding five percent (5%) but not exceeding ten percent (10%) of the valuation of the taxable property therein, to be ascertained from the last assessment for state and county purposes previous to the incurring of such indebtedness, for the purpose of acquiring or improving school sites, constructing, repairing, remodeling, or equipping buildings, or acquiring school furniture, fixtures or equipment; and such assent to such indebtedness shall be deemed to be a sufficient showing of such absolute need, unless provided by law . . . ." (Emphasis added) Title 70 O.S. 15-101 [70-15-101] (1971), provides in pertinent part: "Whenever it shall become necessary for the board of education of any school district to raise sufficient funds for the purchase of a school site or sites, or to erect or purchase and equip a suitable school building or buildings, either or both, or for the purpose of making repairs to an existing school building or buildings, or for the purchase of school furniture and fixtures, or for making improvements to any school site or sites, either or both, it shall be lawful for such board of education to borrow money for which it is hereby authorized and empowered to issue bonds . . . ." Section 70 O.S. 15-106 [70-15-106] of Title 70 provides, in part: "Any school district that is authorized by law to provide transportation for pupils to and from school may become indebted for the purpose of purchasing transportation equipment and may issue its bonds, as hereinbefore provided, in any amount not exceeding, with existing indebtedness, ten percent (10%) of the valuation of the taxable property within said school district as shown by the last preceding assessment for state and country purposes previous to the incurring of such indebtedness . . ." (Emphasis added) It is apparent that school districts are authorized to issue general obligation bonds for the enumerated purposes set out above. In your request for an opinion you relate that your first question concerns itself with a fact situation wherein a school district utilizes in the ballot title proposition one or more of the general purposes authorized by law. Your inquiry is whether the school district is bound to a more specific project or purpose than that approved by the voters. You inquire specifically in your request about the purpose clause language contained in the ballot title submitted to and approved by the voters in Independent School District No. 1, Tulsa County, on November 4, 1969. Being required by 62 O.S. 13 [62-13] (1971), to approve the legality of said bond issue, the records of the Attorney General reveal that said issue was approved by the Attorney General on January 28, 1970, and that the ballot title contained the following purpose clause: ". . . for the purpose of acquiring or improving school sites, constructing, repairing, remodeling, or equipping buildings, or acquiring school furniture, fixtures or equipment, either or both, and all or any of said purposes, . . ." In authorizing the school district to become indebted by the issuance of bonds for said purposes, the voters did not limit the school board to expending said money on any specific projects. Pursuant to such a purpose clause a school board may properly expend the bond proceeds for any specific project which it deems necessary, provided such project falls within the general purposes set forth in the purpose clause. Such determination, however, is not without limitation. As stated by the Court in Johnson v. City of Muskogee, 194 Okl. 513 (1944): "The decisions of this court have been uniform in approving bond elections and bond issues (1) where the purpose was a legitimate municipal function; (2) where that purpose was plainly stated in the election proclamation, and (3) where legal formalities were observed. Extraneous evidence has not been allowed to overcome the purpose expressed in the formal proceedings. This does not mean that constitutional limitations on the use of the money thus raised can be ignored. Those decisions stand for the rule that the purpose stated in the bond election proclamation, manifested elsewhere in the transcript, was accorded the status of good faith. If it should thereafter be attempted to use the money for purposes that were violative of this stated purpose appropriate remedies are available." Article X, Section

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Related

Johnson v. City of Muskogee
1944 OK 246 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1944)
Reid v. City of Muskogee
1929 OK 231 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1929)
Borin v. City of Erick
1942 OK 144 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1942)
Sooner State Water, Inc. v. Town of Allen
1964 OK 202 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1964)

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Bluebook (online)
Opinion No. 76-145 (1976) Ag, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/opinion-no-76-145-1976-ag-oklaag-1976.