Opinion No. 2009-209

CourtArkansas Attorney General Reports
DecidedMay 21, 2010
StatusPublished

This text of Opinion No. 2009-209 (Opinion No. 2009-209) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Arkansas Attorney General Reports primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Opinion No. 2009-209, (Ark. 2010).

Opinion

The Honorable Donna Hutchinson State Representative

24 Rillington Drive Bella Vista, Arkansas 72714-3204

Dear Representative Hutchinson:

This is in response to your request for an opinion on whether, under Amendment 79, an older or disabled person's homestead assessment may rise when newly discovered property is added to the assessment.

Amendment 79 to our state constitution generally limits how fast a property tax assessment may rise, but the limits do not apply to "newly discovered real property, new construction, or . . . substantial improvements to real property." Ark. Const. amend. 79, § 1(b), (c).

The amendment also provides that a homestead assessment generally cannot rise at all if the taxpayer is 65 or older, or disabled. By its structure and terms, the freeze does not prevent an assessment increase when a new residence is constructed on the assessed property. See Ark. Const. amend. 79, § 1(d)(1)(A). While the freeze contains an exception for "substantial improvements to real property," there is no exception expressed for newly discovered property. Ark. Const. amend. 79, § 1(d)(1), (4).

While the answer to your question is not entirely clear, it is my opinion that an older or disabled person's homestead assessment may rise when newly discovered property is added to the assessment. *Page 2

The same rules are used to interpret statutes and the constitution. See, e.g., Gazaway v. Greene County EqualizationBd., 314 Ark. 569, 864 S.W.2d 233 (1993). The common aim of the rules of interpretation is to find and give effect to the intent of those who drafted and enacted the provision at issue.See, e.g., Kervin v. Hillman,226 Ark. 708, 292 S.W.2d 559 (1956); see also City ofFayetteville v. Washington County,369 Ark. 455, 255 S.W.3d 844 (2007). Plain and unambiguous language is generally given its obvious and common meaning. See, e.g.,State v. Oldner, 361 Ark. 316, 206 S.W.3d 818 (2005). Another rule of interpretation is expressio unius est exclusioalterius, which means that the expression of one thing may be interpreted to be the exclusion of another thing. See, e.g.,id.

Applying these rules might lead one to conclude that an older or disabled person's homestead assessment cannot rise with property's discovery. The reasoning might be as follows: The constitution freezes homestead assessments for older and disabled people, and caps other assessments' growth rates. The freeze has two exceptions (new construction and substantial improvements), while the caps have three exceptions (newly discovered property, new construction, and substantial improvements). The caps' newly-discovered-property exception is proof that the General Assembly, which drafted Amendment 79, knew that property is sometimes discovered and added to an assessment. But the General Assembly provided no such express exception to the freeze. The intent of the drafters and the voters therefore must have been to disallow an increase in a frozen assessment even though property is discovered and added.

In my opinion, however, that is a mechanical, ill-considered analysis that ignores both Amendment 79's readily apparent ambiguities and a persuasive interpretation of the provision by an agency responsible for its execution. Prohibiting an assessment increase when property is discovered and added would also lead to absurd and unjust results, and elevate the law's letter over its spirit.

The language of Amendment 79 is unquestionably ambiguous in several respects. It provides, for example, that "[t]his subsection (d) [i.e., the freeze] does not apply to substantial improvements to real property." Ark. Const. amend. 79, § 1(d)(4). Taken literally, the language means that the portion of an older or disabled person's homestead assessment that is attributable to "substantial improvements" is not frozen. In other words, the assessment would be frozen in part, with respect to the part of the homestead not substantially improved, while the part of the *Page 3 assessment representing the value of the substantial improvements could increase with every reappraisal. I do not believe this interpretation is what was intended. Rather, I am of the opinion that the exception means that an assessment is not frozen at its pre-improvement level, but rather increased to account for the substantial improvements, then again frozen at the new level.

Another example of the internal ambiguities that characterize Amendment 79 is illustrated by Op. Att'y Gen. 2008-068 and 2004-300, in which I, and a predecessor in this office, respectively, concluded that the language of the amendment is so ambiguous that it is impossible to provide definitive answers to questions about the caps' operation when property is sold.

The omission from the freeze's language of the phrase "newly discovered real property," the issue here, creates yet another ambiguity.

Particularly where a provision is ambiguous, its interpretation by an agency charged with its administration and execution is "highly persuasive" and not reversed by the courts unless "clearly wrong."Citifinancial Retail Servs. Div. of Citicorp Trust Bank, FSB v.Weiss, 372 Ark. 128, 134, 271 S.W.3d 494 (2008); seealso, e.g., Ford v. Keith, 338 Ark. 487, 996 S.W.2d 20 (1999). Here, the state's Assessment Coordination Department, which, among other things, provides guidance to local assessors and equalization boards, has interpreted the freeze not to prohibit the assessment of newly discovered property at full value. See Assessor's Guide 32 (3rd ed. 2009).

A mechanical application of the rules of statutory and constitutional construction referred to above would lead to absurd and unjust results. Consider two older homeowners living next-door to one another in substantially identical tract houses on substantially identical lots. One's assessment includes all homestead property while the other's omits the large back porch (a feature of both houses), significantly lowering the owner's tax bill. In my opinion, permanent continuation of the tax break, after the assessor's discovery of the error, would be unjust and absurd. The result would be that much more unjust and absurd if the assessor's omission of the porch was the result of fraud, but it is not clear whether or how, under a mechanistic, literal interpretation of the freeze, there could be any remedy for such a fraud. I do not believe a court would interpret Amendment 79 to permit that result.

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Related

State v. Oldner
206 S.W.3d 818 (Supreme Court of Arkansas, 2005)
Ford v. Keith
996 S.W.2d 20 (Supreme Court of Arkansas, 1999)
City of Fayetteville v. Washington County
255 S.W.3d 844 (Supreme Court of Arkansas, 2007)
Williams v. Wayne Farms, LLC
243 S.W.3d 316 (Supreme Court of Arkansas, 2006)
Gazaway v. Greene County Equalization Board
864 S.W.2d 233 (Supreme Court of Arkansas, 1993)
Berry v. Gordon
376 S.W.2d 279 (Supreme Court of Arkansas, 1964)
Graves v. Burns
106 S.W.2d 602 (Supreme Court of Arkansas, 1937)
Bailey, Lieutenant-Governor v. Abington
148 S.W.2d 176 (Supreme Court of Arkansas, 1941)
Stanley v. Gates
19 S.W.2d 1000 (Supreme Court of Arkansas, 1929)
State v. Martin
28 L.R.A. 153 (Supreme Court of Arkansas, 1895)
Snowden v. Thompson
153 S.W. 823 (Supreme Court of Arkansas, 1913)
Gipson v. Maner
287 S.W.2d 467 (Supreme Court of Arkansas, 1956)
Kervin v. Hillman
292 S.W.2d 559 (Supreme Court of Arkansas, 1956)
Thiel v. Priest
28 S.W.3d 296 (Supreme Court of Arkansas, 2000)

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Opinion No. 2009-209, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/opinion-no-2009-209-arkag-2010.