Open Boat

18 F. Cas. 751, 1 Ware 18
CourtDistrict Court, D. Maine
DecidedJune 15, 1823
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 18 F. Cas. 751 (Open Boat) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Open Boat, 18 F. Cas. 751, 1 Ware 18 (D. Me. 1823).

Opinion

WARE, District Judge.

These two cases, growing out of the same transactions, and depending on the same facts, have been argued together as one case, nor do I see any cause for making a distinction between them. Upon the evidence which has been [752]*752produced the decision of one roust determine the fate of the other.

The history of the case, as it comes from the witnesses, is shortly this. A few days before the seizure was made, an English vessel called the Ocean, of which the claimant, Capt. Ricker, was master, arrived in the Bay of Passamaquoddy, with a cargo of from forty to fifty puncheons of rum. Where she was from does not appear, but it is suggested by some of the witnesses that the rum, having been imported into the neighboring province, subject to a duty there, but entitled to a drawback on its re-exportation, the object of the owner was to obtain this drawback by a pretended exportation to the United States, and then smuggle it back into Campo-bello. In pursuance of this plan, or whatever may have been the real destination of the cargo, the Ocean came to anchor a little to the south-eastward of a small island known by the name of Pope’s Folly, situated between Frederick Island and Campobello, and in a line drawn from the eastern shore of Lubec at low water to Dudley Island. While she remained in that situation the rum was unladen, and put on board of an American vessel, the Atlantic, Capt. Richardson, master. The Atlantic remained with the rum on board in the place where she received it, three or four days, taking in a cargo of gypsum, when, having completed her cargo and got ready for sea, and the rum remaining on board undisposed of, it became necessary to remove it again, and it was transferred to the Commerce, Capt. Drinkwater. The Commerce, soon after the rum was put on board, moved up and came to anchor to the northward of Pope’s Folly. She having completed her cargo in three or four days, and being ready to sail, it became necessary again to make some provision for the rum. Twenty puncheons were landed on Campobello, and put into Mr. McLain’s store, and in the following night, eight were put on board the open boat in question, which, in the morning, was seized, with the rum in it, to the southeastward of this island. The Commerce drifted during the night, and the three puncheons were seized in her, in the morning, while lying south-westerly from Frederick Island. All these transfers of the rum, from vessel to vessel, were made while the vessels were lying near to Pope’s Folly, and nearer to that 'than to any other land.

If these transactions took place while the vessels were lying within the waters of the United States, there cannot be a doubt that a forfeiture attaches, under the 50th section of the collection act of March 2, 1799 [1 Stat. 665]. The law annexes the forfeiture to every unlading of goods brought from a foreign port, without a permit from the collector, whatever may be the pretext. Where the law has made no exception, the court can make none. Admitting, therefore, the object to have been, what was suggested by some of the witnesses, and insisted upon at the argument, not to land the goods in the United States, but to smuggle them into Campobello, in fraud of the British revenue laws, this intention, if fully proved, would not withdraw’ them from the forfeiture annexed to the act by our law. If it be true, as argued by the counsel for the claimant, that the courts of this country will not lend their powers to enforce the revenue laws of a foreign country, and this is admitted to be in conformity W’ith the usage of all nations, it is equally true, thatijdf foreigners choose their station within our’ territory, from w’hich to commit frauds upon their own government, they must take care, at least, so to manage their business as not to violate our laws. The common practice of commercial nations, not only to connive at the frauds committed by their subjects upon the revenue laws of other countries, but even indirectly to favor them, has been carried quite as far as is consistent» with a wise policy; for a wise policy cannot often be in opposition to an honest one, and it has been carried somewhat further than can be vindicated on any principles of sound morality. Pothier, Traité Des Assurances, No. 58. The argument, however, would require this court to go one step further on this questionable ground than any court has yet gone, and that is, to admit the avowed intention of violating the revenue laws of a neighboring and friendly nation, as an excuse for violating our own.

The whole case turns upon a single fact, w’hether the unlading alleged in the libel, took place within the waters of the United States, or not; w’hether it was upon the American or British side of the jurisdictional line; and this depends upon another, and that is, whether the small island called Pope’s Folly, in the vicinity of which the unlading took place, belongs to the United States or to Great Britain. The acts complained of as the ground of forfeiture, were done near this island, and much nearer to it than to the island of Campobello. Assuming that it belongs to the United States, and it will follow, from the well-established principles of the laws of nations, that the right of exclusive jurisdiction extends to the middle of the channel, at low water, between the two islands. The whole of the waters are common to both nations for the puiposes of navigation, as a common highway, but the exclusive rights of the two nations meet in the centre or thread of the channel. Kirkland v. The Fame [Case No. 7,845]. The laws of each country extend in their full vigor up to this line, without leaving, as seems to have been imagined by persons in the habit of trading in that quarter, a space or belt of neutral ground, where the laws of both countries may be set at defiance.

It is contended by the counsel for the claimant, that whatever claims the United States might formerly have had to this island, the decision of the commissioners under the fourth article of the treaty of Ghent [753]*753has finally and definitively established it as belonging to Great Britain. The terms used by the commissioners are, it must be admitted, sufficiently comprehensive to support this position. In their report, they say that they “have decided, and do decide, that Moose Island, Dudley Island, and Frederick Island do, and each of them does, belong to the United States; and that all the other islands, and each and every of them, in the Bay of Passamaquoddy, do belong to his Britannic majesty.” This is undoubtedly language of the most comprehensive import, and as this island is situated in the Bay of Passamaquoddy, and is not one of the islands named as belonging to the United States, if there is no principle of interpretation by which the universality of the words can be limited in their operation, the island in question must clearly belong to Great Britain. But there are insuperable objections to taking the language of the commissioners in its largest signification. It would give to their decision an operation which cannot be supposed to have been intended. This will be apparent by adverting to the topography of the bay, and the islands within it. The three islands, named in the decision as belonging to the United States, namely, Moose Island, Frederick Island, and Dudley Island, lie nearly in a right line drawn from the south-eastern extremity of the town of Perry, on the right bank of the Sehoodiac, to Lubec Point and West Quoddy Head. Between these islands and the American shore, there are a number of small islands, some of them inhabited, and several lying close to the shore of the main land. Our title to these has never, at any stage of the controversy, been called in question.

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Bluebook (online)
18 F. Cas. 751, 1 Ware 18, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/open-boat-med-1823.