O'Neil v. Metropolitan Street Railway Co.

93 N.Y.S. 145, 103 A.D. 607
CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
DecidedApril 20, 1905
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 93 N.Y.S. 145 (O'Neil v. Metropolitan Street Railway Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
O'Neil v. Metropolitan Street Railway Co., 93 N.Y.S. 145, 103 A.D. 607 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1905).

Opinion

LAUGHRIN, J.

On the evening of the 16th of August, 1899, the plaintiff was a passenger on one of the defendant’s southbound cars on 8th avenue, and while she was in the act of alighting at 86th street, according to her testimony, which is corroborated by that of her niece, 10 years of age, who accompanied her, the car, after having stopped to transfer passengers to the 86th Crosstown line, suddenly started, precipitating her. to the pavement, inflicting injuries, to recover for which this action was brought.

It is unnecessary to review the evidence relating to the questions of negligence. It has been carefully examined, and we think it was sufficient to take the case to the jury, and that we would not be warranted in setting aside the verdict.

The principal points urged upon the appeal are that the verdict is excessive; that the plaintiff has recovered for total blindness, without sufficient evidence that it was caused by the injuries received at the time of the accident; and that it is contrary to the weight of the evidence on that point. No motion for a nonsuit or for a direction of a verdict was made, but, at the close of the evidence, counsel for the defendant requested the court to take from the jury “the question of the eyesight, on the ground that the evidence does not justify its submission to the jury as the proximate result,” and to the denial of this motion he took an exception. No exception was taken to the charge of the learned trial judge, in which the jury were very fully and fairly instructed upon all material points, and only one request to charge was made by the defendant, and this was granted. The verdict was for $13,580.

In setting forth the material facts which the jury might have found and are deeméd to have found, it is unnecessary to discuss discrepancies and inconsistencies in the testimony, for it may be assumed that the arguments in that behalf urged here were presented to the jury and resolved in favor of the plaintiff. The questions, therefore, requiring consideration, are (1) whether there was [146]*146any competent evidence that the accident was the proximate cause of the loss of the plaintiff’s eyesight, justifying the denial of the defendant’s motion to exclude that question from the jury; and (2) whether the conclusion reached by the jury on that point, as indicated by the amount of their verdict, is sustained by the evidence; and (3) whether the evidence on the question of damages generally justified the verdict in amount.

The plaintiff was a maiden lady, 61 years of age, and the principal of one of the public schools of the city of New York, and had held the position of principal in the public schools of the city for the period of 44 years. Her salary at the time of the accident was $2,500 per annum. She was in excellent health, and, with the exception of very slight astigmatism for one of her age, for which glasses had been prescribed in the year 1891, which it had not become necessary to change, her eyesight was and always- had been perfect. It is evident that she was precipitated to the pavement with considerable violence, and that she landed upon her head and left shoulder, for she sustained a scalp wound an inch and a half in length nearly on top of her head, above her left ear, and her left collar bone was fractured. There is evidence indicating: That she was stunned, and for a brief time remained in a semiunconscious condition,, and that her eyesight immediately became blurred, giving her a feeling of bewilderment. That, while she was able to discover light and shadows, and the outlines of people, she was unable to recognize features, and so remained until she had been placed in a cab, taken to her home on East 120th street, and until after a doctor who was summoned arrived, and was setting the collar bone, and it soon thereafter disappeared; and she does not say that it reoccurred again until after the operation on her eye in 1900. That immediately after the accident she had such intense pain in her eye and in her head between the wound and the eye that she did not feel the injury to the collar bone. That she continued to have these pains almost constantly until shortly before the trial, and then had them at intervals of two or three weeks. That these pains were persistent, and were not like an ordinary headache, and she had never had them before the accident. That “since the accident the pain starts in the spot where I struck, and it feels as if there was a piece of elastic tied to each of my eyes, pulling the eyes apart, and then the pain goes over my neck here, and it feels as if something had gone off the head, and it was flying in different directions. I could not describe you the pain. I had never had anything like that before this accident.” That the pain in her head was more intense than the pain in her eye the night of the accident, and that the pain in the eye was not intense that night. That she was not sure about the time the pain commenced in the eye, but thought that it was the next day, and that the night of the accident “the pain in the head was intense, and my whole head was aching and paining. I thought the whole part of my head gone. * * * I had pain in my eye all along, but not the intense pain, agonizing pain, I afterwards had.” The plaintiff testified that she complained of the pain in her eye to the physician who was called to dress her [147]*147wounds, but he testified he had no recollection on the subject. He testified that there was one scalp wound an inch long, which did not require stitches, and healed in about eight days. She testified that there were two scalp wounds, and that they both left scars and depressions. The fracture of the collar bone united and healed in about three weeks. The plaintiff was-able to resume her duties as principal of the school that fall, and, according to her testimony, had no further serious trouble with her vision or her eye until the month of October, 1900, when, one day, as she was crossing a park, and a fire engine was passing, she felt a sensation as if dust was in her eye. This was on Friday noon, and on returning to school she had one of the teachers examine the eye, but nothing was found. She went to Dr. O’Connell, an eye specialist, the following Monday night. After he had examined the eye several times during a period of two or three weeks, on November 1st he took her to Dr. Hepburn, another specialist, who, after an examination, operated on the eye for glaucoma, and during the operation discovered a subluxation of the lens, which in his opinion, was sufficient to account for the glaucoma, and, in his opinion, caused it.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
93 N.Y.S. 145, 103 A.D. 607, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/oneil-v-metropolitan-street-railway-co-nyappdiv-1905.