Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage & Warehouse, Inc.

872 P.2d 1051, 236 Utah Adv. Rep. 24, 1994 Utah App. LEXIS 52, 1994 WL 120072
CourtCourt of Appeals of Utah
DecidedApril 1, 1994
Docket920434-CA
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 872 P.2d 1051 (Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage & Warehouse, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Utah primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage & Warehouse, Inc., 872 P.2d 1051, 236 Utah Adv. Rep. 24, 1994 Utah App. LEXIS 52, 1994 WL 120072 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).

Opinion

OPINION

JACKSON, Judge:

Oneida Cold Storage and Warehouse, Inc. (Oneida) challenges the trial court’s dismissal of breach of contract, breach of warranty, and negligence claims against Metalclad Insulation Corporation (Metalclad). Oneida specifically disputes the findings of fact upon which the trial court based its dismissal. Because Oneida has failed to marshal all the evidence in support of those findings, we refuse to consider its challenge and summarily affirm the trial court’s dismissal.

BACKGROUND 2

In 1981 Roth Company (Roth) contracted to design and build the shell of a cold storage warehouse in Salt Lake City, Utah for Oneida/SLIC (SLIC). In connection with the development of the warehouse, SLIC entered into a lease agreement with Oneida, under which Oneida agreed to lease approximately 65,000 square feet of warehouse space. As part of the lease agreement, Oneida agreed to supply all insulation and vapor barrier materials necessary for construction of the warehouse’s insulated areas.

To fulfill its lease obligation, Oneida entered into two separate contracts with Metal-clad, under which Metalclad agreed to supply the insulation materials to be used for the warehouse and to supervise the installation of those materials.

Oneida filed a third-party complaint against Metalclad to recover damages resulting from defects in the warehouse’s insulated concrete floor slab system. 3 The concrete floor cracked, buckled, and broke up, both during and after construction. Oneida claimed that Metalclad had breached express and implied warranties relating to the floor insulation that Metalclad had supplied.

The trial court found that Oneida failed to prove Metalclad had breached either of the contracts or had breached express and implied warranties relating to the insulation products. The trial court also found that Oneida failed to prove Metalclad was involved in designing the floor slab system. Finally, the trial court found that Oneida failed to prove Metalclad negligently caused or contributed to the damages which Oneida sustained. Accordingly, the trial court dismissed all of Oneida’s claims against Metal-clad. Oneida now appeals that dismissal.

APPELLANT’S FAILURE TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE

Oneida presents six issues in its brief, four of which are indisputably issues of fact and two of which Oneida characterizes as issues of law. The first issue that Oneida characterizes as one of law challenges the trial court’s denial of damages resulting from alleged breaches of contract and warranties. The trial court’s denial of Oneida’s claim for damages, however, simply followed its finding that Metalclad did not breach its contracts or warranties. The second issue that Oneida characterizes as one of law challenges the trial court’s ruling that Metalclad was not jointly liable with Roth. The trial court’s determination that Metalclad was not jointly liable, once again, simply followed its finding that Metalclad was not negligent. In other words, the trial court’s dismissal of Metal-elad’s damages and liability claims resulted from the trial court’s findings of fact and not from its application, interpretation, or choice of law. Thus despite Oneida’s characterization, all the issues presented on appeal dispute the trial court’s findings of fact.

Utah appellate courts do not take trial courts’ factual findings lightly. We repeatedly have set forth the heavy burden appellants must bear when challenging factual findings. To successfully appeal a trial court’s findings of fact, appellate counsel *1053 must play the devil’s advocate. “[Attorneys] must extricate [themselves] from the client’s shoes and fully assume the adversary’s position. In order to properly discharge the [marshaling] duty ..., the challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists.” West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App.1991); accord In re Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989); State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987); Commercial Union Assocs. v. Clayton, 863 P.2d 29, 36 (Utah App.1993); Ohline Corp. v. Granite Mill, 849 P.2d 602, 604 (Utah App.1993). Once appellants have established every pillar supporting their adversary’s position, they then “must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence” and show why those pillars fail to support the trial court’s findings. West Valley City, 818 P.2d at 1314. They must show the trial court’s findings are “so lacking in support as to be ‘against the clear weight of the evidence,’ thus making them ‘clearly erroneous.’ ” Bartell, 776 P.2d at 886 (quoting Walker, 743 P.2d at 193).

This rigorous standard reflects the doctrine that appellate courts “do not sit to retry cases submitted on disputed facts.” Bartell, 776 P.2d at 886. Accordingly, “[w]hen the duty to marshal is not properly discharged, we refuse to consider the merits of challenges to the findings and accept the findings as valid.” Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 553 (Utah App.1989).

Oneida has failed to marshal the evidence in support of the trial court’s factual findings. Rather than bearing its marshaling burden, Oneida has merely presented carefully selected facts and excerpts of trial testimony in support of its position. Such selective citation to the record does not begin to marshal the evidence; it is nothing more than an attempt to reargue the case before this court — a tactic that we reject. Commercial Union, 863 P.2d at 36; Ohline, 849 P.2d at 604. Because Oneida has failed to marshal the evidence supporting the trial court’s findings, we hold that those findings are accurate and affirm the trial court’s dismissal based on those findings.

As we decline to consider the merits of Oneida’s appeal, we take the occasion to further articulate our rationale behind the marshaling requirement. We recognize that requiring appellants who challenge trial courts’ factual findings first to marshal all the evidence in support of those findings and second to demonstrate why that evidence remains insufficient to support those findings is a rigorous standard. Nonetheless, this strict requirement both grows from and nurtures two interrelated court objectives: efficiency and fairness.

The deference we afford to trial courts’ findings is based on and fosters the principle that traditional fact finders, whether judges or juries, are better equipped to consider, weigh, and assess the evidence that litigants bring before the courts.

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Bluebook (online)
872 P.2d 1051, 236 Utah Adv. Rep. 24, 1994 Utah App. LEXIS 52, 1994 WL 120072, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/oneidaslic-v-oneida-cold-storage-warehouse-inc-utahctapp-1994.