O'neel v. County of Sacramento

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: September 25, 2025
• Docket: 24-3878
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS SEP 25 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

FAUN O'NEEL; B.T., a minor by and No. 24-3878 through her guardian ad litem; A.O., a D.C. No. minor by and through her guardian ad litem; 2:21-cv-02403-WBS-DB D.O., a minor by and through her guardian ad litem; A. T., a minor by and through her guardian ad litem, MEMORANDUM*

Plaintiffs - Appellants,

v.

COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO; SASHA SMITH; KERYN STARKES,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California William B. Shubb, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted September 15, 2025 San Francisco, California

Before: M. SMITH and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges, and BARKER, District Judge.**

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The Honorable J. Campbell Barker, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Texas, sitting by designation. Plaintiff Faun O’Neel is the mother of four minor children: B.T., A.T., D.O.,

and A.O. (collectively, Plaintiffs). O’Neel appeals the district court’s order

granting summary judgment to Defendants Keryn Starkes and Sasha Smith on

Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claim alleging judicial deception. We have jurisdiction

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the district court’s grant of summary

judgment de novo, see Botosan v. Paul McNally Realty, 216 F.3d 827, 830 (9th

Cir. 2000), and we affirm. Because Plaintiffs are familiar with the facts of this

case, we do not recount them here except as necessary to provide context for our

ruling.

1. “To state a violation of the constitutional right to familial association

through judicial deception, a plaintiff must allege ‘(1) a misrepresentation or

omission (2) made deliberately or with a reckless disregard for the truth, that was

(3) material to the judicial decision.’” David v. Kaulukukui, 38 F.4th 792, 801 (9th

Cir. 2022) (quoting Benavidez v. Cnty. of San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1147 (9th Cir.

2021)); see also KRL v. Moore, 384 F.3d 1105, 1117 (9th Cir. 2004). Plaintiffs

contend that Defendant Starkes engaged in judicial deception in the applications

for protective custody warrants she filed for the O’Neel children pursuant to

Sections 300 and 340 of the California Welfare and Institutions Code.

Plaintiffs adduced sufficient evidence to establish that the warrant

applications contained both omissions and misrepresentations. The warrants

2 24-3878 omitted several exculpatory details. The warrants also misrepresent that the family

violated a visitation rule in the agreed-upon Safety Plan, though that rule was never

documented in the written Safety Plan.

However, the record does not support an inference that Starkes committed

these errors “deliberately or with a reckless disregard for the truth.” David, 38

F.4th at 801 (quoting Benavidez, 993 F.3d at 1147). The omitted evidence was

relatively minor considering the inculpatory evidence in the applications.

Moreover, the record suggests that Starkes may have simply confused the terms of

the Safety Plan. She recorded her recollection of the visitation limitations in the

family’s case file the same day the Safety Plan was put in place and discussed the

contested visitation rule with her supervisor, Defendant Smith. Even viewed in the

light most favorable to Plaintiffs, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), the record does not

support the inference that Starkes acted recklessly or deliberately—much less that

she knew or believed that her representations to the juvenile court might be

untruthful.

Further, the errors were not material. “A misrepresentation or omission is

material if a court would have declined to issue the order had [the defendant] been

truthful.” David, 38 F.4th at 801 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted). The applications contained sufficient other evidence to

support probable cause and the issuance of the warrants—including the family’s

3 24-3878 violation of other terms in the written Safety Plan. See Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code §§

300, 340(b). The district court therefore did not err in granting summary judgment

to Starkes. Because we conclude that Starkes did not commit judicial deception,

we do not reach the issue of qualified immunity.

2. Plaintiffs next assert that Defendant Smith is subject to supervisory

liability for Starkes’s judicial deception. This argument was not raised before the

district court, and the district court did not rule on it.1 As a result, Plaintiffs’

supervisory liability argument is waived. Villanueva v. California, 986 F.3d 1158,

1164 n.4 (9th Cir. 2021); see also In re Mercury Interactive Corp. Secs. Litig., 618

F.3d 988, 992 (9th Cir. 2010). Even if this argument were not waived, Plaintiffs

do not establish that Smith possessed the knowledge necessary to identify the

inaccuracies in Starkes’s warrant applications. Thus, there is no basis to hold

Smith liable as Starkes’s supervisor. As with Starkes, we need not reach the issue

of qualified immunity with respect to Smith.

AFFIRMED.

1 At summary judgment, the district court ruled on Plaintiffs’ direct judicial deception claim against Smith and granted summary judgment in favor of Smith.

4 24-3878