O'Neal v. Allison

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. California
DecidedJanuary 27, 2023
Docket5:22-cv-07367
StatusUnknown

This text of O'Neal v. Allison (O'Neal v. Allison) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
O'Neal v. Allison, (N.D. Cal. 2023).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 MICHAEL SR. O'NEAL, Case No. 22-cv-07367-JD

8 Plaintiff, ORDER OF SERVICE v. 9

10 KATHLEEN ALLISON, et al., Defendants. 11

12 13 INTRODUCTION 14 Plaintiff, a California prisoner proceeding pro se, filed this civil rights case under 42 15 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Defendants violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment by 16 transferring over 100 inmates, some of whom were infected with COVID-19, from the California 17 Institution for Men (CIM) to San Quentin State Prison (SQSP) in May 2020. Plaintiff’s complaint 18 (Dkt. No. 1) is before the Court for screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. For the reasons 19 discussed below, the complaint is ordered served on Defendants. Plaintiff will be granted leave to 20 proceed in forma pauperis by separate order. 21 DISCUSSION 22 A. Standard of Review 23 A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a prisoner seeks 24 redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. 25 § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims 26 that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seek 27 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), 1 989, 993 (9th Cir. 2020). 2 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the 3 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “Specific facts are not 4 necessary; the statement need only “‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the 5 grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citations omitted). 6 While Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, it demands more than an unadorned, 7 the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009). 8 A pleading that offers only labels and conclusions, or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 9 cause of action, or naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement does not suffice. Id. 10 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) 11 that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the 12 alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. 13 Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 14 B. Legal Claims 15 Plaintiff names the following Defendants: 16 a. CDCR Director Kathleen Allison, 17 b. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) Secretary Ralph 18 Diaz, 19 c. Associate Director of Reception Mission Ron Davis, 20 d. SQSP Warden Ron Broomfield, 21 e. Federal Receiver J. Clark Kelso, 22 f. SQSP Chief Medical Executive Alison Pachynski, 23 g. California Institute for Men (CIM) chief medical officer L. Escobell, 24 h. Director of CDCR’s Medical Services R. Steven Tharratt, 25 i. San Quentin Healthcare Chief Executive Director Clarence Cryer, 26 j. CIM Warden Dean Borders, and 27 k. CCHCS Director Joseph Bick. 1 Plaintiff alleges that Defendants were involved in the decision to transfer over 100 2 inmates, some of whom were infected with COVID-19, from CIM to SQSP in May 2020. Dkt. 3 No. 1 at 10. He alleges that Defendants failed to take adequate safety precautions before, during, 4 and after the transfer, including failing to test the transferring prisoners or screen them for 5 symptoms at the appropriate times, failing to implement distancing measures on the transfer 6 busses, and failing to test and isolate the transferred prisoners upon arrival. Id. at 9-13. He alleges 7 that SQSP was an inappropriate prison for sending the prisoners, because it has “exceedingly poor 8 ventilation, extraordinary close living quarters, [and] inadequate sanitation due to its antiquated 9 infrastructure and overcrowding.” Id. at 9. Plaintiff sues all Defendants in both their individual 10 and official capacities. Id. at 7. 11 The complaint alleges that defendant Kelso “ordered or helped facilitate the transfer . . . 12 with the approval of” defendants Diaz, Allison, and Davis; that defendants Escobell and Tharratt 13 ordered that the transferring prisoners not be retested the day before the transfer; that defendant 14 Bick was “responsible for all transfer and testing protocols”; that defendant Borders approved 15 the[] transfers of untested” prisoners; and that defendant Davis, “with the approval of” defendants 16 Allison and Bick, “decided to disregard the . . . social distancing guidelines” by placing more than 17 19 prisoners on each bus. Dkt. No. 1 at 9-10, 12. It alleges that defendants Broomfield, Cryer, 18 and Pachynski “chose not to implement . . . basic safety measures” to prevent spread of the virus 19 upon the arrival of the transferring prisoners at SQSP. Id. at 13. It also alleges that defendants 20 Diaz and Allison were “well aware of the concerns raised” regarding the transfer. Id. at 12. 21 Plaintiff experienced symptoms of COVID-19, Dkt. No. 1 at 14, and tested positive for the 22 virus on June 24, 2020. Id. at 21. Plaintiff alleges the above actions and inactions violated the 23 Eighth Amendment. He seeks declaratory relief, injunctive relief, compensatory and punitive 24 damages, and costs of suit. 25 When liberally construed, Plaintiff’s allegations state a cognizable claim for deliberate 26 indifference to his safety, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, against Defendants. Farmer v. 27 Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) (prison official is deliberately indifferent if he or she knows 1 reasonable steps to abate it). 2 But the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution bars a person from suing a state in 3 federal court without the state’s consent. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 4 U.S. 89, 98-100 (1984). State officials acting in their official capacities are not “persons” under 5 Section 1983 because “a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit 6 against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office.” See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of 7 State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Thus, such a suit is therefore no different from a suit against 8 the state itself. Id. Accordingly, the Eleventh Amendment bars Plaintiff’s claims for monetary 9 relief to the extent that they are based on acts by Defendants in their official capacities. See id. 10 The Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s claims for damages against Defendants in their official 11 capacities. 12 The Court also DISMISSES Plaintiff’s complaint against Defendant Tharratt.

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Related

West v. Atkins
487 U.S. 42 (Supreme Court, 1988)
Will v. Michigan Department of State Police
491 U.S. 58 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Erickson v. Pardus
551 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Farmer v. Brennan
511 U.S. 825 (Supreme Court, 1994)

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Bluebook (online)
O'Neal v. Allison, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/oneal-v-allison-cand-2023.