2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 3 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 4 * * * 5 WENDELL DWAYNE O'NEAL, Case No. 2:17-cv-03025-JAD-DJA 6 Plaintiff, 7 SCREENING ORDER v. 8 TERRI ALBERTSON, et al., 9 Defendants. 10 11 Presently before the Court is pro se Plaintiff Wendell Dwayne O’Neal’s application to 12 proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 1), filed on December 8, 2017.1 This matter is also before 13 the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Order (ECF No. 11), filed on April 11, 2019. 14 I. IN FORMA PAUPERIS APPLICATION 15 Plaintiff has submitted the declaration required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) showing an 16 inability to prepay fees and costs or give security for them. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request to 17 proceed in forma pauperis will be granted. 18 II. SCREENING COMPLAINT 19 Upon granting a request to proceed in forma pauperis, a court must screen the complaint 20 under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). In screening the complaint, a court must identify cognizable 21 claims and dismiss claims that are frivolous, malicious, file to state a claim on which relief may 22 be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. 23 § 1915(e)(2). Dismissal for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2) incorporates the standard 24 for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Watison v. Carter, 25
26 1 This matter was originally recommended for dismissal because Plaintiff was declared a vexatious 27 litigant in another case in this district. The Ninth Circuit vacated the District Court’s order to the extent it declared him to be a vexatious litigant. Therefore, the Court vacated it recommendation and this matter is 1 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). To survive § 1915 review, a complaint must “contain 2 sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 3 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The court liberally construes pro se complaints 4 and may only dismiss them “if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts 5 in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 908 6 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). 7 In considering whether the complaint is sufficient to state a claim, all allegations of material 8 fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Wyler Summit P’ship 9 v. Turner Broad. Sys. Inc., 135 F.3d 658, 661 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). Although the 10 standard under Rule 12(b)(6) does not require detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff must provide 11 more than mere labels and conclusions. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 12 A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action is insufficient. Id. Further, a Court may 13 dismiss a claim as factually frivolous if its allegations are “clearly baseless, a category 14 encompassing allegations that are fanciful, fantastic, and delusional.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 15 U.S. 25, 32–33 (1992) (internal citations and punctuation omitted). Unless it is clear the 16 complaint’s deficiencies could not be cured through amendment, a pro se plaintiff should be given 17 leave to amend the complaint with notice regarding the complaint’s deficiencies. Cato v. United 18 States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995). Allegations of a pro se complaint are held to less 19 stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 20 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that liberal construction of pro se pleadings is required after Twombly 21 and Iqbal). 22 Here, Plaintiff submitted a complaint (ECF No. 1-1), amended complaint (ECF No. 3), 23 and addendum to the amended complaint (ECF No. 4). As Plaintiff was not given leave to file an 24 amended complaint or an addendum, the Court will only screen the original complaint. In 25 general, Plaintiff appears to allege that the DMV’s employees failed to take any action against 26 Roadrunner Rentals, Inc. regarding its transport of California registered automobiles and sale of 27 those automobiles via Craigslist. Plaintiff appears to allege that the Court has federal question 1 creates a path for the private enforcement of substantive rights created by the Constitution and 2 Federal Statutes. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989). To the extent that Plaintiff is 3 seeking to state a claim under Section 1983, he “must allege the violation of a right secured by the 4 Constitution and the laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was 5 committed by a person acting under color of law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988). A 6 person acts under “color of law” if he “exercise[s] power possessed by virtue of state law and 7 made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.” West, 487 8 U.S. at 49. Plaintiff names a law firm, Lewis Brisbois, as a defendant, which is a private entity 9 and not subject to a Section 1983 claim. 10 Further, Plaintiff appears to name the Nevada DMV and individual DMV employees as 11 defendants. However, a municipal liability claim under Section 1983 proceeds only if a 12 municipality causes a constitutional violation through a policy or custom. See Harper v. City of 13 Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1024–25 (9th Cir. 2008). Municipal entities may be held directly 14 liable, but not on the basis of respondeat superior. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 15 91 (1978). In other words, a municipality cannot be held liable only because it employs a person 16 who allegedly violated the constitution. Id. at 691. “A plaintiff seeking to impose liability on a 17 municipality under § 1983 [must] identify a municipal policy or custom that caused the plaintiff’s 18 injury.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). A municipal employer is not liable 19 for the wrongful conduct of its employees and agents even if they are acting in the course and 20 scope of their employment. See Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403, 117 S.Ct. 21 1382, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997); Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 179 22 L.Ed.2d 417 (2011) (explaining that to impose liability on a local government under § 1983, 23 plaintiffs must prove that an “action pursuant to official municipal policy” caused their injury); 24 Sandoval v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 756 F.3d 1154, 1167–68 (9th Cir.
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2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 3 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 4 * * * 5 WENDELL DWAYNE O'NEAL, Case No. 2:17-cv-03025-JAD-DJA 6 Plaintiff, 7 SCREENING ORDER v. 8 TERRI ALBERTSON, et al., 9 Defendants. 10 11 Presently before the Court is pro se Plaintiff Wendell Dwayne O’Neal’s application to 12 proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 1), filed on December 8, 2017.1 This matter is also before 13 the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Order (ECF No. 11), filed on April 11, 2019. 14 I. IN FORMA PAUPERIS APPLICATION 15 Plaintiff has submitted the declaration required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) showing an 16 inability to prepay fees and costs or give security for them. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request to 17 proceed in forma pauperis will be granted. 18 II. SCREENING COMPLAINT 19 Upon granting a request to proceed in forma pauperis, a court must screen the complaint 20 under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). In screening the complaint, a court must identify cognizable 21 claims and dismiss claims that are frivolous, malicious, file to state a claim on which relief may 22 be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. 23 § 1915(e)(2). Dismissal for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2) incorporates the standard 24 for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Watison v. Carter, 25
26 1 This matter was originally recommended for dismissal because Plaintiff was declared a vexatious 27 litigant in another case in this district. The Ninth Circuit vacated the District Court’s order to the extent it declared him to be a vexatious litigant. Therefore, the Court vacated it recommendation and this matter is 1 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). To survive § 1915 review, a complaint must “contain 2 sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 3 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The court liberally construes pro se complaints 4 and may only dismiss them “if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts 5 in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 908 6 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). 7 In considering whether the complaint is sufficient to state a claim, all allegations of material 8 fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Wyler Summit P’ship 9 v. Turner Broad. Sys. Inc., 135 F.3d 658, 661 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). Although the 10 standard under Rule 12(b)(6) does not require detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff must provide 11 more than mere labels and conclusions. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 12 A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action is insufficient. Id. Further, a Court may 13 dismiss a claim as factually frivolous if its allegations are “clearly baseless, a category 14 encompassing allegations that are fanciful, fantastic, and delusional.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 15 U.S. 25, 32–33 (1992) (internal citations and punctuation omitted). Unless it is clear the 16 complaint’s deficiencies could not be cured through amendment, a pro se plaintiff should be given 17 leave to amend the complaint with notice regarding the complaint’s deficiencies. Cato v. United 18 States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995). Allegations of a pro se complaint are held to less 19 stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 20 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that liberal construction of pro se pleadings is required after Twombly 21 and Iqbal). 22 Here, Plaintiff submitted a complaint (ECF No. 1-1), amended complaint (ECF No. 3), 23 and addendum to the amended complaint (ECF No. 4). As Plaintiff was not given leave to file an 24 amended complaint or an addendum, the Court will only screen the original complaint. In 25 general, Plaintiff appears to allege that the DMV’s employees failed to take any action against 26 Roadrunner Rentals, Inc. regarding its transport of California registered automobiles and sale of 27 those automobiles via Craigslist. Plaintiff appears to allege that the Court has federal question 1 creates a path for the private enforcement of substantive rights created by the Constitution and 2 Federal Statutes. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989). To the extent that Plaintiff is 3 seeking to state a claim under Section 1983, he “must allege the violation of a right secured by the 4 Constitution and the laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was 5 committed by a person acting under color of law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988). A 6 person acts under “color of law” if he “exercise[s] power possessed by virtue of state law and 7 made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.” West, 487 8 U.S. at 49. Plaintiff names a law firm, Lewis Brisbois, as a defendant, which is a private entity 9 and not subject to a Section 1983 claim. 10 Further, Plaintiff appears to name the Nevada DMV and individual DMV employees as 11 defendants. However, a municipal liability claim under Section 1983 proceeds only if a 12 municipality causes a constitutional violation through a policy or custom. See Harper v. City of 13 Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1024–25 (9th Cir. 2008). Municipal entities may be held directly 14 liable, but not on the basis of respondeat superior. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 15 91 (1978). In other words, a municipality cannot be held liable only because it employs a person 16 who allegedly violated the constitution. Id. at 691. “A plaintiff seeking to impose liability on a 17 municipality under § 1983 [must] identify a municipal policy or custom that caused the plaintiff’s 18 injury.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). A municipal employer is not liable 19 for the wrongful conduct of its employees and agents even if they are acting in the course and 20 scope of their employment. See Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403, 117 S.Ct. 21 1382, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997); Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 179 22 L.Ed.2d 417 (2011) (explaining that to impose liability on a local government under § 1983, 23 plaintiffs must prove that an “action pursuant to official municipal policy” caused their injury); 24 Sandoval v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 756 F.3d 1154, 1167–68 (9th Cir. 2014) (same). 25 Plaintiff’s amended complaint has not made the requisite showing. Although it is not clear that 26 the deficiencies identified can be cured, the Court will allow Plaintiff an opportunity to file an 27 amended complaint to the extent he believes that he can state a claim. 1 If Plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, the document must be titled □□□□□□□□ 2 || Complaint.” The amended complaint must contain a short and plain statement describing the 3 || underlying case, the defendant(s) involvement in the case, and the approximate dates of its 4 || involvement. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure adopt a 5 || flexible pleading standard, Plaintiff still must give defendants fair notice of his claims against 6 || them and his entitlement to relief. 7 Additionally, Plaintiff is advised that if he files an amended complaint, the original 8 || complaint (ECF No. 1-1) no longer serves any function in this case. As such, the amended 9 || complaint must be complete in and of itself without reference to prior pleadings or other 10 || documents. The Court cannot refer to a prior pleading or other documents to make Plaintiff’ □ 11 || amended complaint complete. 12 |} 1. CONCLUSION 13 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff's Application for Leave to Proceed In 14 || Forma Pauperis (ECF No. 1) is GRANTED. Plaintiff will not be required to pay the filing fee in 15 || this action. Plaintiff is permitted to maintain this action to conclusion without the necessity of 16 || prepayment of any additional fees or costs or the giving of a security for fees or costs. This order 17 || granting leave to proceed in forma pauperis does not extend to the issuance of subpoenas at 18 || government expense. 19 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court must file Plaintiff’s complaint 20 || (ECF No. 1-1). 21 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint (ECF No. 1-1) is DISMISSED without 22 || prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, with leave to amend. 23 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff shall have until November 18, 2019, to file an 24 || amended complaint. Failure to file an amended complaint will result in a recommendation that 25 || this case be dismissed. 26 DATED: October 21, 2019 \) _ □
DANIEL J. ALBREGTS 28 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE