Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas MEMORANDUM OPINION No. 04-14-00260-CV
ONE (1) 1992 CHEVROLET PK, VIN 1GCEC14Z4NE164549, Appellant
v.
The STATE of Texas, Appellee
From the 166th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2012-CI-13890 Honorable Peter A. Sakai, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
Sitting: Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice Marialyn Barnard, Justice Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
Delivered and Filed: May 27, 2015
AFFIRMED
Following the driver’s arrest for felony driving while intoxicated, the State filed an asset
forfeiture proceeding against the driver’s 1992 Chevy pickup truck, VIN 1GCEC14Z4NE164549.
The State’s motion for summary judgment was granted by the trial court and the vehicle’s owner
appealed. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. 04-14-00260-CV
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. August 18, 2012 Arrest
On August 18, 2012, Timothy Edward Knoeppel was involved in an accident. San Antonio
Police Officer James Caviness witnessed Knoeppel drive the pickup truck away from the accident
and park the vehicle at a nearby apartment complex. Officer Caviness requested assistance and
San Antonio Police Officer Felicia Martinez began an investigation. Knoeppel exhibited signs of
intoxication and Officer Martinez conducted several field sobriety tests. After determining
Knoeppel was intoxicated, Officer Martinez arrested Knoeppel for DWI. Knoeppel consented to
a blood draw and the Bexar County Medical Examiner’s Officer determined Knoeppel’s blood
alcohol concentration was 0.14 grams of alcohol per deciliter of blood. Based on Knoeppel’s three
prior driving while intoxicated offenses, he was charged with felony DWI. See TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 49.09(b)(2) (West Supp. 2014).
B. Procedural History on the Asset Forfeiture
On August 24, 2012, the State initiated an asset forfeiture proceeding on Knoeppel’s 1992
Chevy pickup truck, VIN 1GCEC14Z4NE164549, alleging Knoeppel used the 1992 Chevy pickup
during the commission of a felony DWI offense. On November 27, 2012, the trial court granted
summary judgment for the State. On appeal, the State conceded error and the case was remanded
to the trial court for further proceedings. See One (1) 1992 Chevrolet Pickup, VIN
1GCEC14Z4NE164549 v. State, No. 04-13-00086-CV, 2014 WL 60928 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
Jan. 8, 2014, no pet.).
On June 6, 2013, while represented by counsel, Knoeppel judicially confessed to the
allegations contained within the felony DWI indictment, specifically the DWI allegations of
August 18, 2012 and four prior convictions: misdemeanor convictions from July 20, 1995, and
-2- 04-14-00260-CV
October 2, 1995, and felony convictions from March 4, 2004, and July 14, 2008. On February 13,
2014, the State filed its second motion for summary judgment relying on the following documents:
(1) Affidavit of San Antonio Police Officer Trevor Borth;
(2) Affidavit of San Antonio Police Officer Felicia Martinez;
(3) Certified copy of Knoeppel’s plea papers, waiver, and stipulation from his June 6, 2013 nolo contendere plea for the DWI offense underlying the cause of action;
(4) Certified copy of a 1995 misdemeanor DWI conviction from Bexar County;
(5) Certified copy of a 1995 misdemeanor DWI conviction from Travis County;
(6) Certified copy of a 2004 felony DWI conviction from Comal County and the court’s revocation of the community supervision in 2008;
(7) Certified copy of a 2008 felony DWI conviction from Bexar County;
(8) Affidavit of Carmen Ayala, the registered nurse who drew Knoeppel’s blood; and
(9) Bexar County Medical Examiner’s Office Forensic Toxicology Laboratory Report showing Knoeppel’s blood alcohol concentration at 0.14 g/dL.
On March 18, 2014, the trial court again granted summary judgment in favor of the State
and this appeal ensued.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A. Arguments of the Parties
Knoeppel contends that because the State’s evidence does not conform to the State’s
Original Petition, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment.
The State counters that the State’s Original Petition comports with the State’s Motion for
Summary Judgment because the suit was founded on Knoeppel’s use of the truck during the
commission of felony driving while intoxicated. Additionally, Knoeppel judicially confessed and
stipulated to the evidence that established all of the essential elements of the State’s cause of action.
-3- 04-14-00260-CV
2. Standard of Review
“The purpose of the summary-judgment procedure is to allow the trial court to promptly
dispose of cases that involve unmeritorious claims or untenable defenses.” 2005 Honda Civic v.
State, 408 S.W.3d 528, 533 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2013, no pet.) (citing City of Hous. v. Clear
Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 678 n.5 (Tex. 1979)). The movant for traditional summary
judgment has the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp
Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009).
We review a trial court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Mann Frankfort, 289
S.W.3d at 848 (citing Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex.
2003); $24,156.00 in U.S. Currency v. State, 247 S.W.3d 739, 742 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008,
no pet.). “We review the evidence presented in the motion and response in the light most favorable
to the party against whom the summary judgment was rendered, crediting evidence favorable to
that party if reasonable jurors could, and disregarding contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors
could not.” Mann Frankfort, 289 S.W.3d at 848 (citing City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802,
827 (Tex. 2005)). “[W]e take as true all evidence favorable to [Knoeppel], indulging every
reasonable inference and resolving any doubts in his favor.” 20801, Inc. v. Parker, 249 S.W.3d
392, 399 (Tex. 2008) (citing Knott, 128 S.W.3d at 215). A summary judgment will only issue if
the movant meets its “burden of showing no genuine issue of material fact exists and it is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” Mann Frankfort, 289 S.W.3d at 848.
C. Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Chapter 59
Chapter 59 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure authorizes the forfeiture of
contraband, which is used or intended to be used in the commission of certain felonies, or proceeds
-4- 04-14-00260-CV
derived from those felonies. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 59.01(2)(A), 59.02(a) (West
Supp. 2014); State v. Silver Chevrolet Pickup VIN 1GCEC14T7YE257128 Tag No. 3TMX16, 140
S.W.3d 691, 692–93 (Tex. 2004) (citing Hardy v. State, 102 S.W.3d 123
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Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas MEMORANDUM OPINION No. 04-14-00260-CV
ONE (1) 1992 CHEVROLET PK, VIN 1GCEC14Z4NE164549, Appellant
v.
The STATE of Texas, Appellee
From the 166th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2012-CI-13890 Honorable Peter A. Sakai, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
Sitting: Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice Marialyn Barnard, Justice Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
Delivered and Filed: May 27, 2015
AFFIRMED
Following the driver’s arrest for felony driving while intoxicated, the State filed an asset
forfeiture proceeding against the driver’s 1992 Chevy pickup truck, VIN 1GCEC14Z4NE164549.
The State’s motion for summary judgment was granted by the trial court and the vehicle’s owner
appealed. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. 04-14-00260-CV
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. August 18, 2012 Arrest
On August 18, 2012, Timothy Edward Knoeppel was involved in an accident. San Antonio
Police Officer James Caviness witnessed Knoeppel drive the pickup truck away from the accident
and park the vehicle at a nearby apartment complex. Officer Caviness requested assistance and
San Antonio Police Officer Felicia Martinez began an investigation. Knoeppel exhibited signs of
intoxication and Officer Martinez conducted several field sobriety tests. After determining
Knoeppel was intoxicated, Officer Martinez arrested Knoeppel for DWI. Knoeppel consented to
a blood draw and the Bexar County Medical Examiner’s Officer determined Knoeppel’s blood
alcohol concentration was 0.14 grams of alcohol per deciliter of blood. Based on Knoeppel’s three
prior driving while intoxicated offenses, he was charged with felony DWI. See TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 49.09(b)(2) (West Supp. 2014).
B. Procedural History on the Asset Forfeiture
On August 24, 2012, the State initiated an asset forfeiture proceeding on Knoeppel’s 1992
Chevy pickup truck, VIN 1GCEC14Z4NE164549, alleging Knoeppel used the 1992 Chevy pickup
during the commission of a felony DWI offense. On November 27, 2012, the trial court granted
summary judgment for the State. On appeal, the State conceded error and the case was remanded
to the trial court for further proceedings. See One (1) 1992 Chevrolet Pickup, VIN
1GCEC14Z4NE164549 v. State, No. 04-13-00086-CV, 2014 WL 60928 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
Jan. 8, 2014, no pet.).
On June 6, 2013, while represented by counsel, Knoeppel judicially confessed to the
allegations contained within the felony DWI indictment, specifically the DWI allegations of
August 18, 2012 and four prior convictions: misdemeanor convictions from July 20, 1995, and
-2- 04-14-00260-CV
October 2, 1995, and felony convictions from March 4, 2004, and July 14, 2008. On February 13,
2014, the State filed its second motion for summary judgment relying on the following documents:
(1) Affidavit of San Antonio Police Officer Trevor Borth;
(2) Affidavit of San Antonio Police Officer Felicia Martinez;
(3) Certified copy of Knoeppel’s plea papers, waiver, and stipulation from his June 6, 2013 nolo contendere plea for the DWI offense underlying the cause of action;
(4) Certified copy of a 1995 misdemeanor DWI conviction from Bexar County;
(5) Certified copy of a 1995 misdemeanor DWI conviction from Travis County;
(6) Certified copy of a 2004 felony DWI conviction from Comal County and the court’s revocation of the community supervision in 2008;
(7) Certified copy of a 2008 felony DWI conviction from Bexar County;
(8) Affidavit of Carmen Ayala, the registered nurse who drew Knoeppel’s blood; and
(9) Bexar County Medical Examiner’s Office Forensic Toxicology Laboratory Report showing Knoeppel’s blood alcohol concentration at 0.14 g/dL.
On March 18, 2014, the trial court again granted summary judgment in favor of the State
and this appeal ensued.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A. Arguments of the Parties
Knoeppel contends that because the State’s evidence does not conform to the State’s
Original Petition, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment.
The State counters that the State’s Original Petition comports with the State’s Motion for
Summary Judgment because the suit was founded on Knoeppel’s use of the truck during the
commission of felony driving while intoxicated. Additionally, Knoeppel judicially confessed and
stipulated to the evidence that established all of the essential elements of the State’s cause of action.
-3- 04-14-00260-CV
2. Standard of Review
“The purpose of the summary-judgment procedure is to allow the trial court to promptly
dispose of cases that involve unmeritorious claims or untenable defenses.” 2005 Honda Civic v.
State, 408 S.W.3d 528, 533 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2013, no pet.) (citing City of Hous. v. Clear
Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 678 n.5 (Tex. 1979)). The movant for traditional summary
judgment has the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp
Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009).
We review a trial court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Mann Frankfort, 289
S.W.3d at 848 (citing Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex.
2003); $24,156.00 in U.S. Currency v. State, 247 S.W.3d 739, 742 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008,
no pet.). “We review the evidence presented in the motion and response in the light most favorable
to the party against whom the summary judgment was rendered, crediting evidence favorable to
that party if reasonable jurors could, and disregarding contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors
could not.” Mann Frankfort, 289 S.W.3d at 848 (citing City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802,
827 (Tex. 2005)). “[W]e take as true all evidence favorable to [Knoeppel], indulging every
reasonable inference and resolving any doubts in his favor.” 20801, Inc. v. Parker, 249 S.W.3d
392, 399 (Tex. 2008) (citing Knott, 128 S.W.3d at 215). A summary judgment will only issue if
the movant meets its “burden of showing no genuine issue of material fact exists and it is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” Mann Frankfort, 289 S.W.3d at 848.
C. Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Chapter 59
Chapter 59 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure authorizes the forfeiture of
contraband, which is used or intended to be used in the commission of certain felonies, or proceeds
-4- 04-14-00260-CV
derived from those felonies. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 59.01(2)(A), 59.02(a) (West
Supp. 2014); State v. Silver Chevrolet Pickup VIN 1GCEC14T7YE257128 Tag No. 3TMX16, 140
S.W.3d 691, 692–93 (Tex. 2004) (citing Hardy v. State, 102 S.W.3d 123, 126–27 (Tex. 2003))
(“A civil forfeiture action is an in rem proceeding against contraband.”). “‘Contraband’ is defined
as property of any nature that is used or intended to be used in the commission of certain
enumerated felonies.” Silver Chevrolet Pickup, 140 S.W.3d at 692–93 (citing TEX. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 59.01(2)). In a forfeiture proceeding, the State must prove the items seized
constituted contraband and were subject to forfeiture. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 59.05(b)
(West 2006); $132,265.00 in U.S. Currency v. State, 409 S.W.3d 17, 23 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2013, no pet.).
The State must prove “‘a substantial connection exists between the property to be forfeited
and the criminal activity defined by the statute.’” 2005 Honda Civic, 408 S.W.3d at 533 (quoting
State v. $11,014.00, 820 S.W.2d 783, 784 (Tex. 1991)); see also $27,877.00 Current Money of the
U.S. v. State, 331 S.W.3d 110, 114 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, pet. denied). We therefore turn
to whether the State proved, as a matter of law, that no genuine issues of material fact existed as
to any of the essential elements of the State’s cause of action and that it was entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. See Mann Frankfort, 289 S.W.3d at 848.
D. Analysis
Elements of the State’s cause of action, as set forth in the State’s indictment and the State’s
motion for summary judgment include (1) 1992 Chevy pickup truck (2) forfeiture was pursuant to
a lawful arrest, (3) the 1992 Chevy pickup truck was used during the commission of a DWI offense,
and (4) the DWI was a felony based on Knoeppel’s prior DWI convictions.
The record includes several officer affidavits and certified copies of Knoeppel’s prior DWI
convictions. Knoeppel’s plea papers on the underlying felony included the following: -5- 04-14-00260-CV
(1) Sworn statements of San Antonio Police Officers James Caviness, Dallas Wyeth, and Felicia Martinez;
(2) Knoeppel’s signed judicial confession acknowledging “that all the allegations contained in the indictment are true and correct”;
(3) Texas Department of Public Safety investigation; and
(4) San Antonio Police Department crash report
Additionally, Knoeppel was seen driving the 1992 Chevy pickup truck and the evidence
conclusively proves that he was intoxicated at the time of the offense. The record supports a
substantial connection that the 1992 Chevy pickup truck was contraband and as such it was subject
to forfeiture. See 2005 Honda Civic, 408 S.W.3d at 533. Knoeppel’s signed judicial confession
further established the State’s proof that he was driving while intoxicated and a substantial
connection between the property and the criminal conduct.
CONCLUSION
We conclude the State proved that the evidence demonstrated the existence of a substantial
connection between the property to be forfeited and the criminal conduct alleged to exist. See id.
The fact that the vehicle is contraband was conclusively established by Knoeppel’s signed judicial
confession. We further conclude the State proved, as a matter of law, that no genuine issues of
material fact existed as to any of the essential elements of the State’s cause of action and that it
was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Mann Frankfort, 289 S.W.3d at 848. Accordingly,
we affirm the trial court’s judgment. 1
Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
1 Because we conclude the evidence is sufficient to support the trial court’s grant of summary judgment based on the State’s motion, we need not address the State’s alternative pleading.
-6-