Oncor Electric Delivery Company LLC v. Public Utility Commission of Texas
Opinion
ACCEPTED 15-24-00042-CV FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 4/22/2025 1:34 PM CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE CLERK KEN PAXTON FILED IN ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS 15th COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS Brendan Fugere (512) 936-1820 4/22/2025 1:34:37 PM Assistant Attorney General Brendan.Fugere@oag.texas.gov CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE Clerk April 22, 2025 Via Electronic Filing
Mr. Christopher A. Prine Clerk of the Court Fifteenth Court of Appeals
Re: Oncor Electric Delivery Company LLC v. Public Utility Commission of Texas; No. 15-24-00042-CV
Dear Mr. Prine:
As requested by Justice Field at oral argument, and in response to Appellant Oncor’s introduction of the decision at oral argument, Appellee Public Utility Commission of Texas submits this post-submission letter to explain how this Court’s decision in AFLOA, LLC v. Tex. DMV, No. 15-24-00003-CV, 2025 WL 209447 (Tex. App. [15 Dist.] Jan. 16, 2025, no pet.) relates to this case.
In short, to the extent it is relevant, AFLOA undermines Oncor’s position and supports the Commission’s reading of Texas Government Code section 2001.146. In AFLOA, as here, the order on rehearing made changes not identified as clerical, and therefore a second motion for rehearing was required. 2025 WL 209447 at *5.
As this Court recognized in AFLOA, “[t]he APA provides ‘a limited waiver of sovereign immunity’ in suits for judicial review if certain statutory prerequisites to suit are satisfied.” Id. at *4 (quoting Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regul. Servs. v. Mega Child Care, Inc., 145 S.W.3d 170, 198 (Tex. 2004)). When construing such statutory waivers of sovereign immunity, courts “generally resolve ambiguities by retaining immunity.” Wichita Falls State Hosp. v. Taylor, 106 S.W.3d 692, 697 (Tex. 2003).
One of the statutory prerequisites is a motion for rehearing, “which must be filed by a party not later than the 25th day after the date the decision or order that is the
P o s t O f f i c e B o x 1 2 5 4 8 , A u s ti n , Tex as 7 8 7 1 1 - 2 5 4 8 • ( 5 1 2 ) 4 6 3 - 2 1 0 0 • w w w.t e x a s a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l .g ov
Page 2
subject of the motion is signed.” AFLOA, 2025 WL 209447 at *4 (citing Tex. Gov’t Code § 2001.146(a)). “A decision or order in a contested case is final on the date that the latest filed motion for rehearing is overruled by operation of law[.]” Id. (citing Tex. Gov’t Code §§ 2001.144(a)(2)(B), 2001.146(c)).
These observations provide context to the definition of “decision or order” in Government Code section 2001.146. A decision or order cannot be a single finding of fact or conclusion of law, or a subset of findings and conclusions, because findings and conclusions cannot themselves be signed or become final and reviewable. Rather, the agency determination in its entirety is signed and appealed. Because the “subject of the complaint” in section 2001.146(h) is the “decision or order,” the final agency determination triggers the subsequent motion for rehearing requirement when that determination as a whole is “modifie[d], correct[ed], or reform[ed] in any respect … including any modification, correction, or reformation that does not change the outcome of the contested case.” Tex. Gov’t Code § 2001.146(h)(1).
AFLOA also recognizes that the default rule under the APA requires “a timely motion for rehearing as a jurisdictional prerequisite to an appeal in a contested case.” AFLOA, 2025 WL 209447 at *5. “Section 2001.146(h)(1)” is “[a]n exception to this general rule,” exempting parties from the motion for rehearing requirement when “the order disposing of the original motion for rehearing” (1) does not “modif[y], correct[], or reform[] in any respect” the original order or (2) makes only a “clerical change identified as such by the agency in the order.” Tex. Gov’t Code § 2001.146(h)(1).
In AFLOA, “[n]either party … contend[ed] that the … Order on Rehearing resulted in only typographical, grammatical, or clerical changes.” 2025 WL 209447 at *5. Thus, “[b]ecause AFLOA failed to file a subsequent motion for rehearing … AFLOA failed to exhaust its administrative remedies, in a manner sufficient to invest the trial court with subject matter jurisdiction.” Id.
In this case, the Public Utility Commission’s order on rehearing likewise made several non-clerical changes. Resp.Br.25-32. This conclusion is certainly true under the plain English meaning of “clerical,” which refers to changes that an ordinary cleric, scrivener, or clerk would be able to make without direction. Clerical Error, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (“a drafter’s or typist’s technical error that
Page 3
can be rectified without serious doubt about the correct reading”); Clerical, Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed. 2003) (“of or relating to a clerk”).
The text of subsection (h) favors this plain-English reading. “When faced with a catchall phrase,” like “other clerical change,” “courts do not necessarily afford it the broadest possible construction it can bear.” Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 603 U.S. 204, 217 (2024). Rather, a catchall term “must be interpreted in light of its surrounding context and read to ‘embrace only objects similar in nature’ to the specific examples preceding it.” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U.S. 497, 512 (2018)). Thus, this ejusdem generis canon requires that the meaning of the general term “other clerical change” be restricted by the specific terms “typographical” and “grammatical” that precede it in subsection (h). Image API, LLC v. Young, 691 S.W.3d 831, 838 n.27 (Tex. 2024) (quoting Hilco Elec. Coop. v. Midlothian Butane Gas Co., 111 S.W.3d 75, 81 (Tex. 2003)). By using “typographical” and “grammatical” to describe clerical errors in subsection (h), the Legislature indicated it was using “clerical” according to its ordinary English meaning, rather than as a broader term of art.
Even according to Oncor’s reading, the Commission made changes that were substantive and required judicial reasoning. Resp.Br.25-32. Because the Commission’s order on rehearing made non-clerical changes under any reading, a second motion for rehearing was required, just as in AFLOA.
Because neither party in AFLOA contended that the changes were all clerical, this Court did not discuss the portion of subsection (h) that requires clerical changes be “identified as such by the agency in the order” to be excepted from the subsequent motion for rehearing requirement. Here, the Commission did not identify its changes as clerical. Resp.Br.32-36.
Oncor claims that by stating that changes were made for “accuracy,” the Commission sufficiently identified the changes as clerical. App.Br.32. That claim is belied by Oncor’s own definition of “accuracy”—“free[] from mistake or error.” Reply.Br.27. An “error” is exactly how Oncor terms the judicial outcome it seeks to appeal. Therefore, “accuracy” clearly encompasses “judicial” errors and is not
Page 4
sufficient to identify a change as clerical, even under Oncor’s definitions of both “accuracy” and “clerical.”
Oncor’s arguments at oral argument based on AFLOA were mistaken. First, Oncor is incorrect that this case is distinguishable from AFLOA. Oncor suggests that the order on rehearing in this case made only “essentially clerical” changes. To the contrary, this case, like AFLOA, does in fact involve significant modifications in the order on rehearing. Resp.Br.25-32. Second, contrary to Oncor’s characterization, AFLOA did not address whether a subsequent motion for rehearing is required after an order on rehearing only makes changes that were “essentially clerical.” In AFLOA, neither party claimed that the changes on rehearing were clerical. Further, subsection (h) does not ask whether changes are “essentially clerical,” but whether they are “identified as such by the agency in the order.” Tex. Gov’t Code § 2001.146(h)(1). Oncor’s reading ignores this identification requirement.
AFLOA’s limited discussion of section 2001.146(h) only supports the Commission’s arguments.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Oncor Electric Delivery Company LLC v. Public Utility Commission of Texas (Oncor Electric Delivery Company LLC v. Public Utility Commission of Texas) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.