Omosefunmi v. Marticio

• Court: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
• Decided: November 17, 1999
• Docket: 99-1281
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

[NOT FOR PUBLICATION NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT] United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit

No. 99-1281

SAMSON OMOSEFUNMI,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

EDWIN MARTICIO; ROBERT LARCONE; UNITED STATES,

Defendants, Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. William G. Young, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Selya, Boudin and Lynch, Circuit Judges.

Samson Omosefunmi on brief pro se. Donald K. Stern, United States Attorney, and Rayford A. Farquhar, Assistant U.S. Attorney, on brief for appellee.

November 16, 1999

Per Curiam. After a careful review of the record and the submissions of the parties, the court affirms the district court's dismissal of the complaint. The district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 2674, as any claim appellant submitted to the Immigration and Naturalization Service did not comply with the requirement of 28 C.F.R. 14.2 that it include a demand for money damages in a sum certain. See Coska v. United States, 114 F.3d 319, 322 (1st Cir. 1997). Appellant's claim that he was deprived of his eighth amendment rights is more properly termed a violation of his due process rights. Lyons v. Powell, 838 F.2d 28, 29 (1st Cir. 1988). And while one cannot argue that racial harassment of detainees could ever be reasonably related to a legitimate administrative goal, see Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 538 (1979), appellant's claim still fails. No protected liberty interest has been identified. See Pittsley v. Warish, 927 F.2d 3, 7 (1st Cir. 1991) ("Fear or emotional injury which results solely from verbal harassment or idle threats is generally not sufficient to constitute an invasion of an identified liberty interest.") (citations omitted). Further, the alleged conduct, while deplorable, does not "shock the conscience." See Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Productions, Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 531 (1995) ("Although we have not foreclosed the possibility that words or verbal harassment may constitute "conscious shocking" behavior in violation of substantive due process rights, . . . our review of the caselaw indicates that the threshold for alleging such claims is high.") (citing Souza v. Pina, 53 F.3d 423, 427 (1st Cir. 1995)). No other basis for a constitutional violation appears in the complaint. Affirmed. See 1st Cir. Loc. R. 27(c).