Omberg v. United States Mutual Accident Ass'n

40 S.W. 909, 101 Ky. 303, 1897 Ky. LEXIS 188
CourtCourt of Appeals of Kentucky
DecidedMay 21, 1897
StatusPublished
Cited by65 cases

This text of 40 S.W. 909 (Omberg v. United States Mutual Accident Ass'n) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Kentucky primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Omberg v. United States Mutual Accident Ass'n, 40 S.W. 909, 101 Ky. 303, 1897 Ky. LEXIS 188 (Ky. Ct. App. 1897).

Opinion

JUDGE HAZELRIGG

delivered the opinion oe the court.

This is an action on a policy of insurance against bodily injuries and death effected through “external, violent and [305]*305accidental means.” The policy was issued by appellee company to Adolph Omberg, and in case of Ms death alone through the means indicated, the indemnity — §5,000—was payable to his wife, who is here the appellant. Upon the conclusion of the trial below it was the opinion of the court that there was a failure of proof to sustain the plaintiff’s contention that her husband’s death had been caused through the means and under the conditions provided for in the policy, and a peremptory instruction followed.

The vital question in the case is w>as the death of Omberg effected through “external, violent and accidental” means, or was his death caused by disease?

Incident to this question is- one respecting the competency of certain testimony offered by the appellant and rejected by the trial judge, conduciug to show the nature and origin of the alleged accident, resulting, as she contends, in the death of the assured.

And still further is the question, whether, conceding that Omberg’s death was the result of the bite of an insect, which produced septic poisoning, as is contended by appellant, payment of the policy is yet to be denied because the insurance was not to extend to or cover accidental injuries or death resulting “from poison in any form or- manner” or “contact with poisonous substances?”

And, first, was the death of the assured the result of a disease or of an accident? Omberg was a traveling salesman of Louisville, Ky., and a stout, healthy man of some forty-eight years of age. On or about July 20,1893, while out on a business trip, he went to his sister’s home in Rome, Q-a.

He was very lame; his foot was swollen and there was an [306]*306inflamed red spot on one of Ms toes, with a pimple or place in the center of the spot, presenting the appearance of a puncture or bite of an insect. He grew worse, complaining solely of his foot; within a few days, the 23d of the month, perhaps, a physician was sent for to treat his foot, who found “an abscess at the base of the fourth toe on the right foot, which was very tender and very much inflamed, with a good deal of redness over the whole top and outside of the foot.” The spot was about as large as a dime, “quite tender to the touch, with á very deep red color and considerably elevated.” In the opinion of the physician the place presented such an appearance as might have resulted “from the sting or bite of an insect.” The physician opened the abscess on the day following his first visit, and there was a discharge of a quantity of “rather unhealthy pus.” In about a week he had a very severe chill, followed by another some two or three hour’s later, accompanied with severe vomiting and followed by purging and persistent vomiting, which continued to his death, on the 12th day of August. 'When asked from what his patient was suffering when he first saw him until his death, the physician answered “some septic poisoning,” commonly called “blood- poisoning;” and, further, that blood poisoning would cause the chills, vomiting, etc. He further testified that the immediate cause of death was the rupture of an aneurism in the abdominal region, and this was itself induced by the persistent and excessive vomiting.. This witness further testified that the bites of insects, such as mosquitoes or fiies often caused blood poisoning, and he had often observed parts badly swollen from mosquito bites and bites from other insects; that he observed no traces of [307]*307any kind of disease in his patient from which he could judge he had heretofore suffered except dyspepsia or indigestion — ■ and these would not have produced blood poisoning. These facts were obtained from a physician who had known the deceased some ten years. A consulting physician of some sixteen years’ experience in infirmaries and hospitals was called in and his testimony is corroborative of his colleague as to the presence of blood poison in the system of the patient. 31 further appears that the physician first sent for, inquired of the patient, who was then only suffering from the infktmed spot on his foot, what caused the trouble, and was told by the patient that “a few days prior to this, early in the morning- and before he got out of bed, the cover was thrown off his feet, and a mosquito bit him on the spot, and that he felt some uncomfortable feeling in this toe that prevented him from wearing his shoe.”

This proposed evidence was rejected. It also appeared that Omberg made similar statements to his sisters when he came to their house in explanation of his lameness and the swollen condition of Ms toe and foot. These statements were also rejected.

The body of Omberg was brought to Louisville, where, in about two weeks after his death and when the remains were badly decomposed and affected by the use of embalming fluid, an autopsy was held which failed to disclose any evidence of blood poisoning, but, on the contrary, conduced to show that death had been caused by disease — namely, by the rupture of an abdominal aneurism — a disease shown to be of gradual development. This is in substance the case and the state of fact presented. The trial court instructed peremptorily for the defendant.

[308]*308We think this was error. Whether the death of Qmberg was caused by blood poisoning itself, superinduced by the bite or sting of some insect, was a question of fact for the jury; the affirmative of these propositions was supported by the evidence of the two attending physicians, and which is confessedly entitled to much weight. Even if we discard the statement of the patient that the spot on the foot was the result of the bite of a mosquito, we still have the condition of the inflamed part, which, in the opinion of an expert, presented such an appearance as might have been caused by the sting or bite of an insect. The jury might have reasonably concluded from this evidence that the injury to the toe was so caused, especially as such a condition is shown not to be an unusual result of such sting or bite. The jury might also have believed that death was caused by blood poisoning, induced by the sting or bite — 'they certainly might have so believed from the evidence of the attending physicians. When.these conclusions on the facts are reached we are of the opinion that, as a matter of law, the death of the assured could be as truly said to have been effected through “external, violent and accidental means” as though death had been caused by the sudden, unforeseen and unexpected bite of a poisonous snake. The bite was external, violent and accidental. If a bite at all it was certainly external. It came from without, and its marks were even visible to the naked eye. The force of it was not as great perhaps as if inflicted by a rattlesnake, but the means were not the less violent within the meaning of the policy. It was also accidental because unexpected, unforeseen and happened as by chance. It was not designed or brought about voluntarily. But for it, the [309]*309blood poisoning and death would not have resulted. The blood poisoning was consequent on the wound;the bite would, therefore, be the proximate cause of death. Death from peritonitis induced 'by a fall, is nevertheless said to have been due to the fall unless the assured already had the disease when he fell. (Freeman v. Mer. Mut. Acc. Assn., 156, Mass., 351).

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

MacKey v. Greenview Hospital, Inc.
587 S.W.2d 249 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky, 1979)
Goldstein v. Sklar
216 A.2d 298 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1966)
Benefit Ass'n of Railway Employees v. France
310 S.W.2d 225 (Supreme Court of Arkansas, 1958)
Lathem v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.
3 S.E.2d 916 (Court of Appeals of Georgia, 1939)
Spackman v. Benefit Ass'n of Ry. Employees.
89 P.2d 490 (Utah Supreme Court, 1939)
Kraut v. State
280 N.W. 327 (Wisconsin Supreme Court, 1938)
Dixon v. Travelers Protective Ass'n of America
113 S.W.2d 1086 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 1938)
Spence v. Bethlehem Steel Co.
197 A. 302 (Court of Appeals of Maryland, 1938)
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Williams
178 So. 477 (Mississippi Supreme Court, 1938)
Burns v. Employers Liability Ass'n
26 Ohio Law. Abs. 52 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 1937)
Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp. v. Glover
182 S.E. 221 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1935)
Hahn v. Home Life Ins. Co.
84 S.W.2d 361 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 1935)
Provident Life & Accident Insurance v. Diehlman
82 S.W.2d 350 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976), 1935)
Bell v. Travelers' Ins. Co.
79 S.W.2d 824 (Court of Appeals of Tennessee, 1935)
Mutual Life Insurance v. Davis
173 S.E. 471 (Court of Appeals of Georgia, 1934)
Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of United States v. Fannin
53 S.W.2d 703 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976), 1932)
Cleveland Ry. Co. v. Merk
180 N.E. 51 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1932)
Reinoehl v. Hamacher Pole & Lumber Co.
6 P.2d 860 (Idaho Supreme Court, 1931)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
40 S.W. 909, 101 Ky. 303, 1897 Ky. LEXIS 188, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/omberg-v-united-states-mutual-accident-assn-kyctapp-1897.