OMAR J. ROSS, SR. v. THE STATE OF FLORIDA

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
DecidedMarch 29, 2023
Docket22-2064
StatusPublished

This text of OMAR J. ROSS, SR. v. THE STATE OF FLORIDA (OMAR J. ROSS, SR. v. THE STATE OF FLORIDA) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
OMAR J. ROSS, SR. v. THE STATE OF FLORIDA, (Fla. Ct. App. 2023).

Opinion

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed March 29, 2023.

________________

No. 3D22-2064 Lower Tribunal No. F21-1264 ________________

Omar J. Ross, Sr., Appellant,

vs.

The State of Florida, Appellee.

An Appeal under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(b)(2) from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Robert T. Watson, Judge.

Omar J. Ross, Sr., in proper person.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Richard L. Polin, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

Before SCALES, LINDSEY and BOKOR, JJ.

SCALES, J.

On Confession of Error Appellant Omar J. Ross, Sr. purports to appeal the trial court’s

November 3, 2022 denial of Ross’s pro se postconviction motion, made

pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(c). 1 Based on the

State’s commendable confession of error, we treat Ross’s appeal as a

petition for writ of certiorari, quash the challenged order, and remand to allow

the trial court to adjudicate the merits of Ross’s motion without regard to

whether Ross’s trial lawyer adopted Ross’s postconviction motion.

As a result of a plea deal entered on August 12, 2022, Ross – while

represented by the public defender – was convicted and sentenced to thirty-

six months in prison on one charge and thirty-one months on another charge,

with the sentences to run concurrently. Pursuant to the plea deal, Ross’s

incarceration was to be followed by five years of probation.

On October 19, 2022, Ross, now pro se, filed his rule 3.800(c) motion

seeking a reduction in his sentence. Ross’s motion alleged that Ross was

suffering from mental disorders and was amenable to treatment. On

November 3, 2022, the trial court entered the challenged order summarily

denying Ross’s motion. The adjudicatory portion of the order reads as

follows: “DENIED WITHOUT A HEARING. NOT ADOPTED BY DEFENSE

1 Rule 3.800(c) provides the terms and deadlines by which a trial court may reduce or modify a criminal sentence.

2 COUNSEL” (all capital letters in original). 2 Ross timely sought appellate

review of this order.

Because a trial court’s adjudication of a criminal defendant’s rule

3.800(c) postconviction motion seeking to mitigate a sentence is purely

discretionary, orders denying such motions are not subject to appeal.

Spaulding v. State, 93 So. 3d 473, 474 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (“It is well

established that an order denying a motion under rule 3.800(c) is not

appealable”); Stavely v. State, 866 So. 2d 1239, 1240 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)

(“An order denying a rule 3.800(c) motion is usually not an appealable order,

because the trial court’s ruling is purely discretionary.”). The order, however,

may be reviewed under this Court’s certiorari jurisdiction, if the order

represents a departure from the essential requirements of law resulting in

irreparable injury. Montesino v. State, 231 So. 3d 514, 515 (Fla. 3d DCA

2017); Stavely, 866 So. 2d at 1240.

The trial court denied Ross’s postconviction motion because Ross’s

motion had not been adopted by Ross’s lawyer. Indeed, under Logan v.

State, 846 So. 2d 472, 475 (Fla. 2003), a pro se motion filed by a criminal

2 The following prefatory language appears in the order: “the Motion being insufficient in support of the relief prayed.” It is unclear whether, by including this language in the order, the trial court intended to address the merits of Ross’s claim. In any event, the adjudicatory portion of the order plainly denies Ross’s motion because it was not adopted by defense counsel.

3 defendant who is represented by counsel is generally not cognizable. As the

State concedes, however, when Ross filed his rule 3.800(c) motion, Ross

was no longer represented by counsel. See Baker v. State, 210 So. 3d 140,

141 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016). Logan’s strictures, therefore, did not preclude the

trial court from reaching and adjudicating the merits of Ross’s pro se

postconviction motion.

We, therefore, treat Ross’s appeal of the trial court’s November 3, 2022

order as a petition for writ of certiorari, quash the challenged order, and

remand to allow the trial court to conduct whatever proceedings the trial court

deems necessary to adjudicate the merits of Ross’s motion without regard

to the strictures of Logan. 3

Order quashed.

3 We express no opinion as to the merits of Ross’s motion.

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Related

Staveley v. State
866 So. 2d 1239 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 2004)
Logan v. State
846 So. 2d 472 (Supreme Court of Florida, 2003)
Baker v. State
210 So. 3d 140 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 2016)
Spaulding v. State
93 So. 3d 473 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 2012)

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OMAR J. ROSS, SR. v. THE STATE OF FLORIDA, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/omar-j-ross-sr-v-the-state-of-florida-fladistctapp-2023.