Olson v. Reed

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedAugust 16, 2024
Docket2:24-cv-00916
StatusUnknown

This text of Olson v. Reed (Olson v. Reed) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Olson v. Reed, (E.D. Wis. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

TIMOTHY LUTHER OLSON,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 24-cv-0916-bhl

KATIE R. YORK, TIMOTHY C. SAMUELSON, JULIE M. SPOKE, THOMAS H. REED, FRANCIS X. SULLIVAN, KATHRYN GALAROWICZ, SARAH E. PETERSON, JOEL R. WITT, JEREMIAH C. VAN HECKE, JOHN DOE OFFICE SUPERVISOR, WISCONSIN STATE DEFENDERS OFFICE, HON. MILTON L. CHILDS, TINA HUDSON, and SARA N. SANDOWSKI,

Defendants.

SCREENING ORDER

Plaintiff Timothy Olson, who is currently incarcerated at the Milwaukee County Jail and representing himself, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging that his civil rights were violated. This matter comes before the Court on Olson’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the full filing fee and to screen the complaint. MOTION TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYING THE FILING FEE Olson has requested leave to proceed without prepaying the full filing fee (in forma pauperis). A prisoner plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis is required to pay the full amount of the $350.00 filing fee over time. See 28 U.S.C. §1915(b)(1). As required under 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(2), Olson has filed a certified copy of his prison trust account statement for the six-month period immediately preceding the filing of his complaint and has been assessed and paid an initial partial filing fee of $38.67. Olson’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee will be granted.

SCREENING OF THE COMPLAINT The Court has a duty to review any complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity and must dismiss any complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised any claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(b). In screening a complaint, the Court must determine whether the complaint complies with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and states at least plausible claims for which relief may be granted. To state a cognizable claim under the federal notice pleading system, a plaintiff is required to provide a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that [he] is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). It

must be at least sufficient to provide notice to each defendant of what he or she is accused of doing, as well as when and where the alleged actions or inactions occurred, and the nature and extent of any damage or injury the actions or inactions caused. “The pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “The tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. A complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 556. “[T]he complaint’s allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above

the speculative level.” Id. at 555 (internal quotations omitted). ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT Olson sues the Wisconsin Public Defenders Office and some of its employees, Milwaukee County Circuit Court Judge Milton L. Childs, employees of the Wisconsin Office of Lawyer Regulation and the Judicial Commission, Wisconsin District Attorney Sara Sandowski, and police officer Brian Zalewski. Olson alleges that Judge Childs colluded with the Wisconsin Public Defenders Office by directing that a particular attorney be appointed to represent him in his ongoing criminal proceedings. He also alleges that supervisors at the Public Defenders Office turned a blind eye to this so-called misconduct and failed to report this and various other ethical violations. He further alleges that employees of the Office of Lawyer Regulation turned a blind

eye to various violations and failed to enforce the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s Rules of Professional Conduct when he brought the violations to their attention. Olson also asserts that the prosecutor in his criminal case and Officer Zalewski have withheld evidence that would exonerate him. THE COURT’S ANALYSIS Olson’s complaint fails to state a claim for the following reasons. First, to state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983, a plaintiff must allege that someone deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, and that whoever deprived him of this right was acting under the color of state law. D.S. v. E. Porter Cty. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Buchanan–Moore v. Cty. of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009)). Defense attorneys, whether state public defenders or privately retained counsel, are not “state actors” and therefore cannot be sued under §1983. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981); see also Cornes v. Munoz, 724 F.2d 61, 63 (7th Cir. 1983). Olson therefore does not state

a claim under §1983 against the Wisconsin Public Defenders Office or any of its employees. Next, Judge Childs enjoys absolute immunity for acts committed within his judicial jurisdiction. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967). “This immunity applies even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly . . . .” Id. Given that it was within the Judge’s duties to confer with the Public Defender’s Office regarding the appointment of a lawyer to represent Olson, he is immune from claims alleging corruption in connection with the execution of those duties. In any event, the Court notes that Olson has identified no harm as a result of this alleged impropriety. According to the Wisconsin Circuit Court Access database, Attorney Kerri Cleghorn was appointed on October 19, 2023, and Judge Childs granted her motion to withdraw on November 20, 2023. See State of Wisconsin v. Olson, Case No. 2022CF4696. Per the docket,

Cleghorn’s motion to withdraw is the only ruling that occurred during that period. Accordingly, it is unclear what harm Olson suffered even if he believes her appointment was improper.

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Olson v. Reed, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/olson-v-reed-wied-2024.