Olmer Augusto Galan Cevallos v. Christopher Chestnut, et al.

District Court, E.D. California·Decided March 5, 2026·No. 2:26-cv-00288·Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 OLMER AUGUSTO GALAN No. 2:26-cv-0288-DAD-CKD P CEVALLOS, 11 Petitioner, 12 FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS v. 13 CHRISTOPHER CHESTNUT, et al., 14 Respondents. 15

16 17 Petitioner Olmer Augusto Galan Cevallos filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 18 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This action was referred to the undersigned by operation of Local 19 Rule 302(c)(17) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The petition, respondents’ response to the petition 20 and motion to dismiss, and petitioner’s reply are before the court. (ECF Nos. 1, 9, 10.) For the 21 reasons set forth below, the undersigned will recommend the petition be granted and respondents 22 be ordered to provide Mr. Galan Cevallos a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge. 23 I. Background 24 Under the petition’s allegations, Mr. Galan Cevallos is a citizen of Ecuador has been 25 residing in the United States since around June 15, 2005, when he entered without inspection after 26 harm or threat by a gang in Ecuador. (ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 1, 11, 43.) On or around December 31, 2025, 27 he was apprehended by Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). (Id., ¶ 2.) He alleges he 28 remains in detention without the opportunity for a bond hearing under Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 1 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). (Id., ¶ 3.) 2 The petition brings the following four claims: (1) denial of a bond hearing in violation of 3 the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”); (2) violation of the Administrative Procedure Act 4 (“APA”); (3) due process violation; and (4) violation of the final order in Lazaro Maldonado 5 Bautista et al. v. Ernesto Santacruz Jr. et al., No. 5:25-cv-01873, of which petitioner is a class 6 member. (ECF No. 1 at 10-12.) Petitioner primarily seeks an order for a bond hearing before an 7 immigration judge or, in the alternative, release. (Id., ¶ 7; ECF No. 10 at 12.) 8 In their response and motion to dismiss, respondents contend petitioner is ineligible for a 9 bond hearing because he is an “applicant for admission” subject to mandatory detention by ICE 10 under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). (ECF No. 9 at 2.) Because petitioner does not possess a right to 11 freedom from immigration detention in any form other than the form provided by Congress, 12 respondents argue, the petition should be denied. (Id. at 2.) Respondents also ask the court to hold 13 the matter in abeyance pending the Ninth Circuit’s resolution of Rodriguez v. Bostock, 779 14 F.Supp.3d 1239, 9th Cir. Docket No. 25-6842. 15 II. Legal Standard 16 The Constitution guarantees the availability of the writ of habeas corpus “to every 17 individual detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) 18 (citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). Relevant here, “in cases that do not involve a final order of 19 removal, federal habeas corpus jurisdiction remains in the district court” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 20 2241 where the petitioner “challenges his confinement on statutory and constitutional grounds.” 21 Nadaraja v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1069, 1075-76 (9th Cir. 2006); accord Flores-Torres v. Mukasey, 22 548 F.3d 708, 713 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding “the district court has jurisdiction over Torres’s 23 habeas petition challenging his detention” in ICE custody). 24 III. Discussion 25 Petitioner alleges he is subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). (ECF No. 1, ¶ 6.) 26 Respondents assert petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). 27 “Where a [noncitizen] falls within this statutory scheme can affect whether his detention is 28 mandatory or discretionary, as well as the kind of review process available to him if he wishes to 1 contest the necessity of his detention.” Prieto-Romero v. Clark, 534 F.3d 1053, 1057 (9th Cir. 2 2008). 3 It is undisputed that petitioner entered the United States without inspection around 2005 4 and has resided in the country since then.1 “Numerous district courts have held that § 1226, rather 5 than § 1225, applies to individuals who were physically present in the United States for some 6 period of time before they were detained by ICE.” Gutierrez v. Chesnut, No. 1:25-cv-1515 DAD 7 AC (HC), 2025 WL 3514495, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2025); see also Singh v. Bondi, et al., No. 8 1:26-cv-0490 DAD DMC, 2026 WL 221373, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2026) (“[B]ecause 9 petitioner resided in the United States from 2013 to December 11, 2025 when he was re-detained, 10 respondents’ assertion that petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2) is 11 unsupported.”). The reasoning of those cases is persuasive. See also Castañon-Nava v. U.S. Dep’t 12 of Homeland Security, 161 F.4th 1048, 1060-62 (7th Cir. 2025) (concluding DHS is “not likely to 13 succeed on the merits of their argument that those individuals, whom ICE arrested without a 14 warrant [in the interior of the United States], are subject to mandatory detention under § 15 1225(b)(2)(A)”); but see Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494, 502 (5th Cir. 2026) 16 (holding individuals who have never been formally admitted into the United States and who are 17 arrested in the interior of the country are properly subject to detention under § 1225(b)(2)). 18 The court finds petitioner is currently detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Section 19 1226(a) expressly authorizes release on bond, and its authorizing regulations provide for 20 immigration judges to convene bond hearings. After arresting a noncitizen, the government “may 21 continue to detain the arreste[e]” until a final removal decision is made or “may release” them on 22 “bond” or “conditional parole.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1)-(2). If a noncitizen wishes to contest the 23 initial custody determination—i.e., the denial or amount of bond—the noncitizen has a right to do 24 so before an immigration judge. 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(d)(1), 1236.1(d)(1). Accordingly, respondents 25 are violating the INA, as codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), by detaining petitioner without a bond 26 hearing. Habeas relief is warranted on petitioner’s statutory claim. 27 1 The record contains no indication petitioner was arrested or placed in immigration custody at or 28 near the time he entered the United States. 1 Petitioner alternately requests relief in the form of release or a bond hearing where DHS 2 bears the burden of establishing he is a flight risk or a danger to the community. (ECF No. 1 at 3 12.) Petitioner provides no authority showing he is entitled to an order of release. Considering § 4 1226(a)’s discretionary detention framework, and the absence of any prior release on bond 5 pursuant to § 1226(a), an order directing respondents to provide a bond hearing is the appropriate 6 remedy. See 8 U.S.C.

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Olmer Augusto Galan Cevallos v. Christopher Chestnut, et al., (E.D. Cal. 2026).

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Related

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld
542 U.S. 507 (Supreme Court, 2004)
Prieto-Romero v. Clark
534 F.3d 1053 (Ninth Circuit, 2008)
Flores-Torres v. Mukasey
548 F.3d 708 (Ninth Circuit, 2008)
Citizens for Appropriate Rural Roads, Inc. v. Foxx
14 F. Supp. 3d 1217 (S.D. Indiana, 2014)
Yajure Hurtado
29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (Board of Immigration Appeals, 2025)