Olivia Campbell v. JWC Property Management Agent for JMCK Properties LLC

• Court: Texas Court of Appeals, 8th District (El Paso)
• Decided: May 5, 2026
• Docket: 08-26-00010-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

COURT OF APPEALS EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS EL PASO, TEXAS ————————————

No. 08-26-00010-CV

————————————

Olivia Campbell, Appellant

v.

JWC Property Management Agent for JMCK Properties LLC, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No 1 Bell County, Texas Trial Court No. 25CCV01713

M E MO RA N D UM O PI NI O N 1 Appellant, Olivia Campbell, appeals from the trial court’s November 21, 2025 judgment

awarding possession of real property located at 4805 Sterling Circle, Killeen, Texas to Appellee,

1 This case was transferred pursuant to the Texas Supreme Court’s docket equalization efforts. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 73.001. We follow the precedent of the Third Court of Appeals to the extent it might conflict with our own. See Tex. R. App. P. 41.3. JWC Property Management, Agent for JMCK Properties LLC (JWC). On April 13, 2026, JWC

filed a motion to dismiss the appeal as moot, arguing that a writ of possession had been executed

in this case, that Campbell is no longer in possession of the property, and that the appeal is therefore

moot. We grant JWC’s motion, vacate the trial court’s judgment, and dismiss this appeal as moot.

“The only issue in a forcible detainer action is the right to actual possession of the

premises.” Marshall v. Hous. Auth. Of City of San Antonio, 198 S.W.3d 782, 785 (Tex. 2006); see

Tex. R. Civ. P. 510.6(f); Herrmann v. Credit Union of Tex., No. 04-25-00209-CV, 2025 WL

2235001, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 6, 2025, pet. denied) (per curiam) (mem. op.). A

judgment awarding possession in a forcible detainer action only determines the right to immediate

possession of the property, without determining whether the eviction is wrongful. See Marshall,

198 S.W.3d at 787; Herrmann, 2025 WL 2235001, at *1; Resendez v. FV REO I, LLC, No. 03-13-

00201-CV, 2014 WL 411720, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin Jan. 31, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (quoting

Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at 787). If a defendant in a forcible detainer proceeding wishes to assert a

challenge to the title to the property or to the foreclosure process employed in an underlying

proceeding, the defendant must pursue such a challenge in a separate suit. See Childress v. U.S.

Bank Trust, N.A. as Trustee for LSF10 Master Participation Tr., No. 06-23-00024-CV, 2023 WL

5498960, at *3 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Aug. 25, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (quoting Herrera v.

Bank of Am., No. 06-15-00081-CV 2016 WL 3655055, at *3 (Tex. App.—Texarkana July 7, 2016,

no pet.) (mem. op.)); Resendez, 2014 WL 411720, at *2; Schlichting v. Lehman Bros. Bank FSB,

346 S.W.3d 196, 199 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, pet. dism’d).

After a trial court awards possession to a plaintiff in a forcible detainer action, “if a proper

supersedeas bond is not filed, the judgment may be enforced, including issuance of a writ of

possession evicting the tenant from the premises.” Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at 786; see Herrmann,

2025 WL 2235001, at *1; see also Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 24.007 (prohibiting a county court’s

2 judgment in an eviction suit from being stayed pending appeal unless the appellant files a

supersedeas bond within 10 days of the signing of the judgment); Tex. R. Civ. P. 510.23 (same).

Further, if a writ of possession is executed and the appellant is no longer in possession of the

property, an appeal from the forcible detainer action becomes moot unless the appellant asserts a

potentially meritorious claim of right to current, actual possession of the property. 2 See Marshall,

198 S.W.3d at 787; Williams v. Orca Realty, LLC, No. 01-23-00854-CV, 2024 WL 4776215, at *2

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 14, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.). Finally, if an appeal from a

forcible detainer action is moot, we must vacate the trial court’s judgment of possession and

dismiss the appeal. See Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at 785, 790; Herrmann, 2025 WL 2235001, at *2;

Williams, 2024 WL 4776215, at *4.

Here, the record shows that, after the justice court issued judgment awarding possession of

the property to JWC, Campbell filed a notice of appeal. Campbell then filed an answer in the

county court, arguing that “[t]he foreclosure was fraudulent” and that “[t]here is a pending case in

District Court . . . challenging the foreclosure.” The county court subsequently issued a judgment

awarding possession of the property to JWC.

Campbell timely appealed the county court’s judgment. In her notice of appeal, Campbell

again argued that “[t]he eviction is based on a foreclosure,” that “the foreclosure validity is pending

in district court,” and that “[t]he foreclosure is void.” Campbell did not, however, file a supersedeas

bond. As a result, a deputy constable executed a writ of possession on the property on January 9,

2026.

2 We note that, if the trial court also awards attorney’s fees in its judgment, “[a] dispute over attorney’s fees is a live controversy that may prevent an entire case from becoming moot.” Williams v. Orca Realty, LLC, No. 01-23-00854- CV, 2024 WL 4776215, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 14, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.); see Daftary v. Prestonwood Mkt. Square, Ltd., 399 S.W.3d 708, 711–12 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, pet. denied); cf. Tex. Prop. Code. § 24.006 (authorizing award of attorney’s fees in an eviction suit). Here, however, the trial court did not consider or award attorney’s fees in its judgment.

3 The record therefore shows that a writ of possession was executed and Campbell is no

longer in possession of the property. Further, although Campbell filed a response in opposition to

JWC’s motion, she does not assert a potentially meritorious claim of right to current, actual

possession of the property. See Moore v. Benitez, No. 14-20-00057-CV, 2020 WL 2070753, at *1

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] April 30, 2020, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.); cf. Herrmann,

2025 WL 2235001, at *2 (holding that the appellants became tenants at sufferance after the

property was foreclosed and that they were “unable to assert a potentially meritorious claim of

right to current, actual possession of the property”); Roberts v. CitiMortgage, Inc., No. 06-18-

00024-CV, 2018 WL 5831333, at *3 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Nov. 8, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.)

(holding that the substance of the appellants’ arguments “intertwine[d] title issues with possession

issues,” that the arguments “amount[ed] to attacks on the underlying foreclosure process, which

attacks [were] not properly resolved in a forcible detainer action,” and that the claims did “not

amount to a separate claim of a right to possession”); Resendez, 2014 WL 411720, at *2 (“Because

the Resendezes’ attack on the underlying foreclosure process cannot be resolved in this forcible

detainer proceeding, we conclude that they have failed to assert a potentially meritorious right to

possession.”).

Accordingly, we conclude that this appeal is moot. We grant JWC’s motion, vacate the trial

court’s judgment, and dismiss the case and this appeal as moot. We dismiss any other pending

motions as moot.

GINA M. PALAFOX, Justice

May 5, 2026

Before Salas Mendoza, C.J., Palafox and Soto, JJ.