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8 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM 9 ANGEL LUIS OLIVERAS, JR., DOMESTIC CASE NO. DM0385-19 10 PLAINTIFF,
11
12 vs. DECISION AND ORDER (Defendant's Motion to Dismiss)
13 KAITL YN OLIVERAS, 14 DEFENDANT.
15
16 INTRODUCTION 17 This matter came before the Honorable Anita A. Sukola on December 5, 2019, upon a 18 motion hearing for Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Complaint for Divorce. Mot. Dismiss (Sept. 11, 19 2019). Kaitlyn Oliveras ("Defendant") is represented by Attorney Daron J. Berman of Berman 20 O'Connor & Mann. Angel Luis Oliveras, Jr., ("Plaintiff') is represented by Darleen E. Hiton of 21 Phillips & Bordallo, P.C. Upon review of the parties' pleadings, oral arguments and legal authorities, 22 the Court hereby DENIES Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. 23 BACKGROUND 24 Plaintiff and Defendant married on September 4, 2009, in the state of Washington, and have 25 since been husband and wife. Verified Am. Compl. at !J[ 2 (Oct. 22, 2019). Plaintiff is an active 26 member of the U.S. Armed Forces, i.e. the U.S. Navy. ld. at !J[ 4. Defendant works in Arkansas and 27 earns ten dollars per hour. Def.'s Decl. at !J[ 8 (Sept. 17, 2019). The parties' have two children 28 together: Brielle Oliveras (DOB: 09/23/2010) and Anthony Oliveras (DOB: 07/24/2012). Def.'s
DM0385-19 Angel Oliveras, Jr. v. Kaitlyn Oliveras DECISION AND ORDER (Motion to Dismiss) ORIGINAL Page 1 of9 1 Decl. at <JI 6. The parties share custody over the children; Defendant retains primary physical custody, 2 whereas Plaintiff is given reasonable visitation. Ex. "A" at <JI 3 (Jul. 30, 2019); Verified Am. Compl. 3 at <JI 7. 4 The parties lived together from 2009 to 2016 but began living separately in 2017. 1 De f.'s 5 Decl. at <JI 4. Together, the parties lived in: Washington (2009-2010), Guam (2010-2012), and 6 California (2012-2016). /d. In 2017, Defendant moved to Arkansas, where she and the children 7 currently reside. /d. Plaintiff returned to Guam in February 2018, where he purportedly began 8 establishing residency. Opp'n Mot. at 2, 6 (Oct. 22, 2019); Pl.'s Decl. at <JI 6 (Oct. 22, 2019). He has
9 since involved himself in another ongoing romantic relationship. Opp'n Mot. at 3; Pl.'s Decl. at <JI 8. 10 On July 11,2019, Plaintiff filed a Verified Complaint for Divorce with the Superior Court of
11 Guam. Compl. (Jul. 11, 2019). A month later, Defendant filed an Answer. Answer (Aug. 14, 2019). 12 She subsequently filed her Motion to Dismiss Complaint for Divorce with the Superior Court of
13 Guam on September 11, 2019. Mot. Dismiss (Sept. 11, 2019). Attached was her Exhibit "A," a 14 Petition for Dissolution of Marriage in Benton County, Arkansas filed July 30, 2019. Def.'s Decl. at
15 <JI 6; Ex. "A". She filed her declaration shortly after. 16 On October 22, 2019, Plaintiff responded with an Opposition to Defendant's Motion to 17 Dismiss Complaint for Divorce, a Motion to Amend Complaint and a Verified Amended Complaint 18 for Divorce. Mot. Amd. (Oct. 22, 2019). Plaintiff made several amendments, like the addition of 19 "irreconcilable differences." Verified Am. Compl. at <JI 5. The Court heard oral arguments for all 20 motions on December 5, 2019, and took the matter under advisement. 21 DISCUSSION 22 The issue before the Court is whether this tribunal is an appropriate forum to adjudicate the 23 parties' dissolution of marriage. Defendant seeks dismissal by asserting Guam is an improper forum 24 under the pleading requirements of Guam Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b) and the forum non 25 conveinens doctrine. Mot. Dismiss at 1. Plaintiff opposes dismissal and maintains Guam is an
26 appropriate forum under local statute and the divisible divorce concept. Opp'n Mot. at 2-6. 27 1 The date of separation is disputed: Plaintiff states September 2016 but Defendant states October 2018. Verified Am.
28 Compl. at<[ 6; Ex. "A" at<[ 2. However, the record supports separation in 2016 as Defendant relocated to Arkansas without Plaintiff in 2017. Def.' s Dec!. at<[ 4.
DM0385-19 Angel Oliveras, Jr. v. Kaitlyn Oliveras DECISION AND ORDER (Motion to Dismiss) Page 2 of9 1 (1) GUAM HAS JURISDICTION OVER PLAINTIFF
2 Defendant states Guam lacks adjudicating authority because the parties and matters fall 3 outside its jurisdiction. The Court disagrees and finds dismissal is improper under Guam's 4 dissolution laws.
5 a. Guam Has Subject-Matter Jurisdiction over Plaintiff 6 A court has subject-matter jurisdiction over a party if he "is entitled to have the court decide 7 the merits of the dispute or of particular issues." Benevente v. Taitano, 2006 Guam 15 <][ 14 (quoting 8 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)). See Speicher v. Speicher, 2013 Guam 11 <][ 19 ("States
9 have a strong public policy interest in the marital status of persons domiciled in their jurisdiction."). 10 Guam has jurisdiction over divorce and dissolutions of marriage if "one (1) of the parties has been a
11 resident of Guam for at least ninety (90) days immediately preceding the filing of a complaint for 12 divorce, or dissolution of marriage." 19 GCA § 8318(a) (2017). For the limited purposes of divorce
13 or dissolution of marriage, a party is a resident of Guam if: 14 [O]ne (1) of the parties has been assigned with the U.S. Military to a unit on Guam or a ship home-ported in Guam for at least ninety (90) days immediately preceding 15 the filing of a complaint for divorce or dissolution of marriage or . .. one (1) of the parties is physically present in Guam for at least ninety (90) days immediately 16 preceding the filing of a complaint for divorce or dissolution of marriage.
17 19 GCA § 8318(a) (emphasis added). Residency in contested actions for divorce or dissolutions 18 must be both pled and proven. 2 !d. at§ 8319. If a party can prove physical presence on Guam for the 19 ninety days which immediately precede the complaint's filing date, a conclusive presumption of 20 residency will form. !d. at§§ 8318-19. 21 Plaintiff states he is a resident of Guam because he satisfies all the conditions requisite to 22 establisping residency. !d. at § 8318(a). Plaintiff offers his continuous residence on Guam since 23 February 28, 2018, which currently estimates a period well beyond ninety days. Opp'n Mot. at 2, 6; 24 Pl.'s Dec!. at <][ 6. Between Plaintiff's alleged outset of residency and the complaint's original filing 25 date, a period of approximately 498 days has passed. See Compl. at 1; see also Pl.'s Decl. at <][ 6. 26 This approximation unmistakably satisfies the residency requirements of divorce and dissolution,
27 2 28 Divorces and dissolutions with consent have separate conditions which only require a plea or proof. !d. at § 8318-19.
The Court will not address any dispute of consent as this matter's adjudication contradicts such claim.
DM0385-19 Angel Oliveras, Jr. v. Kaitlyn Oliveras DECISION AND ORDER (Motion to Dismiss) Page 3 of9 1 which in turn deems Plaintiff a resident of Guam by conclusive presumption. See 19 GCA § 5103 2 ("A presumption is a deduction which the law expressly directs to be made from particular facts."); 3 see also id. at § 5105 ("A presumption, unless declared by law to be conclusive, may be controverted 4 by other evidence, direct or indirect, but unless so controverted, the judges and juries are bound to 5 find according to the presumption in all civil cases."). The Court finds Plaintiff is a resident of Guam 6 under local statute; thus Guam has valid subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff.
7 b. Guam Has Personal Jurisdiction over Plaintiff 8 A court has jurisdiction over a party if he can establish a prima facie showing of personal
9 jurisdiction with reasonable particularity. Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand Tech., Inc., 674 F.3d 1218, 10 1196-97, 1223 (9th Cir. 2011); Frungillo v. Imperia Entm't, Inc., No. 2: 14-mc-00047-KJM-CKD, 11 2015 WL 619628, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2015) (citations omitted). Perez v. United States, 103 12 F.Supp. 3d 1180, 1196 (S.D. Cal. 2015) (citing Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Portage La Prairie Mut. Ins.
13 Co., 907 F.2d 911, 912 (9th Cir. 1990). Should any factual dispute arise, conflicting evidence is 14 resolved in favor of the plaintiff, while uncontroverted evidence is taken at face-value. Perez, 103
15 F.Supp. 3d at 1196-97. Here, a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction is found using the same 16 analysis above. 17 To establish authority over divorce or dissolution, Guam does not compel complete 18 jurisdiction; jurisdiction over one will suffice. 19 GCA §§ 8318(a), 8319(a) (amending an earlier 19 code which presumed having jurisdiction over a wife based on her husband's domicile or residency); 20 see Miller v. Miller, DCA No. 90-00015, 1990 WL 320352 (D. Guam Oct. 22, 1990). This Court has 21 already defined Plaintiff as a resident of Guam by virtue of presumptive conclusion. See 19 GCA § 22 8319 ("Physical presence in Guam for ninety (90) days next preceding the commencement of the 23 action shall give rise to a conclusive presumption of residence in Guam .... "); see also Benevente, 24 2006 Guam <J[ 4 (citations omitted). For this reason, further jurisdictional analysis of Plaintiff would 25 be unnecessary. On the above findings, the Court concludes the same: Plaintiff satisfies all the 26 requisite statutory terms which entitle him dissolution of marriage, thus Guam has valid personal 27 jurisdiction over Plaintiff. 28 I
DM0385-19 Angel Oliveras, Jr. v. Kaitlyn Oliveras DECISION AND ORDER (Motion to Dismiss) Page 4 of9 1 (2) GUAM IS NOT AN INAPPROPRIATE FORUM 2 Defendant states Guam is an inappropriate forum because its authority does not extend to
3 subjects independent from Guam i.e. subjects which exist in Arkansas. The Court disagrees and 4 finds dismissal is improper under divisible divorce- irrespective of forum non conveniens.
5 a. Divisible Divorce 6 The concept of divisible divorce recognizes the underlying public interest in permitting legal 7 separation of those marital relationships in which "legitimate objects of matrimony have been utterly 8 destroyed." Hull v. Super. Ct. L.A. Cty., 352 P.2d 161, 163 (Cal. 1960) (internal quotations and
9 citations omitted). The guiding principle is "financial responsibility and marital status may be 10 separately litigated at different times and in different forums." ld. at 165. "[D]ivisible divorce is
11 more than a jurisdictional concept." ld. It allows courts to terminate the parties' marital relationship 12 without triggering a slew of pending or unrelated disputes, e.g. child custody, property. In re
13 Marriage of Gray, 251 Cal. Rptr. 846, 850 (Ct. App. 1988). 14 To dissolve a marriage on Guam, a judgment by "a court of competent jurisdiction" must
15 decree such dissolution on permissible grounds. 19 GCA §§ 8201, 8203. Courts have some 16 discretionary power in granting decrees of dissolution. ld. at § 8203. However, if a plaintiff satisfies
17 the statutory requirements of divorce or dissolution, then that decree of dissolution must be granted. 18 See Speicher, 2013 Guam at <J[ 20 (stating the decision to terminate a marital relationship falls outside 19 court discretion if the marriage is within jurisdictional control and for irreconcilable differences). 20 Plaintiff's amended complaint seeks a judgment that decrees dissolution of marriage based 21 on irreconcilable differences. "Irreconcilable differences are those grounds which are determined by 22 the Court to be substantial reasons for not continuing the marriage and which make it appear that the 23 marriage should be dissolved." 19 GCA § 8219. Analogous to Speicher, if Plaintiff can prove he 24 satisfies the requisite statutes pertinent to dissolving his marriage, then Guam is an appropriate 25 authority and forum to grant such dissolution. 2013 Guam at <J[ 20. 26 i. Irreconcilable Differences 27 "A dissolution of marriage based on [irreconcilable differences] requires proof of 'substantial 28 marital problems which have so impaired the marriage relationship that the legitimate objects of
DM0385-19 Angel Oliveras, Jr. v. Kaitlyn Oliveras DECISION AND ORDER (Motion to Dismiss) Page5of9 1 matrimony have been destroyed and as to which there is no reasonable possibility of elimination, 2 correction or resolution."' In reMarriage of Garcia, 221 Cal. Rptr. 3d 319, 329 (App. 4th 2017)
3 (citing In reMarriage of Walton, 104 Cal. Rptr. 472, 481 (App. 4th 1972)). 3 The determination of 4 irreconcilable differences is not an objective one. In re Walton, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 479. It requires 5 neither a finding of fault nor direct evidence of objective reasoning. In re Marriage of Greenway, 6 158 Cal. Rptr. 364, 383-84 (App. 4th 2013). Instead, a court "must depend to a considerable extent 7 on the subjective minds of the parties." In re Walton, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 479. An irreconcilable 8 difference analysis merely examines a party's subjective state of mind. In re Greenway, 158 Cal.
9 Rptr. at 383. "It is sufficient evidence for a party to subjectively decide the marriage is over and 10 there is no hope of reconciliation." !d. at 383-84.
11 In Greenway, a husband sought divorce from his wife for irreconcilable differences. !d. at
12 382. His testimony revealed he sought to participate in his legal separation case against her as she 13 became intolerable to live with; she interfered with his medical care; and their relationship had
14 already been bad for the ·past thirty years. !d. at 383. The court granted the husband request for
15 divorce based on irreconcilable differences and stated, "a marriage can break down without direct 16 evidence of an affair or identifiable major disagreement between the parties." !d. at 383-84.
17 The parties' actions - towards each other and towards society - strongly suggest their 18 awareness of a troubled relationship and an inevitable separation. This suggestion became fact when 19 the parties began living separately and apart in 2016. Prior to this, record of the relationship is 20 limited. The parties lived together for over seven years and, in that time, had two children and three 21 different residences. Def.' s Decl. at<][ 4. Since then, the parties have settled and continue to settle in 22 their present residential states. They have been living separately for about nine months. 4 !d. 23 Although Defendant objects in her Answer, the facts in her petition for divorce matches 24 Plaintiff's, to wit: child custody and property division. The child custody agreements stated in both
25 petitions have the same terms. Ex. "A" at<][ 3; Verified Am. Compl. at<][ 7. In fact, the arrangement 26 3 This Court turns to California cases to interpret and apply the irreconcilable differences statute as persuasive authority.
27 See Swnitomo Constr. Co. v. Zhang Ye, Inc., 1997 Guam 8 <][ 17 (reasoning "[g]enerally when a legislature adopts a statute which is identical or similar to one in effect in another jurisdiction, it is presumed that the adopting jurisdiction 28 applies the construction placed on the statute by the originating jurisdiction").
4 Nine months is the difference between the Complaint's filing and the earliest separation date. Above, n.l.
DM0385-19 Angel Oliveras, Jr. v. Kaitlyn Oliveras DECISION AND ORDER (Motion to Dismiss) Page 6 of9 1 sought is the equivalent of the parties' current custody arrangement. ld. Likewise, the parties attempt 2 to characterize and divide property in individualized terms - only to reach the same conclusions. 3 Both pleadings state there is no real property, community debt, or community property to be 4 adjudicated. Ex. "A" at <f[<l[ 4-6; Verified Am. Compl. at 'll'll 10-12. It also suggests the parties' 5 separate property and debt were already divided prior to Plaintiff's complaint. Verified Am. Compl. 6 at 'll 11-14. These statements indicate the parties had likely discussed the idea of separation in the
7 past. Moreover, the fact the property division had already occuned may suggest their anticipation to 8 divorce.
9 The record strongly suggests the parties' desire for indefinite separation without 10 reconciliation. Plaintiff and Defendant both filed individual petitions for divorce. Defendant does not
11 seek divorce on irreconcilable differences or any specific grounds in general. 5 Instead, she seeks 12 "absolute divorce from [Plaintiff]." Ex. "A" at 'll 9. She states [Plaintiff] has treated [her] with such
13 indignities that [her] condition in life has been rendered intolerable for her to continue to live with 14 [him.]" ld. at 'll 8. Likewise Plaintiff states - in no uncertain terms - that there "are substantial
15 reasons for not continuing the marriage . . . which make it appear that the marriage should be 16 dissolved" and "[t]here is no possibility of a reconciliation between the Parties." Verified Am. 17 Compl. at 'll 5; Opp' n Mot. at 3; Pl.'s Decl. at <f[ 9. Plaintiff states he is committed to another romantic 18 relationship. ld. Essentially, the lack of attempt, intent, desire or action clearly shows the marriage is 19 subjectively and objectively over. Hull states, "public interest is not enhanced by refusing people the 20 right to legally terminate a relationship which has already been irrevocably severed in fact." Hull, 21 352 P.2d at 163. 22 The Court finds there is sufficient proof of irreconcilable differences to justify divorce. 23 Plaintiff and Defendant's actions express both subjective and objective belief of an irreparable 24 marriage. "The power to prevent the final dissolution of such marriages should be used only when 25 necessary to preserve the authority of the court." ld. This is not the case here. There is no reason to 26 deny dissolution when the relationship at stake is already severed in fact. Plaintiff satisfies all
27 requisite conditions which entitle him to a divorce. The concept of divisible divorce allows Plaintiff 28 5 Arkansas is not a no-fault state.
DM0385-19 Angel Oliveras, Jr. v. Kaitlyn Oliveras DECISION AND ORDER (Motion to Dismiss) Page7of9 1 his dissolution without compromising any other matter that is reserved for future litigation. Thus, the 2 Court finds Guam is an appropriate forum to decide on the sole issue of dissolution of the martial
3 relationship.
4 b. Forum Non Conveniens 5 "Forum non conveniens ... invok[es] the discretionary power of a court to decline to
6 exercise the jurisdiction it has over a transitory cause of action when it believes that the action may 7 be more appropriately and justly tried elsewhere." Stangvik v. Shiley Inc., 819 P.2d 14, 17 (Cal. 8 1991) (citations omitted). Forum non conveniens balances both public and private interests in
9 determining a forum's appropriateness. Speicher, 2013 Guam <n 10 (citing PC! Commc'ns, Inc. v. 10 GST Pacwest Telecom Haw., Inc., 1999 Guam 17 <n 41). Trial courts will generally respect a
11 plaintiff's choice of forum; thus, a "defendant must make a strong showing of inconvenience to 12 warrant upsetting the plaintiffs choice of forum." PC! Commc'ns, Inc., 1999 Guam 17] 14 (quoting
13 Walter Fuller Aircraft Sales, Inc., v. Republic of the Phil., 965 F.2d 1375, 1389 (5th Cir. 1992)); 14 Porte v. United States, Civ. Case No. 08-00008, 2009 WL 10712943, at *3 (D.Guam, Apr. 9, 2009)
15 (citing Decker Coal Co. v. Commw. Edison Co., 805 F.2d 834, 843 (9th Cir. 1986)). 16 Defendant argues Guam is an inconvenient forum for litigation in comparison to Arkansas.
17 She raises concerns such as witness availability, disruption of the children's routines and schedules, 18 financial strain, judicial economy and duplicity of lawsuits. Mot. Dismiss at 4-6. However, none of 19 Defendant's concerns would be implicated since the outstanding issue is purely severance of the 20 marital relationship. Under divisible divorce, granting Plaintiff a decree of dissolution alone will not 21 trigger other auxiliary matters. See In re Gray, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 850. Though a decree would 22 dissolve their marital status, child custody and personal property can be properly argued in Arkansas, 23 A court cannot extinguish a party's right to property without proper jurisdiction. See 24 Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416, 418 (1957) ("Since the wife was not subject to its 25 jurisdiction, the Nevada divorce court has no power to extinguish any right which she had under the 26 law of New York to financial support from her husband."). Under divisible divorce, Defendant's 27 opportunity to dispute matters separate from the marital status would be preserved. The Full Faith 28 and Credit Clause allows judgment on the marital status without overstepping potential property
DM0385-19 Angel OJiveras, Jr. v. Kaitlyn Oliveras DECISION AND ORDER (Motion to Dismiss) Page 8 of9 1 rights. Speicher, 2013 Guam at<][ 17. See id. at 16 ("The U.S. Supreme Court held that under the Full 2 Faith and Credit Clause . . . New Yark had to respect Nevada's dissolution of the marriage 3 relationship, but Nevada could not remove the wife's intangible property interests ... without in
4 personam jurisdiction."). Because Plaintiff only seeks dissolution of the marital relationship, Guam 5 remains an appropriate forum under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Although the parties'
6 remaining issues require further litigation, the ending the marital relationship would not; therefore, 7 the Court finds dismissal to be improper. 6
8 CONCLUSION 9 By a preponderance of the evidence and based on the foregoing conclusions, the Court
10 hereby DENIES Defendant Kaitlyn Oliveras's Motion to Dismiss.
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SO ORDERED this '/,- { day of February 2020.
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14 15 16
17 The Honorable Anita A. Sukola Judge, Superior Court of Guam 18
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24 25
26 27 6 28 The Court makes no finding as to matters outside the dissolution of the marital relationship. Unless stated otherwise, this Decision and Order has no binding on actions outside and subsequent to this matter.
DM0385-19 Angel Oliveras, Jr. v. Kaitlyn Oliveras DECISION AND ORDER (Motion to Dismiss) Page 9 of9