Oliver v. Muncy

89 S.W.2d 617, 262 Ky. 164, 1935 Ky. LEXIS 769
CourtCourt of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976)
DecidedDecember 11, 1935
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 89 S.W.2d 617 (Oliver v. Muncy) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976) primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Oliver v. Muncy, 89 S.W.2d 617, 262 Ky. 164, 1935 Ky. LEXIS 769 (Ky. 1935).

Opinion

Opinion op the Court by

Judge Richardson

Reversing.

This is an action to recover real estate and damages for being deprived of its use as a residence and as a place of business, and for injunctive relief.

Rena Oliver alleges that she is the owner, both by paper title and prescription, «of lot No. 6,. in the, Lester addition, Berea, Madison county, Ky., and occupied it as a residence and conducted therein lodging rooms for tourists, and used in connection therewith a driveway leading from the front passing her1 residence; that ihe adjoining lot N'o,. 5 was owned and occupied by Hezekiah and John Muncy, and that they- had entered upon her driveway on lot No. 6, and erected a fence therein, thus depriving her of the use and enjoyment of it in connection with the residence used both as a home and in the business of renting rpoms to tourists. She prayed that she be adjudged to be the. owner of lot No. 6, the driveway thereon, and for a mandatory injunction requiring the Muncys to remove the fence which they had erected in the driveway on her lot, and for damages.

The Muncys traversed her petition and further alleged that Hezekiah Muncy owned lot No,. 5, adjoining Oliver’s, and that the fence of which ,she complained was entirely on his lot, and that in building it John Muncy simply acted as a .servant of Hezekiah. Rena Oliver tendered two amendments to her petition. The averments therein were evidentiary. The facts alleged were, admissible under the general issue. The court sustained a motion to strike the greater portion thereof. The facts alleged therein being admissible under the general issue, she was nowise prejudiced by the action of the court striking the same. Her reply to the Muncys’ answer completed the issues.

*166 It is entirely unnecessary to reproduce the evidence of the parties to consider properly and fairly dispose of the case. Prior to, 1906, the Lesters owned a tract of land and sold and conveyed of it to the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company a right of way. They later subdivided a portion of the remainder into lots, known in this action as “Lester’s addition.” Lot No. 6, of the subdivision, on the 22d day of October, 1906, was conveyed by the Lesters to William Shockley. It is a parallelogram, 85 by 200 feet. At the time it was. conveyed to Shockley, there was still standing at each of the four corners of lot No. 6 the stakes which were planted at the time the subdivision was made. Shockley entered upon it; built a residence, 8% feet from the line between it and lot No. 5; constructed a concrete walk of cement blocks, 5 feet in length, along the entire frontage of the 85 feet; erected a fence of post and wire,, beginning at the terminus of the sidewalk at the corner of lots No. 5 and No. 6, running with the line, thereof,, passing about 8% feet of the wall of the residence; and established a driveway on the inside of the fence, leading by the, residence. The fence as constructed by Shockley remained for more than fifteen consecutive years, and until the posts decayed. At the terminus-of the sidewalk at the, corner of lots No. 5 and No. 6,. a large post was set by Shockley and used in the construction of the fence. While it was still standing, an iron pin was driven in the ground by it. It remained until after this controversy originated. The driveway as constructed by Shockley was used for the benefit of his residence, and has been continuously used for like purpose by those who have derived their title from, him, including Rena Oliver, until the Muncys constructed the fence which caused this litigation. Shockley’s, the intervening grantees’, and Rena Oliver’s deed describes lot No. 6, thus:

“Beginning at a point on the north side of Chestnut-Street 40 feet west of the L. & N. right of way,., thence N. 1% W. 200 feet, thence N. 87% E. with.

Chestnut Street 85 feet to the beginning corner. In 1922, an iron pin was planted by the Louisville &■ Nashville Railroad Company in the line of its right of way. The measurement which precipitated this litigation was made by the Muncys, from this pin to the point at which 40 feet plus 85 feet end. The railroad, company’s right of way was surveyed after lot No. 6. *167 was conveyed to Shockley, and, of course, after he had erected his residence, constructed the front sidewalk, side fence, and established his driveway. Its survey was made and the pin driven without regard to the whereabouts of either the comer or the dividing line of lots No. 5 and No. 6, and without regard to the beginning point for which Shockley deed called. The only thing authorizing and justifying this iron pin to be regarded as the beginning point called for in the Shockley deed is its presence in the right of way of the railroad company. 'The plat or map of the. Lester subdivision shows the width and length of lots 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, fronting on Chestnut avenue. It is perfectly apparent that the corners or lines thereof, and the front footage, may or can be located accurately, and with more certainty than the corner of 5 and 6 can be located by merely measuring from the iron pin in the railroad company’s right of way to a point at which 40 feet plus 85 terminate. If it bei conceded that the iron pin in the railroad company’s right of way is the identical beginning point called for in the deeds to lot No. 6, under which Eena Oliver claims title, still inasmuch as the large fence post, the. iron pin planted thereat, and the end of the 85-foot concrete walk constructed by Shockley, are, and have been continuously, since the date of the Shockley deed, visible and recognized objects at the recently disputed corner of lots No. 5 and 6, when measuring the distance from the iron pin in the railroad company’s right of way to these objects, the distance should give way to those existing and recognized objects.

It is the contention of the Muncys that when the Eena Oliver lot is surveyed by the boundary contained in her and Shockley’s deed, using the iron pin in the right of way of the railroad company, as the object called for as the starting point, the 2% feet in dispute on the line between his and Oliver’s lots is outside of Oliver’s and inside of his (Muncy’s). In testifying, he and his son were equivocal as to whether the fence they had erected on the line of his! lot was within the driveway as it had been constructed and used by Shockley, Eena Oliver, and those under whom she claims paper title. They were likewise indefinite as to whether the fence they had erected was 2% feet of the end, or in the middlei, of the first concrete block of the sidewalk constructed by Shockley in front of lot No. 6. They admit the presence of the driveway, the use thereof by *168 the owners of lot No. 6, and of. the fence between it and the. Muncy lot, at the time Muncy acquired paper title-to his lot.

Hezekiah Muncy acquired deed to his lot in 1911.. He built the fence now in dispute in 1932. As to the presence of the old fence, the whereabouts of the Oliver-driveway, and the end of the Shockley concrete walk in front of the Oliver lot, at the time he acquired title-to his lot and located as contended! for by Rena Oliver,, he was asked and answered thus:

“Q. Before that time and when you bought that property, tell the jury whether 'or not there was a fence there? A. There was an old fence when I bought my lot.
“Q.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Powell v. Reid
519 S.W.2d 388 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky, 1975)
Oakes v. Jensen
257 S.W.2d 48 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky, 1952)
Oliver v. Muncy
111 S.W.2d 392 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976), 1937)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
89 S.W.2d 617, 262 Ky. 164, 1935 Ky. LEXIS 769, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/oliver-v-muncy-kyctapphigh-1935.