Oliver Lane Chambers, Donna Kay Chambers-Jones, Rhonda Thompson, Clinton L. Chambers and Wife, Brandi N. Chambers v. San Augustine County Appraisal District

Procedural entryThis page is a short order in Oliver Lane Chambers, Donna Kay Chambers-Jones, Rhonda Thompson, Clinton L. Chambers and Wife, Brandi N. Chambers v. San Augustine County Appraisal District. Read the opinion of the Court — 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 1077
Court of Appeals of Texas·Decided October 15, 2015·No. 12-15-00201-CV·Published

Opinion

ACCEPTED 12-15-00201-CV TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS TYLER, TEXAS 10/15/2015 3:13:06 PM Pam Estes CLERK

NO. 12-15-00201-CV ____________________________________ FILED IN IN THE TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS12th COURT OF APPEALS TYLER, TEXAS TYLER, TEXAS 10/15/2015 3:13:06 PM ____________________________________ PAM ESTES Clerk Oliver Lane Chambers, Donna Kay Chambers-Jones, Rhonda Thompson, Clinton L. Chambers and wife, Brandi N. Chambers, Appellants, v. San Augustine County Appraisal District, Appellee. ____________________________________ On Appeal from the 273rd Judicial District Court San Augustine County, Texas Trial Court No. CV-13-9481

APPELLEE’S BRIEF

GUIDRY, BATES & HOYT ATTORNEYS, LLP Jeff Bates State Bar No. 01905200 bates@gbhattorneys.com 118 E. Hospital Street, Suite 100 Nacogdoches, Texas 75961 (936) 560-6954 telephone (936) 560-5996 facsimile

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS………………………………………………….…….…ii

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES…………………………………………….………...iii

STATEMENT ON ORAL ARGUMENT ...…………………………….………...iv

STATEMENT OF THE CASE…………………………………………………….v

STATEMENT OF FACTS…………………………………………….…………...1

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT…………………………………….……..….2

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES……………………………………………...3

I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING THE APPRAISAL DISTRICT’S TRADITIONAL MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT…………………………………3

LEASE PROVISIONS……………………………………………………....3

UNIT DECLARATIONS……………………………………………….…...3

METHOD OF TAXATION………………………………………………....5

APPELLANTS’ LEASE INTERPRETATION………………………..……6

LIMITED ISSUES……………………………………………...………..….8

CONCLUSION AND PRAYER…………………………………………….…..…9

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE………………………………….……….….10

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE………………………………………….………...10

APPENDIX……………………………………………………………………….11

Texas Attorney General Opinion DM-490 (1998)…………………………12

ii INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Cases: Hooks v. Samson Lone Star, 58 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 252 (Tex. 2015)…………………5

Key Operating & Equip., Inc. v. Hegar, 435 S.W.3d 794 (Tex.2014)………….….6

London v. Merriman, 756 S.W.2d 736 (1988)………………………………….….5

Minchen v. Fields, 162 Tex. 73 (1961)………………………………………….…5

Montgomery v. Rittersbacher, 424 S.W.2d 210 (Tex. 1968)………………………6

Pipe Line Co. v. Tichacek, 997 S.W.2d 166 (Tex.1999)…………………………...6

Veal v. Thomason, 159 S.W.2d 472 (Tex. 1942……………………………………7

Wagner & Brown, Ltd. v. Sheppard, 282 S.W.3d 419 (Tex.2008)………………...7

Other Authorities:

Texas Attorney General Opinion DM-490 (1998)…………………………………5

Basics of Oil and Gas Leases – The Producers 88 Lease Form and its Mutant Progeny, Terry I. Cross, State Bar of Texas, Oil Gas and Energy Resources 101, October 17, 2012, Houston…………………..8

iii STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT

Appellee respectfully requests oral argument.

iv STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellants complain that they do not owe property taxes in San Augustine

County because the surface portion of the real estate for which the minerals are

being taxed is within the boundary of Shelby County. It is undisputed that the

surface estate of Appellants’ real estate lies exclusively within Shelby County.

However, the mineral interest which is being taxed has been unitized, and a portion

of the Unit lies within San Augustine County. Because Appellants’ lands have

been unitized and pooled with other lands, the minerals are appropriately taxed in

both San Augustine and Shelby counties in proportion to the percentage of the unit

lying within each county.

v STATEMENT OF FACTS

Appellant’s Statement of Facts is correct.

This appeal arises from a summary judgment from the District Court relating

to a protest of property taxes in the following amounts:

Donna Kay Chambers $14.49 [CR 14] Oliver Lane Chambers $14.49 [CR 16] Rhonda Thompson $14.49 [CR 18] Clinton and Brandi Chambers $13.99 [CR 20]

1 SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Appellants’ leases provide that the lessee has the right to pool lessor’s lands

with other lands. Appellants’ leases were, in fact, pooled with other lands and a

designation of unit was appropriately filed. Because the unit contains pooled lands

within both Shelby and San Augustine counties, it is appropriate for both counties

to tax a portion of the mineral interests within the unit in the percentage of total

surface area contained within each county.

2 ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES

I. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Granting the Appraisal District’s Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment.

LEASE PROVISIONS

Appellants’ mineral leases [CR 82, 85, and 88] provided their lessee the

right at its option to pool or unitize land covered by the lease with other land. The

leases provide:

“Lessee is hereby granted the right, at its option to pool or unitize any land covered by this lease with any other land covered by this lease, and/or with any other land, lease, or leases, as to any or all minerals or horizons…”. [ CR 82, 85, and 88]

The lease further provides that:

“Any operations conducted on any part of such unitized land shall be considered, for all purposes, except the payment of royalty, operations conducted upon said land under this lease. There shall be allocated to the land covered by this lease within each unit, after deducting any used in lease or unit operations, which the number of surface acres in such land (or in each such separate tract) covered by this lease within the unit bears to the total number of surface acres in the unit, and the production so allocated shall be considered for all purposes, including payment or delivery of royalty, overriding royalty and any other payments out of production, to be the entire production of unitized minerals from the land to which allocated in the same manner as though produced therefrom under the terms of this lease.” [CR 82, 85, and 88]

UNIT DECLARATIONS

It is undisputed that the Chambers’ interests subject to this appeal are

included in the Tigers DU No. 1H Unit (“Tigers Unit”) and the Wolfpack (SL) DU

3 No. 1H Unit (“Wolfpack Unit”). The Unit Designations are included in the

Summary Judgment evidence. [CR 97, 104, and 114]. (The “Wolfpack Unit also

had an amended Designation of Unit which is included in the evidence). From the

face of the documents, the unit designations were in place prior to and on January

1st of the tax year subject to this protest. The designations also demonstrate the

San Augustine/Shelby county boundary consistent with the description set forth in

Appellants’ Statement of Facts. [CR 109, 118]

The Lessees of Appellants Mineral Interests, and all other lessees in the

Unit, XH, LLC, XTO Energy Inc., HHE Energy Company, and Southwestern

Energy Production Company certified pursuant to Railroad Commission

requirements that they held the leases in the unit and that each of said leases:

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Oliver Lane Chambers, Donna Kay Chambers-Jones, Rhonda Thompson, Clinton L. Chambers and Wife, Brandi N. Chambers v. San Augustine County Appraisal District, (Tex. Ct. App. 2015).

Oliver Lane Chambers, Donna Kay Chambers-Jones, Rhonda Thompson, Clinton L. Chambers and Wife, Brandi N. Chambers v. San Augustine County Appraisal District (Oliver Lane Chambers, Donna Kay Chambers-Jones, Rhonda Thompson, Clinton L. Chambers and Wife, Brandi N. Chambers v. San Augustine County Appraisal District) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Wagner & Brown, Ltd. v. Sheppard
282 S.W.3d 419 (Texas Supreme Court, 2008)
London v. Merriman
756 S.W.2d 736 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1988)
Montgomery v. Rittersbacher
424 S.W.2d 210 (Texas Supreme Court, 1968)
Southeastern Pipe Line Co., Inc. v. Tichacek
997 S.W.2d 166 (Texas Supreme Court, 1999)
Key Operating & Equipment, Inc. v. Will Hegar and Loree Hegar
435 S.W.3d 794 (Texas Supreme Court, 2014)
Veal v. Thomason
159 S.W.2d 472 (Texas Supreme Court, 1942)
Minchen v. Fields
345 S.W.2d 282 (Texas Supreme Court, 1961)