Oliver Julius Sowell v. State

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedAugust 31, 2010
Docket03-10-00081-CR
StatusPublished

This text of Oliver Julius Sowell v. State (Oliver Julius Sowell v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Oliver Julius Sowell v. State, (Tex. Ct. App. 2010).

Opinion

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN




NO. 03-10-00081-CR

Oliver Julius Sowell, Appellant



v.



The State of Texas, Appellee



FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BELL COUNTY, 426TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. 64,287, HONORABLE FANCY H. JEZEK, JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N



Oliver Sowell was convicted by a jury of the crime of capital murder of Kimberly Tran. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.03 (West Supp. 2009). After the jury made its determination, the district court imposed a life sentence. On appeal, Sowell challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. We will affirm the judgment of the district court.



BACKGROUND

In April 2008, Tran was shot outside an illegal gaming room that she and her son, Vu Min Lee, ran. Because the gaming room was illegal, Tran limited access to the room and only admitted individuals who her employees knew. In addition, Tran installed a camera outside the door to the gaming room that allowed her or her employees to see who was trying to enter the establishment.

On the day Tran died, Sowell, Bonnie Johnson (Sowell's wife), Dominique Neal, Shanay Brown, and a man named "T" were hanging out at Johnson's home. At some point in the day, they discussed the idea of robbing the gaming room. Due to the illegal nature of the gaming room, the group thought it would be a good place to rob because Tran would not involve the police. In fact, Neal stated that gaming rooms get robbed quite often but that "they can't do nothing about it because it's already illegal." Because Neal had frequently gone to the gaming room, the group thought that Tran and Lee would allow her to enter the establishment. For that reason, the group decided that Neal, Johnson, and Brown should enter the gaming room first and then later let Sowell and T into the room. In furtherance of the plan, the group decided to use the shotgun and the handgun that were inside Johnson's house during the robbery. On the way to the establishment, Sowell and T stopped to get ammunition.

Consistent with the plan discussed above, Neal, Johnson, and Brown went to the gaming room and were admitted. After gambling for a few minutes, Johnson told Lee that she had left something in her purse and asked if she could go outside to get the item from the car that she rode over in. The events that occurred after Johnson left the gaming room form the basis for this case and are disputed; however, what is not disputed is that Lee and Tran were both shot outside the gaming room by a shotgun and that Tran later died from her wounds. Further, when the police arrived on the scene, they found Johnson and Neal near the gaming room and took their statements.

After the shooting, Sowell and Johnson left Texas and went to Maryland. While in Maryland, they were involved in a car accident and were arrested when the responding police officers discovered that there were warrants out for their arrest. After their arrest, Detective Wayne Martin questioned Sowell regarding the shooting. Detective Martin prepared a written statement detailing the answers that Sowell provided, and Sowell signed the statement. Eventually, Sowell was transferred back to Texas and was indicted for capital murder. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.03. Specifically, the indictment alleged that Sowell intentionally caused Tran's death by shooting her and that at the time of the shooting, Sowell "was then and there in the course of" robbing or attempting to rob Tran. Ultimately, a trial was held, and the jury found Sowell guilty of capital murder.



DISCUSSION

In his sole issue on appeal, Sowell contends that the evidence is factually insufficient to support his conviction for capital murder.

In factual-sufficiency determinations, all of the evidence is considered in a neutral light. Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404, 414 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). When performing this analysis, courts bear in mind that the fact finder is the sole judge of the weight and the credibility of the evidence presented. Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); see also Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 36.13 (West 2007) (explaining that "jury is the exclusive judge of the facts"). Under a factual sufficiency review, the judgment may only be set aside if (1) the verdict is "against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence," or (2) the evidence is "so weak that the jury's verdict seems clearly wrong and manifestly unjust." Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 414-15. A conviction is not manifestly unjust simply because an appellate court would have resolved conflicts in the evidence differently, Lancon v. State, 253 S.W.3d 699, 707 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008), and factual-sufficiency reviews are necessarily deferential to the jury's verdict, Grotti v. State, 273 S.W.3d 273, 283 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).

Under the penal code, a person commits capital murder if he "intentionally commits murder in the course of committing or attempting to commit . . . robbery." Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.03(a)(2) (West Supp. 2009); see also id. § 19.02 (West 2003) (defining "murder" as "intentionally or knowingly" causing individual's death). Under the penal code, a person commits robbery if, "in the course of committing theft . . . and with intent to obtain or maintain control of the property, he . . . intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another." Id. § 29.02(a) (West 2003). The code further explains that a "person acts intentionally, or with intent, with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result." Id. § 6.03(a) (West 2003). Intent to commit a crime "may be inferred" from the acts, words, and conduct of the accused and from "the circumstances under which" the criminal act occurred. Hernandez v. State, 819 S.W.2d 806, 810 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). In addition, intent to kill may be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon. Henderson v. State, 825 S.W.2d 746, 749 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, pet. ref'd). A shotgun qualifies as a deadly weapon per se. Dominguez v. State, 125 S.W.3d 755, 761 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. ref'd).

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Related

Dominguez v. State
125 S.W.3d 755 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2003)
Watson v. State
204 S.W.3d 404 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2006)
Sholars v. State
312 S.W.3d 694 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2010)
Hernandez v. State
819 S.W.2d 806 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1991)
Lancon v. State
253 S.W.3d 699 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2008)
Johnson v. State
23 S.W.3d 1 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2000)
Grotti v. State
273 S.W.3d 273 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2008)
Henderson v. State
825 S.W.2d 746 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1992)

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Oliver Julius Sowell v. State, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/oliver-julius-sowell-v-state-texapp-2010.