1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
9 Oliver Complot, No. CV-25-02647-PHX-JJT
10 Plaintiff, ORDER
11 v.
12 American Honda Finance Corporation, et al., 13 Defendants. 14 15 Before the Court are American Honda Finance Corporation’s (“AHFC”) and MRS 16 BPO, LLC’s (“MRS”) respective Motions to Dismiss (Docs. 36, 42) pro se Plaintiff Oliver 17 Complot’s Second Amended Complaint, each of which has been fully briefed by the 18 parties. For the reasons below, the Court will exercise its inherent authority in striking 19 Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint for noncompliance with the Court’s order and 20 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) and deny both Motions as moot. 21 I. BACKGROUND 22 The parties have a long, turbulent history that began on February 18, 2023, when 23 Plaintiff purchased a vehicle through financing provided by AHFC. (Doc. 35, SAC, ¶ 11.) 24 By September 2023, the debt that Plaintiff maintained with AHFC was “charged off with 25 a balance of $57,101.31.” (Id. ¶ 13.) At some point, MRS, a debt collection agency that 26 Plaintiff alleges is an agent of AHFC, purchased some or all the outstanding balance. (Id. 27 ¶ 24.) And, sometime thereafter, Plaintiff initiated arbitration proceedings against AHFC 28 1 and another entity, ACVT Motors, LLC (“ACVT”). (Doc. 29, FAC, ¶ 1.) Those arbitration 2 proceedings culminated in a final arbitration decision and award. (Id. ¶¶ 22–29.) 3 On July 8, 2025, Plaintiff sent AHFC a settlement payment “with comprehensive 4 waiver language” that waived, inter alia, arbitration awards and claims against Plaintiff. 5 (SAC ¶ 29.) Plaintiff additionally agreed to forbear bankruptcy as consideration for 6 AHFC’s acceptance of the settlement. (Id. ¶ 30.) AHFC cashed the check. 7 Plaintiff sued AHFC, MRS, and ACVT on July 28, 2025. (Doc. 1, Compl.). The 8 Court dismissed Plaintiff’s original Complaint for a myriad of pleading issues and granted 9 him leave to file an amended complaint no later than October 21, 2025. (Doc. 28.) He did 10 so and brought a claim arising under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) against AHFC 11 and ACVT only; no claims were brought against MRS. (See FAC.) 12 The Court subsequently dismissed the First Amended Complaint for lack of subject- 13 matter jurisdiction and, once again, granted Plaintiff leave to amend. (Doc. 33.) In so 14 dismissing, the Court found that Plaintiff failed to assert key jurisdictional facts like the 15 citizenship of the parties, amount in controversy, or a federal law that supplies an 16 independent basis1 for jurisdiction. The Court noted that this particular defect was curable 17 and granted Plaintiff leave to amend no later than November 14, 2025. 18 Plaintiff filed his Second Amended Complaint, this time bringing claims against 19 AHFC and MRS only that included: (1) four counts of violating various sections of the Fair 20 Debt Collection Practices Act against MRS; (2) violation of Arizona Consumer Fraud Act 21 against MRS; (3) negligence per se against MRS; (4) violation of the Fair Credit Reporting 22 Act against AHFC; and (5) breach of settlement contract formed through accord and 23 satisfaction against both MRS and AHFC. Both Defendants since moved to dismiss the 24 Second Amended Complaint. (Docs. 36, 42.) 25 . . . 26 . . .
27 1 A claim arising under the FAA cannot establish federal question jurisdiction on its own. Rather, “parties seeking relief under the FAA must establish an independent jurisdictional 28 basis for a federal court’s jurisdiction.” Tesla Motors, Inc. v. Balan, 134 F.4th 558, 560 (9th Cir. 2025) (citation modified). 1 II. LEGAL STANDARD 2 Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs amendments to pleadings. 3 Under Rule 15(a), a party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course within 4 twenty-one days after serving it or after a pleading or motion responsive to it has been filed, 5 whichever is earlier. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). In all other cases, a party can amend his pleading 6 only with the opposing party’s written consent or leave of court. Id. 7 When dismissing pleadings, Ninth Circuit courts freely grant leave to amend a 8 pleading when justice so requires even when a party has not requested leave. Lopez v. 9 Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000). Leave must be granted after a pleading is 10 dismissed “if it appears at all possible that the plaintiff can correct the defect.” Id. (citation 11 modified). “The rule favoring liberality in amendments to pleadings is particularly 12 important for the pro se litigant.” Id. at 1131. 13 “When a court grants leave to amend with a limited scope, and moving parties would 14 like to add claims or parties not authorized by the court’s leave to amend, moving parties 15 are required to seek leave of the court to extend the scope of the leave.” Kihagi v. City of 16 W. Hollywood, No. CV 14-0936 PSG (JEMx), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 200612, at *3 (C.D. 17 Cal. Aug. 6, 2015). “Courts routinely dismiss or strike newly added claims where the 18 addition of such claims exceeds the scope of leave to amend that was previously 19 authorized.” McDonough v. Bidwill, No. CV-24-00764-PHX-DWL, 2025 U.S. Dist. 20 LEXIS 184864, at *13 (D. Ariz. Aug. 21, 2025); see also Benton v. Baker Hughes, No. CV 21 12-07735 MMM (MRWx), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94988, at *8 (C.D. Cal. June 30, 2013) 22 (collecting cases); Kennedy v. Full Tilt Poker, No. CV 09-07964 MMM (AGRx), 2010 23 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112119, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2010) (noting that an earlier pleading 24 was stricken in its entirety because it added new claims and defendants in violation of Rule 25 15); Serpa v. SBC Telecomms., Inc., No. C 03-4223 MHP, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18307, 26 at *10 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 7, 2004) (granting a motion to strike portions of a pleading that 27 exceeded the scope of the leave to amend). 28 . . . 1 III. ANALYSIS 2 MRS urges the Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against it because “the Court was 3 not granting Plaintiff an opportunity to revive the claims [against] MRS which were 4 previous [sic] waived by his failure to comply with the October 21, 2025 deadline.” (Doc. 5 36 at 7.) Plaintiff argues that his Second Amended Complaint complied with the Court’s 6 grant of leave that, according to him, contained “zero limiting language.” (Doc. 43 at 1.) 7 But the Court’s Order cannot be read so broadly. In the Order, the Court analyzed the First 8 Amended Complaint for federal question or diversity subject-matter jurisdiction and, 9 finding no facts to support either, dismissed the pleading upon that defect. (Doc. 33 at 1– 10 2.) The Court noted that “[t]his defect is curable,” granted leave to amend, and permitted 11 Plaintiff to “file a single complaint that comports with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 7, 12 8 and 10 and sets forth a short and plain statement that confer jurisdiction upon this Court.” 13 (Id. at 2.) The leave was not limitless; rather, it was granted specifically for Plaintiff to 14 amend the jurisdictional basis of his claims but not to add new claims or defendants. Here, 15 Plaintiff clearly exceeded that leave when he added new claims that did not exist in the 16 previous rendition of his pleadings and shoehorned MRS back into the litigation. In doing 17 so, he evades the command of Rule 15 and the limitation of this Court’s leave.
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1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
9 Oliver Complot, No. CV-25-02647-PHX-JJT
10 Plaintiff, ORDER
11 v.
12 American Honda Finance Corporation, et al., 13 Defendants. 14 15 Before the Court are American Honda Finance Corporation’s (“AHFC”) and MRS 16 BPO, LLC’s (“MRS”) respective Motions to Dismiss (Docs. 36, 42) pro se Plaintiff Oliver 17 Complot’s Second Amended Complaint, each of which has been fully briefed by the 18 parties. For the reasons below, the Court will exercise its inherent authority in striking 19 Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint for noncompliance with the Court’s order and 20 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) and deny both Motions as moot. 21 I. BACKGROUND 22 The parties have a long, turbulent history that began on February 18, 2023, when 23 Plaintiff purchased a vehicle through financing provided by AHFC. (Doc. 35, SAC, ¶ 11.) 24 By September 2023, the debt that Plaintiff maintained with AHFC was “charged off with 25 a balance of $57,101.31.” (Id. ¶ 13.) At some point, MRS, a debt collection agency that 26 Plaintiff alleges is an agent of AHFC, purchased some or all the outstanding balance. (Id. 27 ¶ 24.) And, sometime thereafter, Plaintiff initiated arbitration proceedings against AHFC 28 1 and another entity, ACVT Motors, LLC (“ACVT”). (Doc. 29, FAC, ¶ 1.) Those arbitration 2 proceedings culminated in a final arbitration decision and award. (Id. ¶¶ 22–29.) 3 On July 8, 2025, Plaintiff sent AHFC a settlement payment “with comprehensive 4 waiver language” that waived, inter alia, arbitration awards and claims against Plaintiff. 5 (SAC ¶ 29.) Plaintiff additionally agreed to forbear bankruptcy as consideration for 6 AHFC’s acceptance of the settlement. (Id. ¶ 30.) AHFC cashed the check. 7 Plaintiff sued AHFC, MRS, and ACVT on July 28, 2025. (Doc. 1, Compl.). The 8 Court dismissed Plaintiff’s original Complaint for a myriad of pleading issues and granted 9 him leave to file an amended complaint no later than October 21, 2025. (Doc. 28.) He did 10 so and brought a claim arising under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) against AHFC 11 and ACVT only; no claims were brought against MRS. (See FAC.) 12 The Court subsequently dismissed the First Amended Complaint for lack of subject- 13 matter jurisdiction and, once again, granted Plaintiff leave to amend. (Doc. 33.) In so 14 dismissing, the Court found that Plaintiff failed to assert key jurisdictional facts like the 15 citizenship of the parties, amount in controversy, or a federal law that supplies an 16 independent basis1 for jurisdiction. The Court noted that this particular defect was curable 17 and granted Plaintiff leave to amend no later than November 14, 2025. 18 Plaintiff filed his Second Amended Complaint, this time bringing claims against 19 AHFC and MRS only that included: (1) four counts of violating various sections of the Fair 20 Debt Collection Practices Act against MRS; (2) violation of Arizona Consumer Fraud Act 21 against MRS; (3) negligence per se against MRS; (4) violation of the Fair Credit Reporting 22 Act against AHFC; and (5) breach of settlement contract formed through accord and 23 satisfaction against both MRS and AHFC. Both Defendants since moved to dismiss the 24 Second Amended Complaint. (Docs. 36, 42.) 25 . . . 26 . . .
27 1 A claim arising under the FAA cannot establish federal question jurisdiction on its own. Rather, “parties seeking relief under the FAA must establish an independent jurisdictional 28 basis for a federal court’s jurisdiction.” Tesla Motors, Inc. v. Balan, 134 F.4th 558, 560 (9th Cir. 2025) (citation modified). 1 II. LEGAL STANDARD 2 Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs amendments to pleadings. 3 Under Rule 15(a), a party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course within 4 twenty-one days after serving it or after a pleading or motion responsive to it has been filed, 5 whichever is earlier. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). In all other cases, a party can amend his pleading 6 only with the opposing party’s written consent or leave of court. Id. 7 When dismissing pleadings, Ninth Circuit courts freely grant leave to amend a 8 pleading when justice so requires even when a party has not requested leave. Lopez v. 9 Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000). Leave must be granted after a pleading is 10 dismissed “if it appears at all possible that the plaintiff can correct the defect.” Id. (citation 11 modified). “The rule favoring liberality in amendments to pleadings is particularly 12 important for the pro se litigant.” Id. at 1131. 13 “When a court grants leave to amend with a limited scope, and moving parties would 14 like to add claims or parties not authorized by the court’s leave to amend, moving parties 15 are required to seek leave of the court to extend the scope of the leave.” Kihagi v. City of 16 W. Hollywood, No. CV 14-0936 PSG (JEMx), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 200612, at *3 (C.D. 17 Cal. Aug. 6, 2015). “Courts routinely dismiss or strike newly added claims where the 18 addition of such claims exceeds the scope of leave to amend that was previously 19 authorized.” McDonough v. Bidwill, No. CV-24-00764-PHX-DWL, 2025 U.S. Dist. 20 LEXIS 184864, at *13 (D. Ariz. Aug. 21, 2025); see also Benton v. Baker Hughes, No. CV 21 12-07735 MMM (MRWx), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94988, at *8 (C.D. Cal. June 30, 2013) 22 (collecting cases); Kennedy v. Full Tilt Poker, No. CV 09-07964 MMM (AGRx), 2010 23 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112119, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2010) (noting that an earlier pleading 24 was stricken in its entirety because it added new claims and defendants in violation of Rule 25 15); Serpa v. SBC Telecomms., Inc., No. C 03-4223 MHP, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18307, 26 at *10 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 7, 2004) (granting a motion to strike portions of a pleading that 27 exceeded the scope of the leave to amend). 28 . . . 1 III. ANALYSIS 2 MRS urges the Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against it because “the Court was 3 not granting Plaintiff an opportunity to revive the claims [against] MRS which were 4 previous [sic] waived by his failure to comply with the October 21, 2025 deadline.” (Doc. 5 36 at 7.) Plaintiff argues that his Second Amended Complaint complied with the Court’s 6 grant of leave that, according to him, contained “zero limiting language.” (Doc. 43 at 1.) 7 But the Court’s Order cannot be read so broadly. In the Order, the Court analyzed the First 8 Amended Complaint for federal question or diversity subject-matter jurisdiction and, 9 finding no facts to support either, dismissed the pleading upon that defect. (Doc. 33 at 1– 10 2.) The Court noted that “[t]his defect is curable,” granted leave to amend, and permitted 11 Plaintiff to “file a single complaint that comports with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 7, 12 8 and 10 and sets forth a short and plain statement that confer jurisdiction upon this Court.” 13 (Id. at 2.) The leave was not limitless; rather, it was granted specifically for Plaintiff to 14 amend the jurisdictional basis of his claims but not to add new claims or defendants. Here, 15 Plaintiff clearly exceeded that leave when he added new claims that did not exist in the 16 previous rendition of his pleadings and shoehorned MRS back into the litigation. In doing 17 so, he evades the command of Rule 15 and the limitation of this Court’s leave. 18 MRS requests the Court to dismiss the case against it under its inherent authority to 19 manage the docket and to sanction Plaintiff for noncompliance with court orders. (Doc. 36 20 at 6–8.) MRS also briefly references Rule 41(b), which permits a party to move to dismiss 21 claims against it if the plaintiff fails to comply with the Rules of Civil Procedure or a court 22 order. (See Doc. 36 at 6.) But no matter what authority MRS cites, dismissal is a harsh 23 sanction applied only in extreme circumstances. Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260 24 (9th Cir. 1992). Such a sanction may be imposed only after a court applies a five-factor 25 test: “(1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court's need to 26 manage its dockets; (3) the risk of prejudice to the party seeking sanctions; (4) the public 27 policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic 28 sanctions.” Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Nat. Beverage Distribs., 69 F.3d 337, 348 (9th Cir. 1 1995) (citation modified); Wanderer v. Johnston, 910 F.2d 652, 656 (9th Cir. 1990). 2 Neither party addresses this five-factor test and the Court declines to do so on its own. 3 While outright dismissal as a sanction is not warranted here, Plaintiff’s 4 noncompliance with the court rules and orders cannot go unanswered. At this stage, it is 5 appropriate that those claims exceeding the bounds of leave are stricken. Ready Transp., 6 Inc. v. AAR Mfg., 627 F.3d 402, 404 (9th Cir. 2010) (“As part of its power to manage its 7 own affairs, a district court can use less drastic measures such as striking documents from 8 the docket to address litigation conduct that does not warrant outright dismissal.”) (citation 9 modified); Spurlock v. FBI, 69 F.3d 1010, 1016 (9th Cir. 1995) (“A district court possesses 10 inherent power over the administration of its business.”). 11 What remains for the Court to decide is which of the claims appearing in the Second 12 Amended Complaint exceed those bounds. In the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff 13 brings a FAA claim against ACVT and AHFC seeking vacatur of the final arbitration 14 award. He also asserts the final award was “extinguished” when he offered to settle the 15 obligations imposed by the award and AHFC accepted the offer. (FAC at 47–50.) 16 Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the post-award settlement are couched within his larger 17 FAA claim and can only be interpreted as one of Plaintiff’s many allegations for why the 18 award must be vacated. As Plaintiff himself alleges, this “accord and satisfaction [] renders 19 the arbitration award unenforceable.” (FAC at 53; see also Compl. at 49). 20 The claims pled in the Second Amended Complaint bear no resemblance to the 21 pleading that came before it. In fact, Plaintiff appears to abandon his FAA claim and asserts 22 new federal and state claims against MRS and AHFC bearing new facts and legal theories. 23 The only similarity between the two pleadings is Plaintiff’s reference to the post-award 24 “accord and satisfaction,” but those allegations pled in the Second Amended Complaint 25 form the basis for a breach of contract claim against AHFC and MRS and evokes a legal 26 theory distinct from the one used in the First Amended Complaint. Upon close review of 27 the claims pled in the Second Amended Complaint, each one of them exceeds the bounds 28 of leave granted by the Court. Accordingly, the Second Amended Complaint is stricken. 1 This is not an outright dismissal. Rather, the Court presents Plaintiff an opportunity 2 to conform his amended pleading to the leave granted to him. No later than fourteen (14) 3 days from the date of this Order, Plaintiff may file an amended pleading that cures the 4 jurisdictional defects of the First Amended Complaint, currently titled “Motion to Vacate 5 Arbitration Awards” and docketed at entry 29. The amended pleading shall bear the name 6 “Third Amended Complaint.” The amended pleading must set forth a short and plain 7 statement that confers jurisdiction upon this Court and shall comply with Federal Rules of 8 Civil Procedure and the prior court orders. The Court observes that the Second Amended 9 Complaint, while now stricken, appeared to conform to Rules 7, 8, and 10 and was a drastic 10 improvement from the preceding pleadings in that regard, and encourages Plaintiff to 11 continue to observe those Rules. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended pleading in the time 12 prescribed, the Clerk of Court is directed to dismiss this matter. The pending Motions to 13 Dismiss will be denied as moot. 14 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED striking Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint 15 (Doc. 35). 16 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, no later than fourteen (14) days from the date 17 of this Order, Plaintiff may file an amended pleading that cures the jurisdictional defects 18 of the First Amended Complaint, currently titled “Motion to Vacate Arbitration Awards” 19 and docketed at entry 29. The amended pleading shall bear the name “Third Amended 20 Complaint.” The amended pleading must set forth a short and plain statement that confers 21 jurisdiction upon this Court and shall comply with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 22 the prior court orders. 23 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, if Plaintiff fails to file an amended pleading in 24 the time prescribed, the Clerk of Court is directed to dismiss this matter. 25 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Defendant MRS BPO LLC’s Motion to 26 Dismiss Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 36) as moot. 27 . . . 28 . . . 1 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Defendant American Honda Finance 2 || Corporation’s Amended Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 3 || 42) as moot. 4 Dated this 25th day of February, 2026. CN
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