Olivencia v. Pérez Sales

49 P.R. 889
CourtSupreme Court of Puerto Rico
DecidedMay 20, 1936
DocketNo. 6866
StatusPublished

This text of 49 P.R. 889 (Olivencia v. Pérez Sales) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Puerto Rico primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Olivencia v. Pérez Sales, 49 P.R. 889 (prsupreme 1936).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Córdova Davila

delivered the opinion of the court.

Enrique Olivencia by the action herein sought to be declared the acknowledged natural child of Pedro Pérez Sales, a brother of the defendant, with all the rights appertaining to such status.

It was alleged in the complaint that the plaintiff was the natural child of Filomena Olivencia and was born out of [890]*890wedlock as the result of a love affair between the latter and Sales, who died in Mayagüez on July 6, 1932; that at the time of plaintiff’s conception, both Filomena Oliveneia and Pedro Pérez Sales were of legal age and single, and there existed no legal impediment whatsoever to prevent them from contracting marriage with each other; that Enrique Oliven-eia has since his birth been in the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child of Pedro Pérez Sales, who always treated and considered the plaintiff, in public and in private, as his child, bestowing upon him parental affection, keeping him under his custody and care, and paying for his board, clothing, food, medicines, and education; that Pedro Pérez Sales died without leaving any ascendants or descendants, and that his brother, the defendant Tomás Pérez Sales, is the only relative he left at the time of his death.

The defendant denied the essential allegations of the complaint, and set up that Filomena Oliveneia, mother of the plaintiff, married Pedro Leandro .Marrero on August 30, 1893, and that as it appears from the Civil Register of Mayagüez, Enrique Oliveneia was born on November 10,1897,. at which time Filomena Oliveneia was married to the said Pedro Leandro Marrero.

Prior to the time of the filing of the complaint herein, Enrique Oliveneia had instituted, in the District Court of San Juan, a proceeding in perpetúan, rei memoriam alleging that the date of his birth was November 10, 1891, and not November 10, 1897, and prayed that the court order the corresponding correction to be made in the Civil Register of Mayagüez. The district court decided said proceeding by granting the relief sought by the petitioner.

The District Court of Mayagüez, after considering the evidence introduced at the trial which was held, rendered judgment for the defendant on the following grounds:

“When the evidence regarding the correction of the date of the plaintiff’s birth was presented, the defendant 'objected to its admission. In our Code of Civil Procedure there is no provision concern[891]*891ing proceedings to perpetuate testimony, but tbe Spanish Code of Civil Procedure which was formerly in force in this island prescribed in section 2001 and succeeding sections, the procedure to be followed in said proceedings. In the proceeding in perpetuam rei memoriam herein the prosecuting attorney did not intervene nor was the defendant notified of it. If the Spanish Code of Civil Procedure is not applicable in this case the circumstances under which this ex parte proceeding was prosecuted shows that it was evidence prepared for this suit, and, therefore, has no probative value whatsoever- and should be rejected.
“In these circumstances, the plaintiff was born while his mother Filomena Olivencia was legally married to Pedro Leandro Marrero, whom she never divorced and of whom plaintiff is a legitimate child, and therefore he can not be adjudged to be an acknowledged natural child of the predecessor in interest of the defendant.”

We agree that proceedings in perpetuam rei memoriam have no probative value where they are not prosecuted with the formalities required by law. If these requirements are complied with, such proceedings serve t'o establish the facts to which they refer, unless proof to the contrary is shown and unless they relate to facts which may prejudice some certain and determinate person.

In commenting on the probative force or value of those proceedings, Manresa says:

“Although the law does not provide it here, it has already provided it in section 596, which says that ‘under the name of formal public documents are included ... all kinds of judicial proceedings.’ The proceedings we are discussing are judicial acts, and therefore, in a trial they would have the same probative force as formal public documents to prove the facts to which they refer, except, of course, where evidence to the contrary is shown. But, in order to have such probative force they must have been prosecuted with the formalities required by section 2003 and succeeding sections, and as ordered by section 2002, should not relate to facts which may prejudice some determinate and certain persons. If they lack these requisites, they can have no probative force, as was held by the Supreme Court of Justice in its judgment rendered on June 27, 1864.” (Manresa, Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil, (3d ed.) vol. 6, p. 443.)

[892]*892Had this been the only evidence presented, there is no doubt that we would be bound to affirm the judgment of the lower court dismissing the complaint on the merits. But the plaintiff further offered testimonial evidence to show that at the time of his birth his mother, Filomena Olivencia, was unmarried; that he is the son of Pedro Pérez Sales; and that he was in possession of the status of a natural child of the latter.

On December 19, 1910, several years after the birth of Enrique and twenty years before this action was commenced, Filomena Olivencia registered in the Civil Begister of Mayagiiez the birth of her son Enrique. From the certificate issued by the secretary of the Civil Begister we transcribe the following:

“In the city of Mayagiiez, at ten o’clock in the morning of the nineteenth day of December, one thousand nine hundred and ten, Filomena Olivencia, of Mayagiiez, of legal age, single, a seamstress by profession,_street, and domiciled in the ward of Mayagiiez Arriba, appeared before Mr. Rafael Mangual Delgado, Municipal Secretary, and declared the birth of a child born in the house of the declarant on the tenth day of November 1897, at twelve o ’clock midnight, and that he is the natural .child of the declarant. He is the grandchild on his mother’s side of Cristina Olivencia. And that this child is named Enrique.”

As may be seen, the mother of the plaintiff appears to have declared that she was single on the date that the registration was made. By that time the said lady was married to Pedro Leandro Marrero. It is strange that Filomena Olivencia should declare that she was single on the day that she registered the birth of her child, rather than on the date of his birth, in order to be able to register him a natural child. What interest could that lady have in stating an untruth? Can one imagine that she would register as a natural child a legitimate one? Why, if he was legitimate, did not her husband register him seasonably? It may be that Filomena Olivencia was mistaken as to the date of the [893]*893birth, of her child at the time she made the registration, and it is also possible that she was misunderstood by the person in charge of the Civil Register. In her testimony, when questioned by the attorney for the defendant, the mother of the plaintiff stated that she was married when she registered her child but that she was single when she had him. From the transcript of the evidence we copy the following:

“Q. Did you go to register your child Enrique?
A. Yes, sir.

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49 P.R. 889, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/olivencia-v-perez-sales-prsupreme-1936.