Olimpia Neal, individually and as representative of the Estate of Mauricio Sanchez Ramos v. City of San Diego, et al.

S.D. California

Olimpia Neal, individually and as representative of the Estate of Mauricio Sanchez Ramos v. City of San Diego, et al.

DecidedNovember 12, 2025

Docket3:25-cv-01414

StatusUnknown

This text of Olimpia Neal, individually and as representative of the Estate of Mauricio Sanchez Ramos v. City of San Diego, et al. (Olimpia Neal, individually and as representative of the Estate of Mauricio Sanchez Ramos v. City of San Diego, et al.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Olimpia Neal, individually and as representative of the Estate of Mauricio Sanchez Ramos v. City of San Diego, et al., (S.D. Cal. 2025).

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 OLIMPIA NEAL, individually and as Case No.: 3:25-cv-1414-CAB-BJW representative of the Estate of Mauricio 12 Sanchez Ramos, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 13 DISMISS Plaintiff,

14 v. [Doc. No. 5] 15 CITY OF SAN DIEGO, et al., 16 Defendants. 17

18 On June 4, 2025, Plaintiff Olimpia Neal sued Defendants City of San Diego, San 19 Diego Police Department (“SDPD”), SDPD Officer Ruben Berton, and Does 1–10 20 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 following the death of her son Mauricio Ramos. [Doc. No. 21 1 (“Compl.”)] She brings claims for wrongful death, survival action, deprivation of 22 relationship with decedent, and Monell violations. [Compl. at 4–8.] Defendants City of 23 San Diego and SDPD (“Defendants”) filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Monell claim. 24 [Doc. No. 5.] The matter is fully briefed, and the Court finds it suitable for determination 25 on the papers. See CivLR 7.1(d)(1). For the reasons below, the Court GRANTS the 26 motion to dismiss. 27

28 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 On June 4, 2023, Plaintiff’s son, Mauricio, boarded a San Diego trolley while 3 allegedly experiencing a mental health emergency. [Compl. ¶¶ 10–12.] After observing 4 Mauricio pacing back-and-forth with a Glock replica BB pistol, a passenger called 9-1-1. 5 [Id. at ¶¶ 13–14.] When the trolley reached San Ysidro station around 9:00 PM, all 6 passengers evacuated with only Mauricio left inside. [Id. at ¶ 16.] Defendant Officer 7 Berton responded to the scene, and a transit security officer identified Mauricio. [Id. at ¶¶ 8 18–19.] Defendant Berton entered the trolley and fired multiple shots at Mauricio, who 9 died waiting for paramedics to arrive. [Id. at ¶ 21.] Plaintiff alleges, inter alia, that 10 Defendants City of San Diego and SDPD are liable for maintaining unconstitutional 11 policies, customs, and practices, including using excessive force, hiring officers that abuse 12 their authority and mistreat citizens, and more, which led to Mauricio’s death. [Id. at ¶ 50.] 13 II. LEGAL STANDARD 14 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a party to raise by motion the 15 defense that the complaint “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” The 16 Court evaluates whether a complaint states a recognizable legal theory and sufficient facts 17 in light of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), which requires a “short and plain 18 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Although Rule 8 “does 19 not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ . . . it [does] demand[] more than an unadorned, 20 the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 21 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 22 “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 23 accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting 24 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A claim is facially plausible 25 when the collective facts pled “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 26 defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. There must be “more than a sheer 27 possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. Facts “‘merely consistent with’ a 28 defendant’s liability” fall short of a plausible entitlement to relief. Id. (quoting Twombly, 1 550 U.S. at 557). The Court need not accept as true “legal conclusions” contained in the 2 complaint, id., or other “allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of 3 fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Daniels-Hall v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 4 (9th Cir. 2010). The Court accepts as true all allegations in the complaint and construes 5 the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 6 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2005). 7 III. DISCUSSION 8 Defendants City of San Diego and SDPD argue that Plaintiff “fails to allege the 9 required facts to establish any Monell violations” and that her allegations are “conclusory, 10 boilerplate statements[.]” [Doc. No. 5-1 at 5.] The Court agrees. 11 “A government entity may not be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, unless a policy, 12 practice, or custom of the entity can be shown to be a moving force behind a violation of 13 constitutional rights.” Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2011) 14 (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). 15 First, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants maintain unconstitutional policies that led to 16 Mauricio’s death. She identifies “SDPD Policy 1.04, 1.05, 6.2, and/or 6.28,” [Compl. ¶ 17 22], but does not allege any facts showing how these policies were a moving force behind 18 the violation. Indeed, she offers only conclusory statements that these policies “were 19 affirmatively linked to and were a significant driving force” behind the violation. [Id. at ¶ 20 54.] Moreover, Plaintiff alleges that these policies actually “emphasize the use of de- 21 escalation tactics and the proper response to individuals experiencing mental health crises.” 22 [Id.] It is unclear, then, how these policies, which emphasize de-escalation when dealing 23 with mentally unwell individuals, enabled Mauricio’s death.1 24 25

26 1 Plaintiff also identifies “California Peace Officer Standard of Training (POST) Learning Domain 37, 27 Chapter 4, which provides guidance on dealing with mentally ill or emotionally disturbed individuals.” [Compl. ¶ 23.] However, she similarly fails to show how this training policy contributed to the 28 1 Plaintiff next alleges that Defendants inadequately supervised, trained, controlled, 2 assigned, and disciplined Defendant Berton. [Id. at ¶ 50.] “Under limited circumstances, 3 the failure to train municipal employees can sustain a Monell claim.” Manlove v. County 4 of San Diego, 759 F. Supp. 3d 1057, 1068 (S.D. Cal. 2024) (internal quotation marks 5 omitted) (citing Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 407 6 (1997). Plaintiff, however, offers “no facts relating to any allegations of constitutional 7 violations that have occurred in the past or any facts relating to the training” of Defendant 8 Berton or any other SDPD officer. Id. Defendant Berton shooting and killing Mauricio— 9 on its own—cannot sustain a Monell failure-to-train claim. See Segura v. City of La Mesa, 10 647 F. Supp. 3d 926, 938 (S.D. Cal. 2022) (granting motion to dismiss on a failure to train 11 claim where plaintiff identified a single alleged unconstitutional incident).

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 OLIMPIA NEAL, individually and as Case No.: 3:25-cv-1414-CAB-BJW representative of the Estate of Mauricio 12 Sanchez Ramos, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 13 DISMISS Plaintiff,

14 v. [Doc. No. 5] 15 CITY OF SAN DIEGO, et al., 16 Defendants. 17

18 On June 4, 2025, Plaintiff Olimpia Neal sued Defendants City of San Diego, San 19 Diego Police Department (“SDPD”), SDPD Officer Ruben Berton, and Does 1–10 20 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 following the death of her son Mauricio Ramos. [Doc. No. 21 1 (“Compl.”)] She brings claims for wrongful death, survival action, deprivation of 22 relationship with decedent, and Monell violations. [Compl. at 4–8.] Defendants City of 23 San Diego and SDPD (“Defendants”) filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Monell claim. 24 [Doc. No. 5.] The matter is fully briefed, and the Court finds it suitable for determination 25 on the papers. See CivLR 7.1(d)(1). For the reasons below, the Court GRANTS the 26 motion to dismiss. 27

28 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 On June 4, 2023, Plaintiff’s son, Mauricio, boarded a San Diego trolley while 3 allegedly experiencing a mental health emergency. [Compl. ¶¶ 10–12.] After observing 4 Mauricio pacing back-and-forth with a Glock replica BB pistol, a passenger called 9-1-1. 5 [Id. at ¶¶ 13–14.] When the trolley reached San Ysidro station around 9:00 PM, all 6 passengers evacuated with only Mauricio left inside. [Id. at ¶ 16.] Defendant Officer 7 Berton responded to the scene, and a transit security officer identified Mauricio. [Id. at ¶¶ 8 18–19.] Defendant Berton entered the trolley and fired multiple shots at Mauricio, who 9 died waiting for paramedics to arrive. [Id. at ¶ 21.] Plaintiff alleges, inter alia, that 10 Defendants City of San Diego and SDPD are liable for maintaining unconstitutional 11 policies, customs, and practices, including using excessive force, hiring officers that abuse 12 their authority and mistreat citizens, and more, which led to Mauricio’s death. [Id. at ¶ 50.] 13 II. LEGAL STANDARD 14 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a party to raise by motion the 15 defense that the complaint “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” The 16 Court evaluates whether a complaint states a recognizable legal theory and sufficient facts 17 in light of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), which requires a “short and plain 18 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Although Rule 8 “does 19 not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ . . . it [does] demand[] more than an unadorned, 20 the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 21 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 22 “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 23 accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting 24 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A claim is facially plausible 25 when the collective facts pled “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 26 defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. There must be “more than a sheer 27 possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. Facts “‘merely consistent with’ a 28 defendant’s liability” fall short of a plausible entitlement to relief. Id. (quoting Twombly, 1 550 U.S. at 557). The Court need not accept as true “legal conclusions” contained in the 2 complaint, id., or other “allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of 3 fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Daniels-Hall v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 4 (9th Cir. 2010). The Court accepts as true all allegations in the complaint and construes 5 the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 6 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2005). 7 III. DISCUSSION 8 Defendants City of San Diego and SDPD argue that Plaintiff “fails to allege the 9 required facts to establish any Monell violations” and that her allegations are “conclusory, 10 boilerplate statements[.]” [Doc. No. 5-1 at 5.] The Court agrees. 11 “A government entity may not be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, unless a policy, 12 practice, or custom of the entity can be shown to be a moving force behind a violation of 13 constitutional rights.” Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2011) 14 (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). 15 First, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants maintain unconstitutional policies that led to 16 Mauricio’s death. She identifies “SDPD Policy 1.04, 1.05, 6.2, and/or 6.28,” [Compl. ¶ 17 22], but does not allege any facts showing how these policies were a moving force behind 18 the violation. Indeed, she offers only conclusory statements that these policies “were 19 affirmatively linked to and were a significant driving force” behind the violation. [Id. at ¶ 20 54.] Moreover, Plaintiff alleges that these policies actually “emphasize the use of de- 21 escalation tactics and the proper response to individuals experiencing mental health crises.” 22 [Id.] It is unclear, then, how these policies, which emphasize de-escalation when dealing 23 with mentally unwell individuals, enabled Mauricio’s death.1 24 25

26 1 Plaintiff also identifies “California Peace Officer Standard of Training (POST) Learning Domain 37, 27 Chapter 4, which provides guidance on dealing with mentally ill or emotionally disturbed individuals.” [Compl. ¶ 23.] However, she similarly fails to show how this training policy contributed to the 28 1 Plaintiff next alleges that Defendants inadequately supervised, trained, controlled, 2 assigned, and disciplined Defendant Berton. [Id. at ¶ 50.] “Under limited circumstances, 3 the failure to train municipal employees can sustain a Monell claim.” Manlove v. County 4 of San Diego, 759 F. Supp. 3d 1057, 1068 (S.D. Cal. 2024) (internal quotation marks 5 omitted) (citing Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 407 6 (1997). Plaintiff, however, offers “no facts relating to any allegations of constitutional 7 violations that have occurred in the past or any facts relating to the training” of Defendant 8 Berton or any other SDPD officer. Id. Defendant Berton shooting and killing Mauricio— 9 on its own—cannot sustain a Monell failure-to-train claim. See Segura v. City of La Mesa, 10 647 F. Supp. 3d 926, 938 (S.D. Cal. 2022) (granting motion to dismiss on a failure to train 11 claim where plaintiff identified a single alleged unconstitutional incident). 12 Finally, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants maintain “an unconstitutional custom and 13 practice of using excessive force against individuals experiencing mental health 14 emergencies, detaining and arresting individuals without probable cause, and covering up 15 instances of police misconduct.” [Compl. ¶ 50.] Plaintiff can allege a Monell claim based 16 on custom, but the “custom must be so persistent and widespread that it constitutes a 17 permanent and well settled city policy.” Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996) 18 (internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, Plaintiff cannot “prove the existence of a 19 municipal policy or custom based solely on the occurrence of a single incident of 20 unconstitutional action by a non-policymaking employee.” Davis v. City of Ellensburg, 21 869 F.2d 1230, 1233 (9th Cir. 1989). That is, however, precisely what Plaintiff attempts 22 to do. The only allegations in the complaint involve Defendant Berton shooting Mauricio. 23 Plaintiff does not allege prior incidents concerning excessive force, illegal arrests, or 24 misconduct cover-ups. Plaintiff offers only conclusory statements that Defendants 25 maintain such customs and practices, which the Court will not accept. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. 26 662 at 678. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to sufficiently plead her Monell 27 claim against Defendants City of San Diego and SDPD. 28 I IV. CONCLUSION 2 Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED. Plaintiff's fourth cause of action for 3 || Monell violations is DISMISSED with leave to amend. Should Plaintiff choose to file an 4 ||amended complaint, she must do so by December 1, 2025. Any amended complaint must 5 comply with CivLR 15.1(c). 6 It is SO ORDERED. (GB 7 Dated: November 12, 2025 Hon. Cathy Ann Bencivengo 8 United States District Judge 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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