Olea v. Teichert Pipelines, Inc.

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: May 31, 2023
• Docket: 4:21-cv-03016
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 ELIAZAR OLEA, Case No. 21-cv-03016-JST

8 Plaintiff, ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE v. 9 Re: ECF Nos. 46, 48 10 TEICHERT PIPELINES, INC., Defendant. 11

12 13 Before the Court is Defendant Teichert Pipelines, Inc.’s motion for summary judgment and 14 Plaintiff Eliazar Olea’s motion for partial summary judgment. ECF Nos. 46, 48. 15 Olea initially filed this action in state court, alleging that Teichert’s disclosure forms 16 concerning background reports are inadequate in violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act 17 (“FCRA”), California’s Investigative Consumer Reporting Agency Act (“ICRAA”), California’s 18 Consumer Reporting and Agencies Act (“CCRAA”), and California’s Unfair Competition Law 19 (“UCL”). ECF No. 1-2. Teichert removed the action to federal court, arguing that the Court has 20 federal question jurisdiction over Olea’s FCRA claim and may exercise supplemental jurisdiction 21 over his state law claims. ECF No. 1. 22 Teichert now moves for summary judgment, arguing that Olea has not suffered an actual 23 injury sufficient for statutory standing under ICRAA, the CCRAA, and the UCL. ECF No. 48 at 24 22-24. However, it is not clear whether Olea has suffered an actual injury sufficient to confer 25 Article III standing, without which the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to hear any of his 26 / / / 27 / / / 1 claims.1 2 “[L]ack of Article III standing requires dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” 3 Maya v. Centex Corp., 658 F.3d 1060, 1067 (9th Cir. 2011). “Subject matter jurisdiction is 4 fundamental; ‘[t]he defense of lack of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived, and the court 5 is under a continuing duty to dismiss an action whenever it appears that the court lacks 6 jurisdiction.’” Billingsly v. C.I.R., 868 F.2d 1081, 1085 (9th Cir. 1989) (alteration in original) 7 (quoting Augustine v. United States, 704 F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1983)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the court 9 must dismiss the action.”). 10 “[U]nder Article III, an injury in law is not an injury in fact.” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 11 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2205 (2021). “Only those plaintiffs who have been concretely harmed by a 12 defendant’s statutory violation may sue that private defendant over that violation in federal court.” 13 Id. “A plaintiff who alleges a ‘bare procedural violation’ of the FCRA, ‘divorced from any 14 concrete harm,’ fails to satisfy Article III’s injury-in-fact requirement.” Syed v. M-I, LLC, 853 15 F.3d 492, 499 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 341 (2016)). 16 The Ninth Circuit has recognized that violation of Section 1681b(b)(2)(A), a “procedural 17 rule [which] protect[s] the consumer’s substantive right to control who receive[s] their credit 18 report and identify any violation of their rights to privacy and information,” may amount to “more 19 than ‘a bare procedural violation.’” Tailford v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 26 F.4th 1092, 1100 (9th 20 Cir. 2022) (quoting Syed, 853 F.3d at 499). In Syed, the Ninth Circuit held that a plaintiff 21 sufficiently alleged a concrete injury where he “was confused by the inclusion of the liability 22 waiver with the disclosure and would not have signed it had it contained a sufficiently clear 23 disclosure, as required in the statute.” 853 F.3d at 499-500. Because the plaintiff was “not aware 24 that he was signing a waiver authorizing the credit check when he signed it,” the plaintiff “was 25

26 1 Because Olea’s FCRA claim provides the basis for the Court’s jurisdiction over the entire action, the Court raises solely the issue of whether Olea has demonstrated standing to bring such a claim. 27 If the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Olea’s federal claim, it lacks discretion to 1 deprived of the right to information and the right to privacy guaranteed by” the statute. Id. at 499. 2 || Thus, the plaintiff's alleged injury was more than a bare procedural violation. 3 Nothing before the Court suggests Olea was confused by the disclosure form or was 4 || otherwise deprived of the substantive rights protected by the procedural rule of Section 5 1681b(b)(2)(A). Deposition testimony indicates that Olea did not find the forms presented to him 6 || confusing, ECF No. 48-3 at 37; knew that he had authorized Teichert to procure a background 7 report when he signed the release, id. at 35, 42, 46; and suffered no harm as a result of the 8 || background report, id. at 50. Absent an injury-in-fact sufficient to confer standing to bring an 9 FCRA claim, this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Olea’s federal claim and cannot 10 || exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims. 11 Teichert, the party who invoked federal jurisdiction, is ordered to show cause, in writing 12 and no later than June 30, 2023, why this case should not be remanded to state court.” Olea shall 13 file any response no later than July 14, 2023. IT IS SO ORDERED. 3 15 Dated: May 31, 2023 . & 16 JON S. TIGA 17 United States District Judge

19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 2 “If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter 97 || Jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); see also Polo v. Innoventions □□□□□□ LLC, 833 F.3d 1193, 1196 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Remand is the correct remedy because a failure of 28 federal subject-matter jurisdiction means only that the federal courts have no power to adjudicate the matter. State courts are not bound by the constraints of Article III.’””) (emphasis in original).