Oldham v. Self

632 S.E.2d 446, 279 Ga. App. 703, 2006 Fulton County D. Rep. 1761, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 672
CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia
DecidedJune 9, 2006
DocketA06A0487
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 632 S.E.2d 446 (Oldham v. Self) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Oldham v. Self, 632 S.E.2d 446, 279 Ga. App. 703, 2006 Fulton County D. Rep. 1761, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 672 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006).

Opinion

MlKELL, Judge.

Brandy Dawn Self, individually and as administrator of the estate of decedent, Stephen A. Sumowski, and as next friend of *704 Sumowski’s minor daughter, sued Kevin D. Oldham, Sumowski’s former business partner and the beneficiary of Sumowski’s $150,000 life insurance policy, for breach of contract, alleging that Oldham agreed to deposit $20,000 of the insurance proceeds into a trust for the benefit of Sumowski’s minor child in exchange for Selfs forbearance to sue. A jury found Oldham liable and awarded $20,000. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Self for $20,000, for the sole benefit of Sumowski’s minor child. Oldham appeals, challenging the trial court’s denial of his motion for directed verdict and arguing that the trial court gave an improper verdict form to the jury. Because we find that no enforceable contract existed, we reverse.

1. Oldham contends that the trial court should have granted his motion for directed verdict on Selfs breach of contract claim because there was no enforceable contract. Although we are most reluctant to disturb any jury’s verdict, we agree with Oldham’s contention.

The standard of review of a trial court’s denial of a motion for a directed verdict is the “any evidence” standard. A directed verdict is authorized when there is only one reasonable conclusion as to the proper judgment; if there is no evidentiary basis for the jury’s verdict, viewing the evidence most favorably to the party who secured the verdict, it is error to deny the motion. 1

So viewed, the evidence shows that Oldham and Sumowski were best friends and business partners in Dublin Transmission Service. Each owned $150,000 in life insurance on the other’s life. The company dissolved in December 1999, after Sumowski twice overdosed on prescription drugs; however, a dissolution agreement was never signed because Sumowski committed suicide on May 8, 2000. Old-ham received insurance proceeds in the amount of $150,421.87.

Shortly after Sumowski’s death, Self, Sumowski’s former girlfriend and the mother of his child, contacted attorney James Hilburn to discuss Sumowski’s estate and an alleged buy/sell agreement involving the partners’ life insurance policies. On May 26, 2000, Hilburn wrote to Oldham’s attorney, Mitch Warnock, requesting a meeting on behalf of his client. During a meeting on June 14, 2000, Self and Hilburn learned that no buy/sell agreement existed. At that time, Oldham told Self he was considering setting aside $20,000 for Sumowski’s minor child. Hilburn advised Oldham and Warnock that he wanted to discuss his client’s options before proceeding and the *705 meeting was adjourned. With respect to the meeting, Hilburn testified, “I mean, we were just talking. There wasn’t any agreements.” The next day, Hilburn told Warnock that Self would not pursue any claims against the business on behalf of the estate or Sumowski’s child if Oldham put $20,000 in a trust for the child’s benefit. Warnock told Hilburn to prepare a trust agreement and send it to him, and that he would get back to Hilburn. When asked if he believed an agreement existed at that time, Hilburn replied, “[w]ell,... I felt we kind of had an understanding that he was going to put the twenty thousand dollars and we were going to do a trust. The exact terms had not been agreed to.” On September 21,2000, Hilburn sent to Warnock a proposed irrevocable trust, naming Self and Sumowski’s brother as co-trustees. In response, Warnock advised Hilburn that Self would not bean acceptable trustee. According to Hilburn, Warnock voiced no other objections to the trust.

On October 20, 2000, Hilburn prepared and sent to Warnock a second proposed irrevocable trust, naming Oldham and Sumowski’s brother as co-trustees. As to the status of the trust agreement on October 20, Hilburn opined as follows: “my recollection is that [Warnock] said I’m going to get it signed and get it back to you. And then there was later a report to my office that one of them had signed it. I believe that [Oldham] had signed it and they were waiting on the other person to sign it and then they’d get it on back to me.” On November 1, 2000, Hilburn wrote to Warnock, requesting that Old-ham and Sumowski’s brother approve and sign two originals of the second proposed trust agreement. Warnock did not respond to Hilburn’s letters or return the documents. On December 12, 2000, Hilburn again wrote to Warnock, requesting a status report on the trust agreement. Sometime between January 9, 2001, and January 12, 2001, Warnock telephoned Hilburn, explaining that Oldham had changed his mind and would not execute the trust agreement. During that conversation, Warnock told Hilburn to write a “real strong letter and I will get [Oldham] in here and talk to him.” Hilburn sent to Warnock a “strong letter” documenting the parties’ discussions and correspondence, and advising that, “[i]f the signed trust agreement has not been received in our office by January 19, 2001, I will recommend that Ms. Self go ahead and file a complaint to enforce the agreement.” The remainder of the letter read as follows:

I was very disappointed when you called and advised that [Oldham] had changed his mind and decided not to honor the agreement to place $20,000 in a trust fund for [Sumowski’s child]. ... [I]t is my opinion there was a very definite and legally enforceable agreement by [Oldham] to put $20,000 in *706 a fund for [the child]. I have reviewed my notes and correspondence. ... We all agree that [Oldham] definitely offered to pay the $20,000. Brandy [Self] and I agreed that we would discuss the offer and advise you if she would be willing to accept the $20,000 and not pursue any claims against [Old-ham] or Dublin Transmission. . . . Following my meeting with [Self], I notified you that she had agreed to accept the offer and that I had recommended that she request that the money be put into a trust____You later requested that I send a draft of a proposed trust agreement for [Oldham] to look at and I did that. You then notified me that [Oldham] had agreed to sign the trust provided [Self] was removed as a trustee and Robert Sumowski substituted. That was agreed to and the revised trust agreement was mailed to you on November 1, 2000. When a follow-up call was made to your office regarding the status of the trust agreement, it was reported that [Oldham] had already signed it and that you were obtaining Robert Sumowski’s signature. This was confirmed in my fax to you on December 12, 2000. [Warnock], if you disagree with any of these factual statements regarding [Oldham’s] offer, our acceptance or your representations to me, please advise me in writing by January 19, 2001.

On January 17, 2001, Warnock called, stating that Hilburn’s letter “worked” and that Oldham was bringing Warnock a check for $20,000 to place in his trust account, and that he wanted to discuss making a few changes in the trust agreement. On January 22, 2001, Warnock telephoned Hilburn, confirming that Oldham delivered to him a check in the amount of $20,000 “to hold until... [a] trust [was] drawn up” and advising that Oldham had some proposed changes to the trust agreement. With regard to any proposed changes, Warnock testified that he and Hilburn discussed the “revocable/irrevocable aspect of [the trust agreement].” On January 29, 2001, Hilburn wrote the following letter to Warnock:

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

City of Demorest v. Roberts & Dunahoo Properties, LLC
655 S.E.2d 617 (Court of Appeals of Georgia, 2007)
Ruskin v. AAF-McQuay, Inc.
643 S.E.2d 333 (Court of Appeals of Georgia, 2007)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
632 S.E.2d 446, 279 Ga. App. 703, 2006 Fulton County D. Rep. 1761, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 672, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/oldham-v-self-gactapp-2006.