Old Trapper Smoked Products Inc. v. Washington County Assessor

• Court: Oregon Tax Court
• Decided: October 24, 2025
• Docket: TC-MD 250001N
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

IN THE OREGON TAX COURT MAGISTRATE DIVISION Property Tax

OLD TRAPPER SMOKED PRODUCTS ) INC., ) ) Plaintiff, ) TC-MD 250001N (Control) ) TC-MD 250002G ) TC-MD 250003G ) TC-MD 250005G v. ) ) WASHINGTON COUNTY ASSESSOR, ) and DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, ) State of Oregon, ) ) Defendants. ) DECISION OF DISMISSAL

This matter1 came before the court on Defendant Department of Revenue’s (the

department) letter stating that Plaintiff failed to comply with the court’s Order Granting

Defendant’s Motion to Compel (Order) entered on April 17, 2025. (Def Dept’s Ltr, May 6,

2025; Def Dept’s Resp to Mot for Ext of Time, May 15, 2025.) Plaintiff disputes the

department’s letter, alleging that it complied with the Order, and requests additional time to

“finalize its production of documents.” (Ptf’s Resp, May 7, 2025.) Plaintiff modified its request

to receive “reasonable time to confirm * * * the documents in the sharefile as of May 16, 2025.”

(Ptf’s Mot to Strike at 3.) A hearing was held June 3, 2025, by remote means to allow the parties

to explain their positions regarding the appropriate next step in this case. Michael Mangan, an

Oregon attorney with the law firm of Vorys Sater Seymour and Pease LLP, argued on behalf of

Plaintiff. Daniel Paul, Senior Assistant Attorney General, argued on behalf of the department.

1 The four cases were initially assigned to two different magistrates. On the parties’ request at the initial case management conference, the cases were related and assigned to a single magistrate. (Journal Entry, Feb 19, 2025.) The parties’ motions and briefs in the four cases are identical and present common questions for resolution. On its own motion, the court hereby consolidates the cases and identifies TC-MD 250001N as the control case.

DECISION OF DISMISSAL TC-MD 250001N (Control) 1 I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS

Plaintiff filed its Complaints for the 2024-25 tax year on December 31, 2024, for an

industrial appeal involving 10 accounts of real and personal property. An initial case

management conference was held on February 19, 2025, during which the parties agreed to file a

status report by April 4, 2025, identifying any cases or accounts that may be dismissed and

proposing mutually agreed mediation dates.

On April 4, 2025, the department filed its status report and its Motion to Dismiss or,

Alternatively, Motion to Compel. The department wrote that Plaintiff had “neither responded to

the requests nor provided any documents” responsive to the department’s request for production

(RFP) served February 7, 2025, and re-sent to Plaintiff by request on February 20, 2025. (Def

Dept’s Mot at 3, 8.) The department’s RFP sought information and documents relevant to the

2024-25 value of the subject properties, particularly pertaining to changes that occurred between

January 1, 2023, and January 1, 2024. (See Decl of Paul at Ex D, Apr 4, 2025.)

Plaintiff did not file its own status report or a response to the department’s motion. On

April 17, 2025, the court entered the Order, which granted the motion to compel and contained

three components: (1) a 14-day deadline for Plaintiff to produce documents responsive to the

department’s February 7, 2025, RFP, (2) imposition of the Regular Division discovery rules, Tax

Court Rules (TCR) 36 through 46, and (3) a warning that Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the

Order would result in sanctions, which may include exclusion of withheld information at trial or

dismissal of the cases.

On May 6, 2025, the department filed a letter stating that Plaintiff failed to produce any

documents or communicate with the department’s representative by the May 1 deadline. On

May 7, Plaintiff filed its Response to Letter, simultaneously alleging that Mangan’s firm

DECISION OF DISMISSAL TC-MD 250001N (Control) 2 uploaded responsive documents to the Department’s request via a sharefile link on May 1, and

asking for a 14-day extension “to confer with counsel for defendant and finalize its production of

documents.” (See also Mangan Decl in Supp of Resp to Ltr at ¶3; TC-MD 250002G.) Mangan

explained he “was unable to attend to this matter” due to an “accidental injury” on March 8, and

subsequent ongoing treatment through “early April.” (Id. at ¶2.) Mangan received care for his

injury on March 8, 11, 18, and 22, and on April 8. (Id.) He did not identify any appointments

after April 8. (See id.) Mangan further asserts that he “verbally asked the Department for an

additional 30 days on this matter and a related case (240003G)” and “[t]he additional time was

granted” in 240003G.2 (Id.) The department disputes both that Mangan requested additional

time and that it was granted. (Decl of Paul at ¶2, May 15, 2025.)

On May 15, 2025, the department filed its Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Extension

of Time, opposing the request because Plaintiff failed to comply with the court’s Order. The

department alleged that “the purported ‘production’ that [P]laintiff claims to have made consists

entirely of documents from a previous case that the department explicitly excluded from its

discovery requests.” (Def Dept’s Resp at 1.) The department reviewed the metadata and URL of

the uploaded documents to confirm that they were identical to documents produced in a previous

case. (Id. at 3.) Further, Plaintiff’s upload “failed to provide any written response” to the

department’s RFP, indicating which documents correspond to which request. (Id.) The

department alerted Mangan to those issues by email on May 9, and Mangan responded on May

12, “We do have recent documents uploaded to the server. We are working to determine why

///

2 Mangan’s declaration cites to “240003G” and then “2400043G,” the latter appearing to be a scrivener’s error (adding a “4”), because no such case exists. Instead, the court understands him to be referring to the case cited in the prior sentence of his declaration, TC-MD 240003G.

DECISION OF DISMISSAL TC-MD 250001N (Control) 3 you aren’t able to see them.” (Decl of Paul at ¶5-6, Exs D and E, May 15, 2025.) As of May 15,

the department had not received any responsive documents. (Id. at ¶7.)

The night before and the morning of the June 3, 2025, hearing, Plaintiff filed a Motion to

Strike and declarations from Mangan and his legal assistant—Veronica Lees—in support of the

motion.3 Plaintiff moved to strike the department’s May 6 letter and its response to Plaintiff’s

Motion for Extension. (Ptf’s Mot to Strike at 1.) Plaintiff asserted the basis for the motion as

“the [d]epartment failed to detail its efforts to obtain the requested items and/or make good faith

efforts to confer under TCR-MD Rule 9 B(1) and/or TCR 14, respectively.” (Id.) Lees’

declaration stated that she “created a sharefile for the discovery responses in this matter” and

“the plaintiff’s CFO, Eric Everson, uploaded documents to the sharefile” on the following dates:

“April 27, 2023; 5/01/2023; 5/02/2023; 5/03/2023; 1/11/2024; 5/08/2025; 5/16/2025.” (Decl of

Veronica Lees in Supp of Mot to Strike at ¶1-2.) She further declared that Paul “has access to

this sharefile.” (Id. at ¶3.) Mangan alleged that he attempted to confer with Paul regarding

discovery by email on May 7 and by phone on May 12. (Decl of Mangan in Supp of Mot to

Strike at ¶2-4.)

At the hearing on June 3, 2025, Paul disputed the veracity of Mangan’s declaration

asserting that his firm uploaded documents on May 1. Paul noted that Lees’ declaration,

detailing the timing of uploads to the sharefile, contains no reference to an upload on May 1,

2025. Only two uploads occurred after the department served its RFP and the court entered its

Order: one on May 8 and one on May 16.4

3 On June 1, 2025, Plaintiff also filed a Motion to Reset Oral Arguments out of concern that Mangan’s trial in the Regular Division on another matter that was continuing beyond its scheduled dates would likely continue into the morning of June 3, 2025. The Regular Division matter concluded on June 2, 2025, so no continuance of the hearing in these matters was needed. 4 Those are also the only two uploads that occurred since these cases were filed. Presumably the uploads in

DECISION OF DISMISSAL TC-MD 250001N (Control) 4 In his remarks at the June 3, 2025, hearing, Mangan characterized Lees’ declaration as

documenting the uploads from Plaintiff’s CFO to the sharefile. Mangan contrasted this with his

own declaration, which he described as focusing on the effort to provide the sharefile link to

Paul. After allowing each counsel to be heard, the court asked Mangan to clarify what evidence

Plaintiff had of its effort to comply with the Order on May 1, 2025. Mangan responded “I don’t

have that for the court.” He went on to explain that it was his assistant’s fault for either inputting

an incorrect email address or that Paul “wasn’t properly added [to the sharefile] on May 1.”

II. ANALYSIS

The first issue before the court is whether Plaintiff complied with the court’s April 17,

2025, Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Compel or, if not, identified good cause for its

noncompliance. A second issue is the appropriate sanction for noncompliance.

A. Whether Plaintiff Complied with the Order

The department alleges that Plaintiff did not comply with the Order because Plaintiff did

not produce any documents or otherwise respond to the department’s RFP by the May 1, 2025,

deadline. Mangan asserted that his firm uploaded documents via a sharefile for the department

on Thursday, May 1, 2025, but offered no evidence to support that assertion. At the June 3,

2025, hearing, Mangan confirmed that he had no evidence to support that assertion. Indeed,

Plaintiff was unable to offer any evidence that it responded to discovery requests between the

department’s service of the RFP on February 7, 2025, and the May 1 deadline. Lees’ declaration

indicates that May 8, 2025, was the first time Plaintiff produced any documents for discovery

since the RFP and Order.

2023 and 2024 were related to prior year appeals.

DECISION OF DISMISSAL TC-MD 250001N (Control) 5 Mangan’s assertion that Plaintiff produced discovery documents on May 1 is not

credible; it is not supported by independent evidence and is undermined by Lees’ declaration

omitting any reference to May 1, 2025. The department disputes the assertion, maintaining it

had received no responsive documents as of May 15.

Not only did Plaintiff fail to produce responsive documents by May 1, 2025, Plaintiff also

failed to provide any communication related to discovery prior to that date. Mangan stated at the

hearing that Plaintiff intends to rely on documents produced in a prior appeal, 230006R. (See

also Ptf’s Mot to Strike at 3 (stating Plaintiff has “no intention of offering any documents not

produced by May 16, 2025 on its sharefiles at trial.”)) Yet, Plaintiff did not communicate that

intention before May 1 or otherwise make a response allowed under TCR 43 B.5 It is

unreasonable for Plaintiff to assume the department would know to look for documents in a

sharefile location for Plaintiff’s prior appeal (230006R) for discovery responsive to the

department’s RFP in this group of cases. The court finds Plaintiff failed to comply with the

court’s Order because Plaintiff failed to produce responsive documents or otherwise respond to

the department’s RFP by May 1, 2025.

B. Whether Plaintiff Identified Good Cause for Noncompliance

Having found that Plaintiff failed to comply with the court’s Order, the question becomes

whether Plaintiff identified any good cause for its noncompliance. See Spears v. Dept. of Rev.,

20 OTR 229 (2010) (on review of magistrate’s dismissal, applying “good cause” standard to

counsel’s failure to timely submit documents in magistrate case). Good cause might include

serious medical problems that prevent counsel from addressing caseload requirements. See id. at

5 TCR 43 B(2)(a) requires a responding party to “organize and label” its response “to correspond with the categories in the request[.]” The responding party may object to a specific request or state that a requested item is not in the party’s possession or control and it was unable to obtain it with reasonable effort. TCR 43 B(2)(b), (d).

DECISION OF DISMISSAL TC-MD 250001N (Control) 6 235. Here, Mangan argues that an accidental injury and his resulting treatment prevented his

compliance with the Order. Yet, he identified no dates of injury and treatment between the April

17 Order date and the May 1 deadline, or after. Mangan’s last treatment date was April 8, and he

offers no explanation or evidence to demonstrate how the nature of his recovery prevented him

from attending to this matter between April 8 and the May 1 deadline. If Mangan’s injury

prevented him from complying with the May 1 deadline, it is unclear why he did not request an

extension of time before that date. See Spears, 20 OTR at 235 (admonishing those who appear

in this court that “letters stating deadlines with dismissal consequences must be taken seriously”

and noting that “a motion for leave to extend time frames coupled with detailed reasons should

be submitted whenever possible.”) Mangan’s injury and treatment fails to explain why he did

not comply with the court’s Order or, at a minimum, request an extension to comply.

Plaintiff argues that its noncompliance with the Order should be excused by the

department’s failure to confer under TCR-MD 9. (See generally Ptf’s Mot to Strike.6) TCR-MD

9 B(1) requires a party to make a written request for discoverable items before moving the court

for an order to compel. The department complied with TCR-MD 9 B(1) by sending Plaintiff an

RFP on February 7, 2025, and making additional written requests to Plaintiff between February 7

and March 21, 2025. (See Or Gtg Def’s Mot to Compel at 1.) Plaintiff’s argument that the

department failed to confer after the court entered its Order and after Plaintiff missed the

response deadline finds no support in the facts or the rule.

Similarly, Mangan’s assertion—that on April 16, 2025, he asked for a 30-day extension

for this matter concurrently with an extension he claims the department granted in an unrelated

6 Plaintiff also cites TCR 14, which states that “[t]he court will deny any motion pursuant to TCR 36 through TCR 46 unless counsel for the moving party, before filing the motion, makes a good faith effort to confer with the other parties concerning the issues in dispute.”

DECISION OF DISMISSAL TC-MD 250001N (Control) 7 case—is unavailing. The department disputes the claimed extension. The court takes judicial

notice that the other case, TC-MD 240003G, was closed by a Judgment of Stipulation on

January 22, 2025, following a January 8, 2025, order denying Mangan’s request to reset a trial

scheduled for February 4 and 5, 2025. That case was closed well before Plaintiff’s injury on

March 8, 2025, so it is unclear how Plaintiff could have asked for an extension in a closed case

or based on an injury that had not yet occurred. The court concludes Plaintiff did not have good

cause for failing to comply with the court’s Order.

C. Appropriate Sanction

The court’s Order stated that “failure to comply with [the] Order will result in sanctions,

which may include exclusion of withheld information at trial or dismissal of the case.” (Or Gtg

Def’s Mot to Compel at 2, citing TCR-MD 9, 21.) To consider the appropriate sanction for

Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the court’s Order, the court looks to TCR 46 B, adopted by the

Order. TCR 46 B(2) provides that, if a party “fails to obey an order to provide [] discovery, * * *

the court may make such orders in regard to the failure as are just[.]” Under that rule’s further

subsections, the court is charged with tailoring a sanction—including dismissing the action—to

address the noncompliance. See TCR 46 B(2)(a) – (2)(d). Interpreting the equivalent provision

of Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure (ORCP) 46 B(2)(c), the Oregon Supreme Court held that a

trial court imposing a sanction of dismissal must “explain why [the] sanction is ‘just’[.]”

Pamplin v. Victoria, 319 Or 429, 431, 877 P2d 1196 (1994). The court further explained “that a

finding of willfulness, bad faith, or fault of a similar degree on the part of the disobedient party is

required; and that a finding of prejudice to the party seeking discovery is not required.” Id. With

that obligation in mind, the court explains why dismissal is just in this case.

DECISION OF DISMISSAL TC-MD 250001N (Control) 8 1. Fault for noncompliance with the order

Mangan’s conduct in this case and explanations to the court demonstrate that he is at fault

for noncompliance with the court’s Order. He failed to submit a status report as agreed during

the initial case management conference, failed to respond to the department’s Motion to Compel,

and failed to respond to or comply with the court’s Order. His eventual response to the court—

after the May 1 deadline had passed—lacked credibility, claiming without any support that his

firm sent responsive documents to the department on May 1. Mangan also claimed that the

department granted him an extension of time but offered no evidence to support that claim when

the department disputed it. He claimed that an injury prevented him from attending to the case,

but the dates of the injury and treatment do not explain why he failed to communicate after April

8, the last date of treatment. The court gave Mangan ample opportunity to explain Plaintiff’s

failure to comply with the Order, yet he was unable to offer any credible explanation. The court

concludes that Mangan is at fault for Plaintiff’s noncompliance.

2. Dismissal is appropriate because lesser sanctions are insufficient

Although a severe sanction, the court regularly dismisses appeals where a taxpayer fails

to comply with an order compelling discovery. This occurs most commonly following

noncompliance with an order to allow a site inspection in property tax appeals. See e.g.,

Salisbury v. Dept. of Rev., 24 OTR 497 (2021) (determining that magistrate’s dismissal of appeal

for failure to allow site inspection justified); Bleoaja v. Dept. of Rev., 20 OTR 102 (2010) and

Poddar v. Dept. of Rev., 328 Or 552, 983 P2d 527 (1999) (both upholding a dismissal where

taxpayer refused an inspection necessary to determine the correctness of the assessor’s

valuation). The principle in those cases is that the taxing authority is entitled to discovery of

information relevant to the property’s value. Without the discovery, the requesting party cannot

DECISION OF DISMISSAL TC-MD 250001N (Control) 9 adequately prepare its case, and the court cannot determine the correct valuation. Salisbury, 24

OTR at 511-512. Typically, no other sanctions will serve to alleviate the detriment suffered by

the requesting party.

That predicament is mirrored here. Plaintiff’s failure to provide the requested production

impedes the department’s ability to prepare a defense of its valuations. If the court were to

impose a lesser sanction—perhaps the exclusion of the information Plaintiff withheld—and

allow the case to proceed to trial, the detriment would be felt by the department, which must

prepare for trial. Further, the court’s own duty to determine the correct value based on the

evidence presented would be hampered. See Oregon Revised Statute (ORS) 305.412 (2023). As

such, that sanction is insufficient in this case where Plaintiff has produced no responsive

discovery for the 2024-25 tax year and seeks, instead, to rely on documents produced in a prior

year appeal.

Prior year evidence likely clears the low bar of having “some probative value” for the

2024-25 tax year such that it is not irrelevant. See Mughal v. Dept. of Rev., TC 5458, 2024 WL

4341411 (Or Tax, Sept 27, 2024) (discussing a magistrate’s discretion to consider evidence that

has some probative value without adhering to the rules of evidence). Yet, the court questions the

value of such evidence in a complex industrial appeal involving 10 accounts of real and personal

property. The department’s discovery sought documents pertaining to changes that occurred

between January 1, 2023, and January 1, 2024, such as an accurate list of machinery and

equipment as of January 1, 2024, accounting for any items idled, removed, or placed into service.

(See Decl of Paul at Ex D, Apr 4, 2024.) Further, Plaintiff had the opportunity to present its

prior year evidence in a prior year appeal, resulting in a stipulated agreement. To proceed to trial

DECISION OF DISMISSAL TC-MD 250001N (Control) 10 with no current year evidence to correctly determine the subject properties’ 2024-25 tax year

values is a waste of the parties’ and the court’s time.

Plaintiff failed to comply with the court’s Order, producing no responsive documents,

and now seeks to move these cases to trial on evidence submitted in a prior year appeal. Mangan

is at fault for Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the court’s Order. A lesser sanction will not

address Mangan’s conduct, allow Defendant access to the information required to prepare a

defense of the valuation, or allow the court to determine the correct values. The court therefore

finds dismissal is appropriate.

III. CONCLUSION

Upon careful consideration, the court finds that Plaintiff failed to comply with the court’s

Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Compel and failed to identify good cause for its failure to

comply. Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike and Motion for Extension are denied. Plaintiff’s appeal is

dismissed as a sanction for Plaintiff’s noncompliance with the court’s Order. Now, therefore,

IT IS THE DECISION OF THE COURT that Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike and Motion for

Extension are denied.

IT IS FURTHER DECIDED that Plaintiff’s consolidated appeals are dismissed.

ALLISON R. BOOMER PRESIDING MAGISTRATE

If you want to appeal this Decision, file a complaint in the Regular Division of the Oregon Tax Court, by mailing to: 1163 State Street, Salem, OR 97301-2563; or by hand delivery to: Fourth Floor, 1241 State Street, Salem, OR.

Your complaint must be submitted within 60 days after the date of this Decision or this Decision cannot be changed. TCR-MD 19 B.

This document was signed by Magistrate Allison R. Boomer and entered on October 24, 2025.

DECISION OF DISMISSAL TC-MD 250001N (Control) 11