Olaya v. Stoddard

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Michigan
DecidedMarch 27, 2025
Docket2:24-cv-11064
StatusUnknown

This text of Olaya v. Stoddard (Olaya v. Stoddard) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Michigan primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Olaya v. Stoddard, (E.D. Mich. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

JUAN OLAYA, Case No. 2:24-cv-11064 Plaintiff, Jonathan J.C. Grey United States District Judge v. Patricia T. Morris M. STODDARD, et al., United States Magistrate Judge

Defendants. /

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO DENY PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT (ECF No. 14)

I. RECOMMENDATION For the following reasons, I RECOMMEND that this Court DENY Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment. (ECF No. 14). II. REPORT A. Background Plaintiff filed the instant pro se complaint against Defendants on April 23, 2024. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff alleges that while incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institute in Milan, Michigan (“FCI Milan”), Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his medical needs in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. (Id. at PageID.4‒8). Plaintiff previously moved for entry of default against several Defendants (ECF No. 10), and that motion was denied in an order entered on September 23, 2024 (ECF No. 11). In that order, the Court also ordered the reissuance of summons

and extended the time for service. (ECF No. 11). On February 10, 2025, Plaintiff filed the instant motion for default judgment against all Defendants. (ECF No. 14). The docket reveals that on February 27, 2025,

the Court entered an order directing the U.S. Marshals Service (“USMS”) to effectuate service (ECF No. 15), and summonses were issued for all Defendants on the same day (ECF No. 16). On March 10, 2025, USMS acknowledged receipt of the service of process documents. (ECF No. 17). The certificates of

service/summons were executed, and the answers from the various Defendants are due between April 18 and May 16, 2025. (ECF No. 18). B. Analysis

Default can occur when a defendant fails to appear in a case, or having appeared, fails to answer the complaint or otherwise defend against it. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a); see also 10A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2681 (3d ed. 1998). The procedures for entering a default judgment

are formalized in the Federal Rules, having taken shape from historical pro confesso decrees in equity and nil dicit judgments at law. See 10A Wright & Miller, supra § 2681; see also Robert Wyness Millar, Civil Procedure of the Trial Court in

Historical Perspective 367 (1952) (discussing the history of default judgments and noting that “[a] decree pro confesso for want of an answer after due service of process was thus the general rule of the American chancery practice”).

Pursuant to Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a two-step procedure is required to obtain a default judgment. First, “[w]hen a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise

defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the party’s default.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). Once this step has been completed, a plaintiff may proceed to request entry of a default judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b). “If the plaintiff’s claim is for a sum certain or a sum that can be made certain by

computation, the clerk – on the plaintiff’s request, with an affidavit showing the amount due – must enter judgment for that amount and costs. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(1). “In all other cases, the party must apply to the court for a default

judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). There are limitations on the entry of default judgments against certain classes of defendants. For example, “[a] default judgment may be entered against a minor or incompetent person only if represented by a general guardian, conservator, or

other like fiduciary who has appeared.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). Furthermore, a “default judgment may be entered against the United States, its officers, or its agencies only if the claimant establishes a claim or right to relief by evidence that

satisfies the court.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(d). The default entry is distinct from the subsequent default judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55. For the clerk to enter default, the requesting party must provide an

affidavit with specific information. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a); E.D. Mich. LR 55.1. “It is axiomatic that service of process must be effective under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure before a default or a default judgment may be entered against a

defendant.” Maryland State Firemen’s Ass’n v. Chaves, 166 F.R.D. 353, 354 (D. Md. 1996). In the instant case, service of process was only recently obtained and the deadline for Defendants to file their answers has not yet passed. In addition, Plaintiff

did not obtain an entry of default from the Clerk of the Court but instead filed the instant motion. Under these circumstances, the motion for default judgment should be denied. See, e.g., Devlin v. Kalm, 493 F. App’x 678, 685 (6th Cir. 2012) (stating

that “it was procedurally improper for Plaintiff to move for entry of default judgment without first obtaining an entry of default from the clerk.”); Long v. Finch, No. 14- 13260, 2015 WL 1637517 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 13, 2015) (adopting report and recommendation to deny motion for default judgment).

C. Conclusion For the reasons discussed above, I RECOMMEND that this Court DENY Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment. (ECF No. 14). III. REVIEW Pursuant to Rule 72(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[w]ithin

14 days after being served with a copy of the recommended disposition, a party may serve and file specific written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations. A party may respond to another party’s objections within 14 days

after being served with a copy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Failure to file specific objections constitutes a waiver of any further right of appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Howard v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir.

1981).

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Related

Thomas v. Arn
474 U.S. 140 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Willis v. Sullivan
931 F.2d 390 (Sixth Circuit, 1991)
Patrick Devlin v. Richard Kalm
493 F. App'x 678 (Sixth Circuit, 2012)
Maryland State Firemen's Assn. v. Chaves
166 F.R.D. 353 (D. Maryland, 1996)

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