Olausen v. Second Judicial District Court

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: July 27, 2020
• Docket: 3:20-cv-00402
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

5 * * *

6 JOHN STEVEN OLAUSEN, Case No. 3:20-cv-00402-MMD-WGC

7 Plaintiff, ORDER v. 8

9 SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, IN AND 10 FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE,

11 Defendants.

12 13 I. SUMMARY 14 Plaintiff John Steven Olausen, an inmate in the custody of the Northern Nevada 15 Correctional Center (“NNCC”), has filed a civil rights complaint (“Complaint”) against the 16 Second Judicial District Court of Nevada in Washoe County (“State Court”) asserting that 17 the court violated his procedural due process and equal protection rights under the Fifth 18 and Fourteenth Amendments. (ECF No. 1-1.) Plaintiff has filed a motion for a temporary 19 restraining order (ECF No. 6) and an identical motion for preliminary injunction (ECF No. 20 7) (collectively, “Motion”). While the Motion is confusing, based on the Court’s review of 21 the underlying documents, Plaintiff appears to seek an order requiring the State Court to 22 appoint counsel and resentence him because of errors in his initial sentencing. (ECF No. 23 1-1 at 27; ECF No. 6 at 3, 5.) The Court denies the Motion because Plaintiff cannot 24 demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of his claims. 25 II. DISCUSSION 26 To qualify for a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must satisfy four requirements: (1) 27 a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a likelihood of irreparable harm; (3) that the 28 balance of equities favors the plaintiff; and (4) that the injunction is in the public interest. 2 factor is dispositive of Plaintiff’s Motion.2 3 As noted, it appears that Plaintiff is seeking to compel the State Court to resentence 4 him. Plaintiff cannot show a likelihood of success on the merits because Plaintiff’s claims 5 are likely barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the Younger abstention doctrine, and 6 judicial immunity. 7 If Plaintiff is seeking a modification of his sentence by asking to be resentenced, 8 then Plaintiff’s recourse is to seek such relief in state court.3 Federal district courts do not 9 have appellate jurisdiction over any state court or state supreme court, whether by direct 10 appeal, writ of mandamus, or otherwise. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); 11 D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482-86 (1983). The Rooker-Feldman 12 doctrine prevents Plaintiff from obtaining the relief he seeks from this Court—an order from 13 a federal district court functionally overturning the Nevada court’s initial sentencing of 14 Plaintiff. 15 If Plaintiff is asking this Court to intervene in ongoing post-conviction proceedings, 16 the Younger abstention doctrine prevents federal courts from interfering with pending state 17 criminal proceedings that are “(1) ongoing, (2) implicate important state interests, and (3) 18 provide an adequate opportunity . . . to raise constitutional challenges.” Herrera v. City of 19 Palmdale, 918 F.3d 1037, 1044 (9th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted); see 20 also Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). The Ninth Circuit also requires that “[t]he 21 requested relief must seek to enjoin—or have the practical effect of enjoining—ongoing 22 state proceedings.” ReadyLink Healthcare, Inc. v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 754 F.3d 754, 23 758 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing AmehsourceBergen Corp. v. Roden, 495 F.3d 1143, 1149 (9th 24

25 1Temporary restraining orders are governed by the same standard applicable to preliminary injunctions. See Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F. 3d 26 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001).

27 2The Court therefore will not address the remaining Winter factors.

28 3If the State Court denies Plaintiff’s request, his recourse to seek appellate review through the state court. 1 || Cir. 2007)). 2 To the extent Plaintiff's criminal case is still pending, all prerequisites to the Younger 3 || abstention doctrine would be present. Plaintiff would be the subject of an ongoing criminal 4 || proceeding in state court that had not reached final adjudication. The State of Nevada has 5 || an important interest in protecting the public through the prosecution of criminal 6 || proceedings. The state court criminal proceedings would afford an opportunity for Plaintiff 7 || to raise the constitutional claims asserted in the Complaint. Finally, while Plaintiff asserts 8 || that he is seeking declaratory relief, his request has the practical effect of compelling the 9 || State Court to appoint trial counsel and give Plaintiff a new sentencing hearing. 10 Finally, to the extent Plaintiff seeks to hold State Court judges personally liable, it 11 || is well established that judges who perform judicial functions are immune from suit. Mireles 12 || v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9-10 (1991) (per curiam). “Accordingly, judicial immunity is not 13 || overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice, the existence of which ordinarily cannot be 14 || resolved without engaging in discovery and eventual trial.” /d. at 11 (citing Pierson v. Ray, 15 || 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967)). Plaintiff's claims against the State Court are based on 16 || challenges to the performance of that court in the handling of Plaintiff's criminal case. The 17 || State Court judges are therefore entitled to judicial immunity even if, as Plaintiff alleges, 18 || the State Court harbors bias against him. (See ECF No. 6 at 2.) 19 || Ill. CONCLUSION 20 For the foregoing reasons, it is ordered that Plaintiff's motion for a temporary 21 || restraining order (ECF No. 6) and motion for preliminary injunction (ECF No. 7) are denied. 22 DATED THIS 27" day of July 2020. { Shr. 24 MIRANDA M. DU 25 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 26 27 28