Olamide Bello v. Quick Bridge Funding, LLC

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: May 29, 2025
• Docket: 02-24-00319-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-24-00319-CV ___________________________

OLAMIDE BELLO, Appellant

V.

QUICK BRIDGE FUNDING, LLC, Appellee

On Appeal from County Court at Law No. 2 Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 2024-001366-2

Before Birdwell, Bassel, and Wallach, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Wallach MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellee Quick Bridge Funding, LLC domesticated a California judgment

against Appellant Olamide Bello and then obtained a postjudgment order appointing

a receiver to take possession of Bello’s nonexempt assets to satisfy the judgment.

Bello, pro se, appeals from the trial court’s receivership order. On appeal, Bello has

not raised any issue or argument that Quick Bridge did not show its entitlement to a

postjudgment receiver. Instead, his arguments focus on the merits of the California

judgment and challenge the trial court’s jurisdiction. Because he cannot challenge the

merits of the underlying judgment and his other arguments are not supported by the

record, we will affirm.

Background

On February 12, 2024, Quick Bridge filed with the Tarrant County clerk a

California default clerk’s judgment. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 585(a); see also Tex. Civ.

Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 35.003. The California judgment had been rendered

against Bello, but a corporate defendant, Ajide Technology Corporation, had also

been named in the suit. Bello did not file a motion to vacate the domestication of the

California judgment and did not appeal. Cf. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann.

§ 35.003(c).

Several days after filing the judgment with the Tarrant County clerk, Quick

Bridge filed a “Motion for Receivership and, Alternatively to Compel Discovery,”

seeking to recover on its judgment against Bello. See id. § 31.002(a), (b)(3) (providing

2 that a judgment creditor “is entitled to aid from a court” to reach the judgment

debtor’s nonexempt property to obtain satisfaction of the judgment and that a court

may, among other aid, “appoint a receiver with the authority to take possession of the

nonexempt property, sell it, and pay the proceeds to the judgment creditor to the

extent required to satisfy the judgment”).

The matter was set for a hearing on April 12. On March 13, 2024, Bello filed a

notice that he was incarcerated and thus would not be available to attend the hearing.

The hearing on Quick Bridge’s motion for receivership was then reset for a Zoom

hearing on June 7. On that day, the trial court signed an order appointing a receiver.

Bello subsequently filed three motions. First, Bello filed a motion to dismiss,

citing federal procedural rules and alleging lack of service of process and lack of

personal jurisdiction. He provided no further details and did not specify whether he

was challenging the jurisdiction of the Tarrant County court or the California court.

Bello then filed a “motion to vacate receivership” in which he argued that the

trial court did not have personal jurisdiction over him because the service of process

on him had not been procedurally proper and there was no statutory basis for the

court to exercise personal jurisdiction over him. Although unclear, his argument

appeared to be directed at the jurisdiction of the California court rather than the

Tarrant County court. However, Bello did not provide further argument or details and

did not attach any evidence.

3 Regarding the receivership, Bello also argued that the Tarrant County court had

failed to make findings under the factors governing the appointment of a receiver as

set forth in Netsphere, Inc. v. Baron, 703 F.3d 296, 305 (5th Cir. 2012). Netsphere involved

a receivership under federal law to control a vexatious litigant, not a Texas

postjudgment receivership. Bello’s motion did not address the requirements for a

postjudgment receivership under Texas law. The trial court did not rule on this

motion.

Finally, Bello filed a “Motion to Dismiss/Vacate” arguing that service of

process on him regarding the receivership motion had been procedurally defective

because the Tarrant County court lacked jurisdiction to issue a bench warrant to the

federal authorities holding him1 to compel his presence at the Zoom hearing on the

motion. He also asserted in one sentence that he did not have non-exempt property.

The trial court did not rule on any of Bello’s three motions.

Discussion

On appeal, Bello’s brief does not argue that Quick Bridge did not establish its

entitlement to a postjudgment receivership. 2 Instead, he primarily attacks the

Bello was apparently being held on federal charges in a Texas county jail. 1

2 Bello’s notice of appeal included arguments that he did not include in his appellant’s brief, including an argument that Quick Bridge had not met its burden to show the necessity of a receivership. However, his argument was one of the same arguments that he had raised in his motion to vacate—that Quick Bridge had not satisfied requirements discussed in Netsphere for establishing a receivership under federal procedural rules. Bello did not incorporate this argument into his appellant’s

4 enforceability of the California judgment. For the reasons below, Bello’s challenges

fail.

I. Domestication of a Foreign Judgment in Texas

“Under the United States Constitution, each state must give a final judgment of

a sister state the same force and effect the judgment would be entitled to in the state

in which it was rendered.” Ward v. Hawkins, 418 S.W.3d 815, 821 (Tex. App.—Dallas

2013, no pet.). Enforcement in Texas of another state’s judgment is governed by the

Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, outlined in Chapter 35 of the Civil

Practice and Remedies Code. Under that Act, “[a] copy of a foreign judgment

authenticated in accordance with an act of congress or a statute of this state may be

filed in the office of the clerk of any court of competent jurisdiction of this state.”

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 35.003(a). If a judgment creditor complies with

the procedures in the Act, then “[t]he clerk shall treat the foreign judgment in the

same manner as a judgment of the court in which the foreign judgment is filed,” and

the “filed foreign judgment has the same effect and is subject to the same procedures,

defenses, and proceedings for reopening, vacating, staying, enforcing, or satisfying a

judgment as a judgment of the court in which it is filed.” Id. § 35.003(b), (c).

When a judgment creditor files an authenticated copy of a foreign judgment

under the Act, the filing instantly creates a Texas judgment that is enforceable, and the

brief and, even if he had, did not address the requirements for a postjudgment receivership under Texas law.

5 burden shifts to the judgment debtor to establish why the judgment should not be

given full faith and credit. Clamon v. DeLong, 477 S.W.3d 823, 825–26 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth 2015, no pet.). The judgment debtor may meet this burden by showing,

for example, that the foreign judgment is not a final judgment, Minuteman Press Int’l,

Inc. v. Sparks, 782 S.W.2d 339, 342 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1989, no writ), or that the

court that rendered the foreign judgment had no personal or subject matter

jurisdiction, Browning v. Placke, 698 S.W.2d 362, 363 (Tex. 1985). However, the

judgment debtor may not collaterally attack the judgment by raising a defense that

goes to the merits of the original judgment. Ward, 418 S.W.3d at 822.

II. Bello’s Arguments

Bello asserts the following issues on appeal:

1. Whether the trial court’s judgment is void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction of the court that issued the judgment;

2. Whether the fiduciary shield doctrine prohibited the trial court from exercising personal jurisdiction over an individual whose only actions in the forum state were taken in the individual capacity as a corporation representative;

3. Whether the liability shield doctrine under Texas Business Organizations Code Section 21.223(a)(2) shields an individual in their fiduciary rule and status from any contractual obligation of the corporation or any matter relating to or arising from the obligation on the basis that such individual is the holder, beneficial owner, subscriber, or affiliate, or is or was the alter ego of the corporation, or on the basis of actual or constructive fraud, a sham to perpetuate a fraud, or other similar theory;

4. Whether the trial court is prohibited from exercising personal jurisdiction over a corporate officer without proper service of process;

6 5. Whether the trial court is prohibited from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over a controversy against an individual in an official capacity as a representative of a corporation based on fiduciary duty and status without primary violation by the corporation; and

6. Whether the trial court judge is prohibited to sit by designation to decide a trial court order, judgment, and action in the absence of subject matter jurisdiction.

In the arguments section of his brief, Bello argues his issues together.

A. Jurisdictional Challenges

1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Bello argues that the trial court “erred by improperly exercis[ing] subject matter

jurisdiction over the diversity jurisdiction controversy in the underlying civil case

because [Quick Bridge] failed to levy [its] claim against the corporation [that] allegedly

[breached] the contract.” This appears to be a challenge to the California court’s

subject matter jurisdiction. Bello cites no authority for the proposition that a

California state court needs “diversity jurisdiction” to exercise its authority over a

case. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i). Other than his vague reference to “diversity

jurisdiction,” Bello does not tell us why the California court had no subject matter

jurisdiction in the underlying suit, he directs us to nothing in the record indicating that

the California court had no subject matter jurisdiction, and we have found nothing in

the record to support the argument.

Bello cites Grace v. Bank Leumi Trust Co. of New York, 443 F.3d 180 (2d Cir.

2006), and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4) to support his argument, but

7 these citations do not clarify his argument. Rule 60(b)(4) provides that a court “may

relieve a party . . . from a final judgment” if the judgment is void, see Fed. R. Civ. P.

60(b)(4), but does not shed any light on why Bello believes the California judgment

was void. Likewise, Grace involved a judgment’s being declared void for reasons that

have no obvious application here, and Bello does not explain how the case applies. See

443 F.3d at 191–93 (discussing, among other matters, that a corporation cannot

appear pro se in court, and noting that the court in that case had wrongly allowed a

corporation acting through an individual who was not a lawyer to execute a stipulation

of settlement while appearing pro se). We have no record from the underlying

proceeding, and the face of the California judgment does not show that the California

court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Nothing in the record supports Bello’s

argument that the California court lacked jurisdiction. See Remote Control Hobbies,

L.L.C. v. Airborne Freight Corp., No. 14-12-01088-CV, 2014 WL 1267073, at *2 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 27, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (noting that party

appealing turnover order had burden to present appellate court with record

demonstrating that underlying default judgment was void).

2. Personal Jurisdiction

Bello also argues that the California court did not have personal jurisdiction

over him. He asserts that “[a]n individual status in a diversity jurisdiction

controversy . . . as an officer of a corporation, is insufficient to establish the minimum

contacts required to subject the individual to personal jurisdiction in a foreign forum”

8 and that “jurisdiction over the individual officers of a corporation may not be based

on jurisdiction over the corporation.” See Ward, 418 S.W.3d at 822 (noting that a

defendant “may assert that the sister state’s exercise of jurisdiction offends due

process because the defendant does not have minimum contacts with the sister

state”). He appears to argue that while the corporate defendant may have had

sufficient contacts with California for that state to exercise jurisdiction over the

corporation, he did not. However, Bello did not raise this complaint in the Tarrant

County court while that court had plenary power to decide whether the California

judgment was entitled to full faith and credit, and he did not produce any evidence to

support his argument. See Browning, 698 S.W.2d at 363; see Cannon v. Cannon, No. 02-

21-00404-CV, 2023 WL 1859881, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 9, 2023, no

pet.) (mem. op.) (noting that after a trial court’s plenary power has expired, the trial

court cannot set aside its judgment except by bill of review). Further, as stated above,

we do not have the record from the California proceeding, and nothing on the face of

the California judgment indicates that Bello did not have sufficient contacts with

California for that state to exercise jurisdiction over him. Nothing in the record

reveals the jurisdictional defect of which he complains. See PNS Stores, Inc. v. Rivera,

379 S.W.3d 267, 273 (Tex. 2012) (considering record in collateral attack on judgment

to determine whether record affirmatively demonstrated a jurisdictional defect).

Bello also argues that the trial court was prohibited from exercising personal

jurisdiction over him as a corporate officer “without proper service of process.” It is

9 not entirely clear whether his complaint about the lack of proper service is regarding

the suit against him in California or the motion for appointment of a receiver, but the

context suggests that he refers to the California suit. In his summary of his argument,

he argues that the trial court erred by improperly exercising personal jurisdiction over

him based “on the ground of an individual whose only actions in the forum state were

taken in the individual capacity as a corporate representative.” “The forum” to which

he refers appears to be California, given that the record indicates that he is a Texas

resident. He also argues that Quick Bridge could not “levy a claim” against him as an

owner of a company “without first piercing the corporate veil[,] which may require[ ]

proper service of process” and that “when defendants are separate entities and were

presumptively entitled to have independent existence,” the plaintiff must establish a

basis to subject each defendant to the court’s jurisdiction. He then states that the

agreement involved “in the underlying civil case” was between Quick Bridge and

Ajide Technology Corporation and that he did not owe Quick Bridge anything under

the agreement. Thus, he appears to argue that he was not properly served as an

individual defendant in the California suit. See Crown Bay Mgmt., LLC v. Surface Works,

Inc., No. 02-21-00025-CV, 2022 WL 247569, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 27,

2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (noting that if a personal jurisdiction defect implicates due

process, such as lack of proper service of process, the judgment will be void and

cannot be used to support a postjudgment writ of garnishment, but if the defect does

not implicate due process, the underlying judgment is not subject to collateral attack).

10 However, the California judgment states that Bello was “properly served with a

copy of the summons and complaint.” No other part of the record affirmatively

demonstrates a lack of jurisdiction. See PNS Stores, 379 S.W.3d at 273. We overrule the

part of his issues complaining that the receivership order should be set aside because

the California court did not have personal jurisdiction over him.

To the extent that Bello argues that he was not properly served with notice of

the receivership motion, his complaint does not show reversible error. A judgment

creditor is entitled to aid from a court to obtain satisfaction of a judgment, and that

aid may include the appointment of a receiver with the authority to take possession of

the judgment debtor’s nonexempt property, sell it, and pay the proceeds to the

judgment creditor to satisfy the judgment. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann.

§ 31.002. Under Section 31.002, notice and a hearing are not required. Main Place

Custom Homes, Inc. v. Honaker, 192 S.W.3d 604, 628 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, pet.

denied); see also Williams Farms Produce Sales, Inc. v. R & G Produce Co., 443 S.W.3d 250,

256 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2014, no pet.); Sivley v. Sivley, 972 S.W.2d

850, 860 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1998, no pet.); Thomas v. Thomas, 917 S.W.2d 425,

433 (Tex. App.—Waco 1996, no writ); Plaza Court, Ltd. v. West, 879 S.W.2d 271,

276 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ). Thus, even if Bello was not

given notice of the receivership motion, we would not be required to set aside the

receivership order. We overrule the parts of Bello’s issues raising jurisdictional

challenges.

11 B. Challenges to the Merits of the Foreign Judgment

Most of Bello’s arguments are based on his assertion that, as an owner or

officer of a corporation, he was not liable on a contract executed by the corporation.

He also argues that Quick Bridge failed to join an indispensable party (he does not say

who), failed to “state a primary offense,” and failed to state a claim.

However, these arguments go to the merits of the underlying dispute in

California. See, e.g., Sneddeker v. Vita 10 IV Therapy, LLC, No. 02-24-00316-CV,

2025 WL 1141878, at *9 n.3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 17, 2025, no pet. h.)

(mem. op.) (noting that lack of contractual privity may affect capacity, but it does not

affect the court’s jurisdiction). These arguments would not have provided a successful

defense, had Bello timely made them after Quick Bridge filed its California judgment

with the Tarrant County court. See Ward, 418 S.W.3d at 822 (noting that in responding

to authenticated foreign judgment filed under the Act, judgment debtor cannot raise a

defense attacking the merits of the underlying judgment).

Further, even if Bello could have raised these arguments in the Tarrant County

court, he did not make those complaints (or seek a ruling on them) until after the

court had lost plenary power to declare that the California judgment was not entitled

to full force and effect. See BancorpSouth Bank v. Prevot, 256 S.W.3d 719, 724 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (op. on reh’g) (noting that trial court’s

plenary power regarding foreign judgment filed under the Act expired thirty days later

because no party filed a post-judgment motion attacking the judgment); Browning,

12 698 S.W.2d at 363 (“When time for direct attack by appeal has elapsed, a bill of review

in the court rendering the initial judgment is the exclusive remedy to attack the

judgment.”). And because these arguments, even if true, would not establish that the

California judgment was void, these arguments would not entitle Bello to have the

trial court’s receivership set aside. Cf. Crown Bay Mgmt., 2022 WL 247569, at *3 (stating

that to have postjudgment garnishment order set aside, judgment debtor had to

establish that judgment was void). We overrule the remainder of Bello’s issues, which

are based on challenges to the merits of the underlying judgment.

Conclusion

Having overruled Bello’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s receivership order.

/s/ Mike Wallach Mike Wallach Justice

Delivered: May 29, 2025