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5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 9 10 OKSANA B., et al., CASE NO. C22-1517 MJP 11 Plaintiffs, ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES 12 v. 13 PREMERA BLUE CROSS, et al., 14 Defendants. 15 16 This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Attorneys’ Fees. (Dkt. No. 17 53.) Having reviewed the Motion, the Response (Dkt. No. 58), the Reply (Dkt. No. 59), and all 18 supporting materials, the Court GRANTS the Motion. 19 BACKGROUND 20 Plaintiffs A.B. and his parents, Oksana and Alexander, brought suit against Defendants 21 Premera Blue Cross, The Tableau Software, Inc. Employee Benefit Plan, and Salesforce.com 22 Health and Welfare Plan (“Defendants”) for denying claims for A.B.’s stay at two mental health 23 care facilities: (1) Second Nature, and (2) Catalyst. The Court granted summary judgment in 24 1 Plaintiffs’ favor, finding that Premera had wrongly denied plan benefits for A.B.’s both facilities. 2 (Order on Cross Motions (Dkt. No. 37).) The Court found that Premera abused its discretion by 3 failing to provide reasoned decisions and improperly construing and applying the Plan’s terms. 4 (Id. at 14-24.) And while the Court denied Plaintiffs’ Parity Act claim, it did so because their
5 success on the other claims mooted the Parity Act claims. In other words, Plaintiffs achieved a 6 high degree of success. The Court then awarded attorneys’ fees to Plaintiffs, finding that they 7 were properly awarded under ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1). (Order Granting Motion for 8 Attorneys’ Fees (Dkt. No. 49) (“Fee Order”).) In total, the Court awarded $49,552.50 in fees and 9 $400 in costs. (Id.) 10 The Ninth Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment and award of fees and costs. 11 (Ninth Cir. Mem. (Dkt. No. 52).) First, the Ninth Circuit held that the Plan did not cover the 12 Second Nature stay. (Id. at 2-3.) Second, though the Ninth Circuit agreed with this Court’s 13 analysis and conclusion that Premera violated ERISA in denying the Catalyst claim and that 14 Plaintiffs had made a strong showing of an entitlement of coverage, it ordered the determination
15 be remanded to Premera for further assessment. (Id. at 3-7.) The Ninth Circuit also vacated the 16 award of fees so that this Court could “conduct that analysis anew” in light of its decision. (Id. at 17 7.) 18 Plaintiffs have filed a renewed motion for attorneys’ fees, asking for an award of 19 $41,827.50 in fees, and $400 in costs. (Reply at 7 (Dkt. No. 59).) The Court previously found the 20 fees were appropriately awarded under the applicable law, because Plaintiffs had prevailed on 21 their claims and the relevant factors supported an award. In its prior order, the Court found that 22 all of the time requested was reasonable, and that the hourly rates were also reasonable. 23 Specifically, the Court found reasonable: (1) 54.7 hours spent by Brian King, the principal
24 1 attorney, (2) 58.5 hours spent by Andrew Sommers, a law clerk and attorney, and (3) 5.9 hours 2 spent by local counsel, John Wood. (Fee Order at 8.) And the Court approved King’s $600/hour 3 rate, Sommer’s rate $225-$250/hour, and Wood’s $500/hr. (Id.) Plaintiffs asks for approval of 4 these same rates, but have reduced their fee request by $7,725, to reflect the exclusion of time
5 entries that counsel has identified as being solely related to the Second Nature claim. (Reply at 6 6 n.23.) They ask for a total award of $41,827.50. (Id. at 7.) 7 ANALYSIS 8 A. Plaintiffs Entitled to Fees 9 Premera argues that Plaintiffs should not be awarded any attorneys’ fees or costs because 10 they only obtained remand of their Catalyst-related claim to Premera, and otherwise lost their 11 claim concerning the Second Nature stay. The Court disagrees. 12 Under Supreme Court authority, “a fees claimant must show some degree of success on 13 the merits before a court may award attorney’s fees under § 1132(g)(1).” Hardt v. Reliance 14 Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 255 (2010) (citation and quotation omitted). “A claimant
15 does not satisfy that requirement by achieving trivial success on the merits; or a purely 16 procedural victor[y], but does satisfy it if the court can fairly call the outcome of the litigation 17 some success on the merits without conducting a lengthy inquir[y] into the question whether a 18 particular party’s success was substantial or occurred on a central issue.” Id. (citation and 19 quotation omitted). As the Ninth Circuit has explained, a remand order “even without a positive 20 signal on the plaintiff’s eligibility for benefits or a subsequent award of benefits, can constitute 21 some success ‘on the merits’ under Hardt.” Woolsey v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., No. 20-16885, 2022 22 WL 1598964, at *2 (9th Cir. May 20, 2022). The court explained: “What is critical in this 23 context is that the court determined the administrative process was significantly deficient, and
24 1 that the plaintiff obtained a renewed opportunity to secure benefits.” Id. The Ninth Circuit 2 reached a similar conclusion in another unpublished decision, finding an entitlement to fees 3 where the plaintiff “obtain[ed] an initial remand for further consideration of her ERISA claim . . . 4 even [though] the district court did not ultimately agree that she was entitled to benefits.”
5 Gorbacheva v. Abbott Lab'ys Extended Disability Plan, 794 F. App'x 590, 594 (9th Cir. 2019). 6 Applying Hardt and considering the two unpublished Ninth Circuit decisions noted 7 above, the Court finds that Plaintiffs here are entitled to fees under ERISA. Although Plaintiffs 8 lost their claim that Premera wrongly denied coverage for the Second Nature stay, Plaintiffs 9 succeeded before both this Court and the Ninth Circuit in demonstrating that Premera abused its 10 discretion in denying the Catalyst claim. And both courts have agreed that Plaintiffs made a 11 strong showing that they are entitled to coverage. (Ninth Cir. Mem. at 7; Order on Cross Motions 12 at 18-24.) Thus, the remand is not merely a “purely procedural victory” that falls short of 13 satisfying § 1132(g)(1). See Hardt, 560 U.S. at 255. Instead, Plaintiffs succeeded in obtaining a 14 meaningful opportunity to obtain benefits. This supports an award.
15 B. The Hummell Factors Remain Satisfied 16 ERISA provides the District Court with discretion to award attorneys’ fees and costs to 17 either party of an action brought by a plan participant. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1); Hardt v. Reliance 18 Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 256 (2010). In making this discretionary determination, a 19 district court “should” consider the following, non-exclusive five factors: 20 (1) the degree of the opposing parties' culpability or bad faith; (2) the ability of the opposing parties to satisfy an award of fees; (3) whether an award of fees against the 21 opposing parties would deter others from acting under similar circumstances; (4) whether the parties requesting fees sought to benefit all participants and beneficiaries of an 22 ERISA plan or to resolve a significant legal question regarding ERISA; and (5) the relative merits of the parties’ positions. 23 24 1 Hummell v. S. E. Rykoff & Co., 634 F.2d 446, 453 (9th Cir. 1980). The Court refers to these as 2 the “Hummell factors.” The Court’s analysis also acknowledges the “general rule, [that] the 3 prevailing party on an ERISA claim is entitled to attorney’s fees, ‘unless special circumstances 4 would render such an award unjust.’” United Steelworkers of Am. v. Ret. Income Plan For
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5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 9 10 OKSANA B., et al., CASE NO. C22-1517 MJP 11 Plaintiffs, ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES 12 v. 13 PREMERA BLUE CROSS, et al., 14 Defendants. 15 16 This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Attorneys’ Fees. (Dkt. No. 17 53.) Having reviewed the Motion, the Response (Dkt. No. 58), the Reply (Dkt. No. 59), and all 18 supporting materials, the Court GRANTS the Motion. 19 BACKGROUND 20 Plaintiffs A.B. and his parents, Oksana and Alexander, brought suit against Defendants 21 Premera Blue Cross, The Tableau Software, Inc. Employee Benefit Plan, and Salesforce.com 22 Health and Welfare Plan (“Defendants”) for denying claims for A.B.’s stay at two mental health 23 care facilities: (1) Second Nature, and (2) Catalyst. The Court granted summary judgment in 24 1 Plaintiffs’ favor, finding that Premera had wrongly denied plan benefits for A.B.’s both facilities. 2 (Order on Cross Motions (Dkt. No. 37).) The Court found that Premera abused its discretion by 3 failing to provide reasoned decisions and improperly construing and applying the Plan’s terms. 4 (Id. at 14-24.) And while the Court denied Plaintiffs’ Parity Act claim, it did so because their
5 success on the other claims mooted the Parity Act claims. In other words, Plaintiffs achieved a 6 high degree of success. The Court then awarded attorneys’ fees to Plaintiffs, finding that they 7 were properly awarded under ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1). (Order Granting Motion for 8 Attorneys’ Fees (Dkt. No. 49) (“Fee Order”).) In total, the Court awarded $49,552.50 in fees and 9 $400 in costs. (Id.) 10 The Ninth Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment and award of fees and costs. 11 (Ninth Cir. Mem. (Dkt. No. 52).) First, the Ninth Circuit held that the Plan did not cover the 12 Second Nature stay. (Id. at 2-3.) Second, though the Ninth Circuit agreed with this Court’s 13 analysis and conclusion that Premera violated ERISA in denying the Catalyst claim and that 14 Plaintiffs had made a strong showing of an entitlement of coverage, it ordered the determination
15 be remanded to Premera for further assessment. (Id. at 3-7.) The Ninth Circuit also vacated the 16 award of fees so that this Court could “conduct that analysis anew” in light of its decision. (Id. at 17 7.) 18 Plaintiffs have filed a renewed motion for attorneys’ fees, asking for an award of 19 $41,827.50 in fees, and $400 in costs. (Reply at 7 (Dkt. No. 59).) The Court previously found the 20 fees were appropriately awarded under the applicable law, because Plaintiffs had prevailed on 21 their claims and the relevant factors supported an award. In its prior order, the Court found that 22 all of the time requested was reasonable, and that the hourly rates were also reasonable. 23 Specifically, the Court found reasonable: (1) 54.7 hours spent by Brian King, the principal
24 1 attorney, (2) 58.5 hours spent by Andrew Sommers, a law clerk and attorney, and (3) 5.9 hours 2 spent by local counsel, John Wood. (Fee Order at 8.) And the Court approved King’s $600/hour 3 rate, Sommer’s rate $225-$250/hour, and Wood’s $500/hr. (Id.) Plaintiffs asks for approval of 4 these same rates, but have reduced their fee request by $7,725, to reflect the exclusion of time
5 entries that counsel has identified as being solely related to the Second Nature claim. (Reply at 6 6 n.23.) They ask for a total award of $41,827.50. (Id. at 7.) 7 ANALYSIS 8 A. Plaintiffs Entitled to Fees 9 Premera argues that Plaintiffs should not be awarded any attorneys’ fees or costs because 10 they only obtained remand of their Catalyst-related claim to Premera, and otherwise lost their 11 claim concerning the Second Nature stay. The Court disagrees. 12 Under Supreme Court authority, “a fees claimant must show some degree of success on 13 the merits before a court may award attorney’s fees under § 1132(g)(1).” Hardt v. Reliance 14 Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 255 (2010) (citation and quotation omitted). “A claimant
15 does not satisfy that requirement by achieving trivial success on the merits; or a purely 16 procedural victor[y], but does satisfy it if the court can fairly call the outcome of the litigation 17 some success on the merits without conducting a lengthy inquir[y] into the question whether a 18 particular party’s success was substantial or occurred on a central issue.” Id. (citation and 19 quotation omitted). As the Ninth Circuit has explained, a remand order “even without a positive 20 signal on the plaintiff’s eligibility for benefits or a subsequent award of benefits, can constitute 21 some success ‘on the merits’ under Hardt.” Woolsey v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., No. 20-16885, 2022 22 WL 1598964, at *2 (9th Cir. May 20, 2022). The court explained: “What is critical in this 23 context is that the court determined the administrative process was significantly deficient, and
24 1 that the plaintiff obtained a renewed opportunity to secure benefits.” Id. The Ninth Circuit 2 reached a similar conclusion in another unpublished decision, finding an entitlement to fees 3 where the plaintiff “obtain[ed] an initial remand for further consideration of her ERISA claim . . . 4 even [though] the district court did not ultimately agree that she was entitled to benefits.”
5 Gorbacheva v. Abbott Lab'ys Extended Disability Plan, 794 F. App'x 590, 594 (9th Cir. 2019). 6 Applying Hardt and considering the two unpublished Ninth Circuit decisions noted 7 above, the Court finds that Plaintiffs here are entitled to fees under ERISA. Although Plaintiffs 8 lost their claim that Premera wrongly denied coverage for the Second Nature stay, Plaintiffs 9 succeeded before both this Court and the Ninth Circuit in demonstrating that Premera abused its 10 discretion in denying the Catalyst claim. And both courts have agreed that Plaintiffs made a 11 strong showing that they are entitled to coverage. (Ninth Cir. Mem. at 7; Order on Cross Motions 12 at 18-24.) Thus, the remand is not merely a “purely procedural victory” that falls short of 13 satisfying § 1132(g)(1). See Hardt, 560 U.S. at 255. Instead, Plaintiffs succeeded in obtaining a 14 meaningful opportunity to obtain benefits. This supports an award.
15 B. The Hummell Factors Remain Satisfied 16 ERISA provides the District Court with discretion to award attorneys’ fees and costs to 17 either party of an action brought by a plan participant. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1); Hardt v. Reliance 18 Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 256 (2010). In making this discretionary determination, a 19 district court “should” consider the following, non-exclusive five factors: 20 (1) the degree of the opposing parties' culpability or bad faith; (2) the ability of the opposing parties to satisfy an award of fees; (3) whether an award of fees against the 21 opposing parties would deter others from acting under similar circumstances; (4) whether the parties requesting fees sought to benefit all participants and beneficiaries of an 22 ERISA plan or to resolve a significant legal question regarding ERISA; and (5) the relative merits of the parties’ positions. 23 24 1 Hummell v. S. E. Rykoff & Co., 634 F.2d 446, 453 (9th Cir. 1980). The Court refers to these as 2 the “Hummell factors.” The Court’s analysis also acknowledges the “general rule, [that] the 3 prevailing party on an ERISA claim is entitled to attorney’s fees, ‘unless special circumstances 4 would render such an award unjust.’” United Steelworkers of Am. v. Ret. Income Plan For
5 Hourly-Rated Emps. of ASARCO, Inc., 512 F.3d 555, 564 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Hensley v. 6 Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983)). And when applying the Hummell factors, courts “must 7 keep at the forefront ERISA’s remedial purposes that should be liberally construed in favor of 8 protecting participants in employee benefit plans.” McElwaine v. US W., Inc., 176 F.3d 1167, 9 1172 (9th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation and citation omitted). 10 Consistent with its previous Order, the Court again finds that all of these factors support 11 an award. (See Fee Order at 3-7.) First, as the Court previously found, Premera failed to explain 12 how it made its medical-necessity determination and how A.B. had recovered sufficiently to 13 warrant treatment at a lower level and that this showed bad faith and culpability. (Id. at 4.) 14 Although that determination is now remanded, the Court’s finding concerning Premera’s
15 culpability stands and supports the award of fees. Second, there remains no dispute that Premera 16 can satisfy the award. Third, there remains a deterrent effect in the award, as doing so would help 17 convince Premera that providing a reasoned and thoughtful decision in the first place will avoid 18 litigation and wrongful denials of coverage. Fourth, other Plan beneficiaries may yet gain some 19 benefit from the outcome here, though this remains largely neutral. Fifth, even with the Ninth 20 Circuit’s reversal, Plaintiffs continue to have a strong position with regard to the Catalyst claim. 21 So while Premera vindicated its position with regard to the Second Nature claim, it lacks any 22 solid footing with regard to the Catalyst claim. The Court again finds this favors Plaintiffs. On 23 balance, these factors all support an award of fees. And Premera has not identified any new
24 1 analysis based on the Ninth Circuit’s reversal that would make the Hummell factors cut against 2 an award of fees. The Court therefore finds that the Hummell factors again favor an award of 3 fees, and that an award is appropriate and proper on the record before it. 4 C. Reduced Fees Appropriate
5 The Court agrees with Defendants, in part, that a haircut to the reduced fee request is 6 proper to account for time spent solely on the Second Nature claim. 7 As the Court previously explained, in deciding the number of hours “reasonably 8 expended,” the Court considers whether the time on matter that was “excessive, redundant, or 9 otherwise unnecessary.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983); (See Fee Order at 8). 10 And the requesting attorney must provide reasonable documentation of the work performed to 11 enable this determination. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433. 12 Although Plaintiffs have proposed a reduction of $7,725 from their initial fee request, the 13 Court finds that a further reduction is proper to exclude time spent on the Second Nature Claim. 14 Defendants argue that counsel should have segregated the time spent solely on the Second
15 Nature claims, and given their failure to do so, the Court should reduce the fee request by 50%. 16 (Defs. Opp. at 7-9.) The Court agrees with Defendants that additional time spent briefing matters 17 specific to Second Nature should be excluded, and that the $7,725 reduction is not quite 18 adequate. But the Court rejects the request for a 50% reduction. Although Plaintiffs’ counsel 19 expended time solely to the facts and law concerning Second Nature, almost all of the legal 20 analysis and core briefing on summary judgment benefitted both claims. And the Second Nature 21 claim was factually less complex than the Catalyst claim, while involving the same law and 22 general legal framework. For this reason, the Court does not find that 50% of counsel’s time 23 reasonably reflects time spent solely on the Second Nature claim. Considering that counsel has
24 1 already reduced the award by over 15%, and based on the Court’s review of the billing entries, it 2 Court finds that a total reduction of 20% of the billed time reasonably reflects the exclusion of 3 time spent exclusively on the Second Nature Claim. Applying the 20% reduction to the total time 4 billed, the Court awards $39,642 (which is 80% of $49,552.50).
5 The Court again awards $400 in costs for the filing fee. 6 CONCLUSION 7 The Court finds that Plaintiffs are entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs and that an award 8 of $39,642 reasonably reflects the time expended on Plaintiffs’ successful claim. The Court thus 9 GRANTS the Motion and AWARDS Plaintiffs $39,642 in attorneys’ fees and $400 in costs. 10 The clerk is ordered to provide copies of this order to all counsel. 11 Dated October 15, 2025. A 12 13 Marsha J. Pechman United States Senior District Judge 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24