Okmulgee Window Glass Co. v. Bright

1917 OK 64, 183 P. 898, 65 Okla. 53, 1917 Okla. LEXIS 10
CourtSupreme Court of Oklahoma
DecidedJanuary 9, 1917
Docket7881
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 1917 OK 64 (Okmulgee Window Glass Co. v. Bright) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Okmulgee Window Glass Co. v. Bright, 1917 OK 64, 183 P. 898, 65 Okla. 53, 1917 Okla. LEXIS 10 (Okla. 1917).

Opinion

Opinion by

HOOKER, C.

In the petition filed in this action the defendant in error alleged that, while he was employed by plaintiff in error he was ordered to go inside of its plant and assist in the construction of a floor therein; that said floor was being constructed by the laying of steel plates on brick pillars 12 to 15 feet high and ten feet apart; that over and across said plates were placed certain other steel or iron plates, or railings, extending about 30 feet long, parallel with each other and about five feet apart; that these plates or railings were wedged, and thereupon were placed planks upop which he and the other employes were working; that the company negligently and unnecessarily caused large timbers to be placed upon this floor without any intention of using them, and as a result thereof the weight of said timbers caused the floor and jack supporting the same to give way or kick out, which caused the floor upon which plaintiff was engaged ait work to fall to the ground with him some distance of 12 or 15 feet, injuring him, for which he sues to recover damages here.

The answer was a general denial, an attempted plea of contributory negligence and assumption of risk, and upon the trial below the defendant in error recovered judgment, to reverse which an appeal is had to this court.

The company asserts that it is entitled to a reversal here for the following reasons, to wit: (1) Failure of.the court to submit the issue of contributory negligence .to the jury; (2) failure of the court to submit the issue of assumed risk to the jury; (3) the admission of the opinion testimony of the purported expert witnesses, W. S. Moore and V. L. Hawkins, on the question of negligence; (4) the excessive verdict; (5) error of the court in giving instructions Nos. 2, 3, 6, and 6.

We will now discuss these propositions as they are presented by the plaintiff in error.

This court in the well-considered ease of Jones v. Oklahoma Planing Mill & Mfg. Co., 47 Okla. 477, 147 Pac. 999, has said:

“In an action for damages for injuries alleged to have resulted from a violation of a statutory duty imposed upon a master, the contributory negligence of the person injured may be urged as a defense thereto, unless such defense -is excluded by the statute.”

This action is brought to recover damages alleged to have accrued by reason of tho violation of section 3772, Revised Laws of 1910, and by reference to that statute we fail to find any provision of law excluding the defense of contributory negligence; hence it follows that the plea of contributory negligence is a proper defense to this action, if the same is properly pleaded and there is any evidence supporting the same. The plea of contributory negligence relied upon by the company here is as follows:

“Defendant, further answering said petition, and as a defense thereto, alleges and avers that if the plaintiff was injured as alleged in said petition the said injuries were received by him by reason of his own fault and negligence, which directly contributed thereto.”

No motion was made by the plaintiff below to require the defendant company to make definite or certain, and in the absence thereof we are inclined to the opinion that the answer as pleaded" was sufficient to raise the question of contributory negligence, if the evidence in the case justifies the same. Upon the examination of the petition here, we are of the opinion that the same is for damages accruing from the violation of a statutory duty, and while the statute itself, which the company is charged with having violated, is not referred to, yet the facts set forth in the petition are sufficient to 'bring the case *55 within the statute, and this court, in the case of St. L. & S. F. R. Co. v. Snowden, 48 Okla. 115, 149 Pac. 1083, said:

“A case which, by allegation and proof, is brought within the Employers’ Liability Act of April 22, 1908, 35 Stat. 65, c. 149 (U. S. Comp. St. 1913, sections 8657-8665), is controlled by that act, although its provisions may not have been referred to in express terms in the pleadings or presented at the trial.”

And the plea of contributory negligence is permissible under the statute aforesaid, but upon an .examination of .the record here we are unable to find any evidence which would justify the court in submitting the question of contributory negligence to the jury. While under the Constitution the defense of contributory negligence is a question of fact, always to be decided by the jury, yet, where there is no evidence relative thereto, it cannot be prejudicial error to refuse to submit that issue to the jui*y.

It is asserted that the court committed error in failing to submit such defense to the jury. To this we cannot agree, for the reason stated above, that there is no evidence here supporting the defendant’s theory of contributory negligence.

With reference to the second proposition of the assumption of risk, this court in a number of cases has said tliat, for a violation of a statutory duty, assumed risk is not available to the defendant as a defense to the cause of action set forth by the injured party. See Great Western Coal & Coke Co. v. Cunningham, 43 Okla. 417, 143 Pac. 26. But for the violation of a common-law duty, the assumption of risk is a valid defense.

We do not feel disposed to disturb the verdict on account of the claim of the plaintiff in error that the damages imposed were excessive, for if the testimony of the defendant in error is to be believed and relied upon, then the jury was justified in rendering a verdict for this amount. While we conceive that the evidence as to the extent of the -injury is not as accurate or as definite as in other cases, yet the estimony of the defendant in error in this case was sufficient for the jury to believe that the defendant in error was a physical wreck on account thereof, and might possibly, before life had departed, become a mental wreck. This being true, -the verdict of the jury fixing his damages will not be disturbed by this court.

The objections urged by the plaintiff in error as to instructions Nos. 2 and 5 are not tenable. We, have examined the instructions here, and the same seem to fairly present the law of the case to the jury

' As to the other ground relied upon by the pliantiff in error for a reversal here, a more serious proposition is presented.

When the witness Moore was being examined the following proceedings were had:

“Q. Mr.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
1917 OK 64, 183 P. 898, 65 Okla. 53, 1917 Okla. LEXIS 10, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/okmulgee-window-glass-co-v-bright-okla-1917.