Okie v. State of Maine

Superior Court of Maine·Decided November 21, 2013·No. KENcr-11-20·Unpublished

Opinion

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT KENNEBEC, ss CR-11-20 M ;11 lV't - ,. ,. -~ 1\)

JOHNOKIE, Petitioner

v. ORDER ON PETITION FOR POST -CONVICTION REVIEW

STATE OF MAINE, Respondent

Introduction

Before the Court is John Okie's Petition for Post-Conviction Review filed January 4, 2011. Mr. Okie was found guilty on December 19, 2008 oftwo counts of Intentional or Knowing Murder after trial by jury in the Kennebec County Superior Court. 1 He was sentenced on January 30, 2009 to two consecutive 30-year prison terms. His direct appeal of the Judgment of Conviction as well as the sentence imposed by Justice Joseph Jabar was affirmed by the Maine Supreme Court on February 2, 2010. Mr. Okie was represented throughout the criminal trial and appellate processes by Attorney Peter DeTroy. The State of Maine was represented at trial by Assistant Attorneys General Andrew Benson and Lisa Marchese. Mr. Okie is represented in this proceeding by

1 Mr. Okie was originally indicted by both the Kennebec County Grand Jury as well as the Lincoln County Grand Jury, but on November 14, 2008 the Lincoln County case was consolidated with the Kennebec County case, and transferred on December 3, 2008 to Kennebec County for trial proceedings.

Attorney George Hess, and the State is represented by Assistant Attorney General Donald Macomber. This matter was heard on July 23, 2013 and the parties filed post-hearing memoranda, the last of which was received on October 31, 2013.

While Mr. Okie originally alleged 14 separate grounds for post-conviction relief in his prose Petition filed January 4, 2011, that Petition was amended by Attorney Hess on January 11, 2013 to add a fifteenth ground, and again on March 10, 2013 to add a sixteenth ground. After hearing on the amended Petitions, Attorney Hess argued and briefed only four grounds for relief, those enumerated as grounds 2,6,9 and 16. The Court therefore deems all other grounds asserted as having been waived by the Petitioner. State v. Haskell, 2001 ME 154, 784 A.2d 4 fn. 3; State v. Barlow, 320 A.2d 895 (Me. 1974). The Court will address the remaining four grounds separately.

I Trial Counsel's failure to object to Opening Statements o[Prosecutor In his opening statement, Assistant Attorney General Andrew Benson described for the jury the killings of Petitioner's friend, Aleigh Mills and the Petitioner's father, John Okie. The prosecutor's comments, which could fairly be characterized as dramatic and graphic, drew no objection from Trial Counsel (hereinafter "TC"), and on appeal TC did not raise an argument about their propriety. While the trial Justice did not intervene on his own about the opening statement, he did give the standard "Alexander" instruction that the opening statements of the attorneys were not evidence. (Trial Transcript, hereinafter "TT" Vol. 1, pgs-14-15).

The parties agree that in order to make out a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, a convicted person must prove that trial counsel's performance fell below what

might be expected from an "ordinary, fallible" attorney; and that this failing likely deprived the convicted person of an otherwise available, substantial ground of relief. Brewer v. State, 1997 ME 177; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

The Court has reviewed the trial transcript referred to above, and has considered the attorneys' arguments in regard to TC's failure to object both during and after trial to these statements. The Court would note at the outset that different trial Justices might reasonably disagree about when an opening statement becomes argumentative or even unethical, but the Court declines to make a finding as to whether that occurred in this instance. Certainly, the presiding Justice, who had the opportunity to not only hear the words spoken by the prosecutor, but also observe the tone and the perceived affect on the jury, did not on his own raise concerns about this. It is also not lost on the Court that any rendition of the uncontested facts of what occurred in this case would have had a profound impact on any juror. However, even if Petitioner were to prove the statements made crossed a line, the Court concludes that the Petitioner has failed to prove that he was deprived of an available, substantial ground of relief. Had TC objected, it is clear to the Court that the remedy would have been an instruction emphasizing to the jury that the statements were not evidence, which was the instruction that the trial Justice provided. The Court therefore denies relief to the Petitioner based upon the prosecutor's opening statement.

II. Trial Counsel's failure to object to Trial Justice's instruction in allocating the burden o(proo(on the defense o(intoxication

At trial TC failed to note or object to an instruction from the Trial Justice which the parties agree was erroneous. The Trial Justice stated in his oral instructions, "Again, the ultimate question is not whether the defendant was intoxicated, but whether the defendant has proven the required state of mind beyond a reasonable doubt." (Trial Transcript, pg. 1564). TC conceded at hearing on this Petition that he missed this error, and also conceded that he did not catch it when he appealed the Defendant's conviction.

However, as the State points out, the Trial Justice provided written jury instructions that properly allocated the burden of proof on this issue to the State, and the instructions went into the jury room for their use during deliberations. In addition, in pre- trial jury instructions, the Trial Justice properly allocated the burden on this issue (Trial Transcript, Vol. 1 pg. 26). The State points to a number of other places in the trial record where the Trial Justice correctly referred to the State's burden to prove the elements regarding the Defendant's state of mind, except on the issue of criminal responsibility. Finally, as the State points out neither the State nor defense counsel addressed the issue of intoxication in their lengthy closing statements. While this failure to argue the issue might not constitute a waiver by the Defendant on this issue, it is clear to the Court that by the conclusion of the case the evidence submitted by both parties (and reviewed by this Court) focused almost entirely on the issue of the Petitioner's criminal responsibility or lack of it.

Tlte Court therefore concludes that the Petitioner has failed to prove that TC's error in not noticing or objecting to this one-time error by the Trial Justice did not deprive him of a substantial ground of defense.

III. Failure to seek suppression ofPetitioner's statements to lavv enforcement

Although the Petitioner was interviewed on two occasions by law enforcement, he was not provided Miranda warnings, and TC did not challenge the admissibility of these statements. Petitioner claims that TC's failure to do so constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.

In order to prove a claim of this nature the Petitioner would have to do more than establish that a "motion hearing Judge could have concluded that John was in custody," thus triggering law enforcement's obligation to provide him with Miranda warnings for both interviews. (Pg. 9, Memorandum in Support of Petition.) The Petitioner must prove by a preponderance of evidence that this decision fell below the standard of what an "ordinary, fallible" attorney would have done, and also that the decision resulted in a deprivation of an available, substantial ground of defense.

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Okie v. State of Maine, (Me. Super. Ct. 2013).

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Related

Strickland v. Washington
466 U.S. 668 (Supreme Court, 1984)
State v. Brewer
1997 ME 177 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1997)
State v. Barlow
320 A.2d 895 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1974)
State v. Michaud
1998 ME 251 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1998)
State v. Haskell
2001 ME 154 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2001)