O'Keefe v. Muckenfuss

CourtCourt of Appeals of South Carolina
DecidedJuly 7, 2010
Docket2010-UP-350
StatusUnpublished

This text of O'Keefe v. Muckenfuss (O'Keefe v. Muckenfuss) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of South Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
O'Keefe v. Muckenfuss, (S.C. Ct. App. 2010).

Opinion

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Pauline J. O'Keefe in the matter of Pauline T. Muckenfuss, Appellant,

v.

Wendell L. Muckenfuss, and Thomas D. Muckenfuss III, Respondents.


Appeal From Charleston County
 R. Markley Dennis, Jr., Circuit Court Judge


Unpublished Opinion No. 2010-UP-350
Submitted June 1, 2010 – Filed July 7, 2010   


AFFIRMED


Dennis James Christensen, of Mt. Pleasant, for Appellant.

Nat B. Benson, Jr, of Mt. Pleasant, for Respondents.

PER CURIAM: Pauline Jane O'Keefe (Daughter) appeals the circuit court's order affirming the probate court’s orders appointing third parties as Pauline Muckenfuss's (Mother's) guardian and conservator.  Daughter argues the probate court erred in finding good cause existed to bypass her statutorily-designated priority as Mother's attorney-in-fact.  We affirm.[1] 

FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Mother is a widow who has four children, Daughter, and three sons: Thomas (Tommy), Wendell, and Paul Muckenfuss (Sons).  Daughter was designated as Mother's attorney-in-fact in October of 2002.  Mother was admitted to the Savannah House, an assisted-living facility in Charleston, in November of 2002, following hospitalization for mental illness.

On January 29, 2004, Wendell and Tommy petitioned the probate court to find Mother incapacitated and to appoint a guardian and conservator.  After a hearing, the probate court ordered third parties Seniors Choice and First Southeast Fiduciary and Trust Services, Incorporated, to serve as Mother's guardian and conservator, respectively.  Daughter appealed to the circuit court, which affirmed.  Daughter then appealed to this court. 

In an unpublished opinion, this court held:  "Based on the language of the applicable statutes, we believe before a probate court bypasses a person with a statutory priority for the appointment of a conservator or guardian, it must make a finding of good cause by articulating its reasons for such a finding."  Muckenfuss v. Muckenfuss, Op. No. 07-UP-361 (Ct. App. filed July 7, 2007).  Because the probate court failed to make the requisite finding of good cause, we remanded the case to the probate court for a finding consistent with the statutes.  Id. 

On remand, the probate court found good cause existed to appoint third parties as Mother's guardian and conservator due to the friction and divisiveness between Daughter and Sons, as well as Daughter's lack of communication with Sons.  The circuit court affirmed.  This appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

"[T]he determination of the standard of review by an appellate court of matters originating in the probate court is controlled by whether the cause of action is at law or in equity."  Dean v. Kilgore, 313 S.C. 257, 259, 437 S.E.2d 154, 155 (Ct. App. 1993).  "To make this determination, the appellate court must look to the essential character of the cause of action alleged by the petitioners in the court below."  Id.  "Persons of unsound mind, like infants, are under the special protection of the courts of equity with respect to their persons, property, and legal transactions."  Shepard v. First Am. Mortgage Co., 289 S.C. 516, 518, 347 S.E.2d 118, 119 (Ct. App. 1986); Gaddy v. Douglass, 359 S.C. 329, 333, 597 S.E.2d 12, 14 (Ct. App. 2004) (recognizing an action to set aside a power of attorney and an instrument revoking a power of attorney on the ground of a lack of mental capacity sounds in equity); see Dean, 313 S.C. at 259, 437 S.E.2d at 155 (finding petition to remove personal representative is in equity).  When the circuit court concurs with the probate court in an equity case, the standard of review for this court is whether there is any evidence that reasonably supports the findings of the court below.  Dean, 313 at 260, 437 S.E.2d at 155-56.

The specific choice of who should serve as guardian and conservator is decided under the probate court's discretion.  "The matter of a selection of a guardian is within the discretion of the court, and the appellate court ordinarily will not interfere unless a clear abuse of discretion is shown."  39 C.J.S. Guardian and Ward § 28 (2003).  "The selection of a guardian is a matter committed largely to the discretion of the appointing court, whose decision will only be interfered with on appeal in the case of an abuse of discretion."  39 Am. Jur. 2d Guardian and Ward § 38 (2008). 

The relevant statutes in this case, Sections 62-5-311 and 62-5-410 of the South Carolina Code (2009), indicate the appointing court has discretion by using the phrases "may be appointed guardian" and "the court may appoint . . . as conservator," respectively.  The appointing court will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion.  See Patterson v. Cook, 288 S.C. 220, 221, 341 S.E.2d 782, 782 (1986) (interpreting an appointment statute without priority guidelines). 

LAW/ANALYSIS

Daughter argues the probate court, and in turn the circuit court, erred in finding good cause to appoint third parties as Mother's guardian and conservator because Daughter had statutory priority as Mother's attorney-in-fact.  We disagree. 

Section 62-5-311 states the order of priority for guardian appointees but provides such priority is "subject to a finding of good cause by the court."  Similarly, section 62-5-410 sets forth the order of priority for conservator appointees but allows:  "The court, for good cause, may pass over a person having priority and appoint a person having less priority or no priority."  Under both statutes, Daughter, as Mother's attorney-in-fact, has priority over the third parties appointed by the probate court.  §§ 62-5-311(B)(2) & 62-4-410(a)(3). 

Good cause is defined as "[a] legally sufficient reason.  Good cause is often the burden placed on the litigant . . . to show why a request should be granted or an action excused."  Black's Law Dictionary 251 (9th ed. 2009).  "Bitter dissension between an incapacitated person's family members . . . can justify appointment of a neutral third party as a guardian."  39 Am. Jur. 2d Guardian & Ward § 41 (2008). 

At trial, Dr. Susan Hardesty of the Medical University of South Carolina testified Mother needed a guardian and conservator.  Dr. Hardesty stated to a reasonable degree of medical certainty Mother's capacity did not allow her to manage her resources. 

Dr.

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Related

Shepard v. First American Mortgage Company
347 S.E.2d 118 (Court of Appeals of South Carolina, 1986)
Gaddy v. Douglass
597 S.E.2d 12 (Court of Appeals of South Carolina, 2004)
Patterson v. Cook
341 S.E.2d 782 (Supreme Court of South Carolina, 1986)
Dean v. Kilgore
437 S.E.2d 154 (Court of Appeals of South Carolina, 1993)

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O'Keefe v. Muckenfuss, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/okeefe-v-muckenfuss-scctapp-2010.