Okai v. Office and Professional Employees International Union - Local 30

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: May 27, 2026
• Docket: 24-5035
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 27 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

NAA-ANORKOR OKAI, No. 24-5035 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 3:22-cv-00112-TWR-DTF v. MEMORANDUM* OFFICE AND PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION - LOCAL 30; KAISER PERMANENTE INTERNATIONAL; KAISER FOUNDATION HEALTH PLAN, INC.,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California Todd W. Robinson, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted May 26, 2026**

Before: S.R. THOMAS, MILLER, and H.A. THOMAS, Circuit Judges.

Naa-Anorkor Okai appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). dismissing her action alleging federal and state law claims arising from her

termination. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo.

Flaxman v. Ferguson, 151 F.4th 1178, 1184 (9th Cir. 2025) (dismissal for failure

to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)); Pickern v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.),

Inc., 457 F.3d 963, 968 (9th Cir. 2006) (compliance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8). We

affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Okai’s action because, despite being

granted multiple opportunities to amend, Okai’s third amended complaint failed to

comply with Rule 8, and her breach of duty of fair representation claim was

untimely. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (a pleading must contain “a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”); Gibson v.

City of Portland, 165 F.4th 1265, 1290 (9th Cir. 2026) (explaining that “pleadings

that do not tie factual averments against specific parties to individual causes of

action” violate Rule 8); Stone v. Writer’s Guild of Am. W., Inc., 101 F.3d 1312,

1314 (9th Cir. 1996) (explaining that a “claim for breach of the duty of

representation is governed by the six month federal statute of limitations”).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Okai’s complaint

with prejudice because amendment would be futile and the district court gave Okai

multiple opportunities to amend with detailed instructions. See Cervantes v.

Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth

2 24-5035 the standard of review and explaining that leave to amend may be denied when

amendment would be futile); Destfino v. Reiswig, 630 F.3d 952, 959 (9th Cir.

2011) (holding that dismissal with prejudice was proper because “the district court

gave plaintiffs several chances to amend, with detailed instructions as to what they

needed to do to fix the problems with their complaint”).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Okai’s motion to

appoint counsel because Okai did not demonstrate exceptional circumstances. See

Cano v. Taylor, 739 F.3d 1214, 1218 (9th Cir. 2014) (setting forth the standard of

review and standard for the appointment of counsel).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by giving Okai too little time to

amend her complaint. See Ready Transp., Inc. v. AAR Mfg., Inc., 627 F.3d 402,

404 (9th Cir. 2010) (setting forth the standard of review); see also Dietz v. Bouldin,

579 U.S. 40, 47 (2016) (“[D]istrict courts have the inherent authority to manage

their dockets . . . with a view toward the efficient and expedient resolution of

cases.”).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Okai’s motion to

proceed in forma pauperis because Okai failed to make a sufficient showing of

indigency to the district court. See Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234

(9th Cir. 2015) (setting forth the standard of review and explaining that an affidavit

is sufficient under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) if it states that “the affiant cannot pay the

3 24-5035 court costs and still afford the necessities of life”).

Okai does not have standing to challenge the district court’s decisions

regarding James Kevin Tillory. See Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 129 (2004)

(explaining that a plaintiff “generally must assert his own legal rights and interests,

and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties”

(citation omitted)).

We do not consider issues not specifically and distinctly argued in the

opening brief, or issues raised for the first time on appeal. See Roley v. Google

LLC, 40 F.4th 903, 911 (9th Cir. 2022).

AFFIRMED.

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