1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 RAYMOND OIYEMHONLAN, Case No. 22-cv-02954-HSG
8 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR JOINDER AND MOTION FOR 9 v. REMAND
10 ARAMARK MANAGEMENT SERVICES, Re: Dkt. Nos. 10, 14 INC., et al., 11 Defendants. 12 13 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Raymond Oiyemhonlan’s motion for joinder and 14 motion to remand. Dkt. Nos. 10. 14. The Court finds this matter appropriate for disposition 15 without oral argument and the matter is deemed submitted. See Civil L.R. 7-1(b). For the reasons 16 detailed below, the Court DENIES the motion for joinder and DENIES the motion to remand. 17 I. BACKGROUND 18 Plaintiff initially filed this action in San Francisco County Superior Court in March 2022. 19 See Dkt. No. 1. Plaintiff alleges that he was wrongfully terminated by Defendant Aramark 20 Facility Services, LLC based on his age and national origin. See generally Dkt. No. 1-1, Ex. A 21 (“Compl.”). He alleges that Matthew Bailey, the Senior Director of Support Services, specifically 22 “did not like plaintiff and tried to get him fired because he was from the African continent and 23 spoke with an accent.” See id. at ¶ 50. Plaintiff further contends that he was terminated in 24 retaliation for reporting health and safety violations regarding the proper cleaning of an operating 25 room at a medical center in San Francisco. See id. at ¶¶ 34, 51. He suggests that Mr. Bailey used 26 Plaintiff’s complaints about safety protocols as an excuse to terminate him. See id. at ¶ 51. Based 27 on these allegations, Plaintiff brings causes of action against Aramark for wrongful termination; 1 discrimination, or retaliation under California law. See id. at ¶¶ 16–58. 2 Aramark removed this action in May 2022 on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, asserting 3 that Plaintiff is a citizen of California and Aramark is a citizen of Delaware and Pennsylvania. See 4 Dkt. No. 1 at 2–4. Plaintiff now seeks to join California residents Don Hall, William Butler, and 5 Matthew Bailey as additional Defendants, and to remand the action back to state court. Dkt. Nos. 6 10, 14, 16. Plaintiff’s two motions are inextricably related: Defendant does not dispute that if the 7 Court grants the motion for joinder, remand is appropriate for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 8 See Dkt. No. 13 at 3–7. 9 II. MOTION FOR JOINDER 10 A. Legal Standard 11 “[I]f after removal the plaintiff seeks to join additional defendants whose joinder would 12 destroy subject matter jurisdiction, the court may deny joinder, or permit joinder and remand the 13 action to the State court.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e). The Court has discretion to grant or deny 14 joinder under such circumstances. See Newcombe v. Adolf Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686, 691 (9th Cir. 15 1998). In determining whether to permit joinder of non-diverse defendants, courts generally 16 consider whether: (1) the new defendants are needed for just adjudication and would be joined as 17 necessary parties under Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a); (2) the statute of limitations would preclude an 18 action against the new defendants in state court; (3) there has been unexplained delay in requesting 19 joinder; (4) joinder is intended solely to defeat federal jurisdiction; (5) the claims against the new 20 defendants appear valid; and (6) denial of joinder would prejudice the plaintiff. See IBC Aviation 21 Servs., Inc. v. Compania Mexicana de Aviacion, S.A. de C.V., 125 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1011 (N.D. 22 Cal. 2010) (collecting cases). “Any of the factors might prove decisive, and none is an absolutely 23 necessary condition for joinder.” Yang v. Swissport USA, Inc., No. C 09–03823 SI, 2010 WL 24 2680800, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 6, 2010). 25 B. Discussion 26 Necessary Parties. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a) requires joinder of persons 27 whose absence would preclude the grant of “complete relief” to existing parties, impede the 1 inconsistent obligations. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a); see also CP Nat. Corp. v. Bonneville Power 2 Admin., 928 F.2d 905, 912 (9th Cir. 1991) (describing necessary parties as those “having an 3 interest in the controversy, and who ought to be made parties, in order that the court may act on 4 that rule which requires it to decide on, and finally determine the entire controversy, and do 5 complete justice, by adjusting all the rights involved in it”). A party is necessary when he plays a 6 principal role in the claim and bears more than a “tangential” relationship to the cause of action. 7 See IBC, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 1012 (finding that a management employee who was the principal 8 person responsible for the acts underlying the plaintiff’s claim was necessary). 9 Here, Aramark contends that Messrs. Hall, Butler, and Bailey are not necessary parties 10 because Aramark as a large, publicly-traded company, can satisfy any money judgment that 11 Plaintiff obtains in this case. Dkt. No. 18 at 2–3. Ability to pay, however, is not the only 12 consideration under Rule 19(a). Plaintiff contends that Messrs. Hall, Butler, and Bailey harassed 13 Plaintiff because of his accent, retaliated against him for reporting safety concerns, and either 14 directly terminated him or failed to prevent his wrongful termination. See Dkt. No. 16 at 2. As 15 noted above, Plaintiff alleges that Mr. Bailey in particular did “everything in his personal power” 16 to get Plaintiff fired after he reported issues with the cleaning protocols at work. See Compl. at 17 ¶ 51. And at least as alleged, Mr. Bailey was the person who put Plaintiff on leave without a 18 formal reason. Id. In other words, Plaintiff asserts that Messrs. Hall, Butler, and Bailey played a 19 principal role in the alleged conduct, and have more than just a tangential relationship to the 20 causes of action in this case. See IBC, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 1012. In short, Aramark’s liability is 21 dependent on the alleged conduct of these individuals. 22 Statute of Limitations. Plaintiffs do not argue that a new action against Messrs. Hall, 23 Butler, or Bailey would be time-barred. 24 Unreasonable Delay. In determining whether to permit joinder, courts also consider 25 whether the plaintiff delayed in seeking amendment. See IBC, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 1012. Here, 26 Plaintiff filed his motion for joinder in June 2022, approximately three and a half months after he 27 filed the initial complaint, and just seven weeks after Defendant removed the action to federal 1 schedule, the Court has not set a deadline to seek leave to amend the complaint, and the parties do 2 not appear to have engaged in any formal discovery. Under the circumstances, the Court does not 3 find any unreasonable delay. Accord Lopez v. Gen. Motors Corp., 697 F.2d 1328, 1332 (9th Cir. 4 1983) (finding six months after removal not unreasonable delay). 5 Motive for Joinder. Adding a non-diverse defendant does not always signal an improper 6 motive. See IBC, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 1012. Courts have found that the more involved a new 7 defendant is in the events giving rise to the cause of action, the less likely it is that a plaintiff’s 8 motive is improper. See id. As discussed above, Plaintiff suggests that these individuals were 9 integral to the alleged wrongful conduct.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 RAYMOND OIYEMHONLAN, Case No. 22-cv-02954-HSG
8 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR JOINDER AND MOTION FOR 9 v. REMAND
10 ARAMARK MANAGEMENT SERVICES, Re: Dkt. Nos. 10, 14 INC., et al., 11 Defendants. 12 13 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Raymond Oiyemhonlan’s motion for joinder and 14 motion to remand. Dkt. Nos. 10. 14. The Court finds this matter appropriate for disposition 15 without oral argument and the matter is deemed submitted. See Civil L.R. 7-1(b). For the reasons 16 detailed below, the Court DENIES the motion for joinder and DENIES the motion to remand. 17 I. BACKGROUND 18 Plaintiff initially filed this action in San Francisco County Superior Court in March 2022. 19 See Dkt. No. 1. Plaintiff alleges that he was wrongfully terminated by Defendant Aramark 20 Facility Services, LLC based on his age and national origin. See generally Dkt. No. 1-1, Ex. A 21 (“Compl.”). He alleges that Matthew Bailey, the Senior Director of Support Services, specifically 22 “did not like plaintiff and tried to get him fired because he was from the African continent and 23 spoke with an accent.” See id. at ¶ 50. Plaintiff further contends that he was terminated in 24 retaliation for reporting health and safety violations regarding the proper cleaning of an operating 25 room at a medical center in San Francisco. See id. at ¶¶ 34, 51. He suggests that Mr. Bailey used 26 Plaintiff’s complaints about safety protocols as an excuse to terminate him. See id. at ¶ 51. Based 27 on these allegations, Plaintiff brings causes of action against Aramark for wrongful termination; 1 discrimination, or retaliation under California law. See id. at ¶¶ 16–58. 2 Aramark removed this action in May 2022 on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, asserting 3 that Plaintiff is a citizen of California and Aramark is a citizen of Delaware and Pennsylvania. See 4 Dkt. No. 1 at 2–4. Plaintiff now seeks to join California residents Don Hall, William Butler, and 5 Matthew Bailey as additional Defendants, and to remand the action back to state court. Dkt. Nos. 6 10, 14, 16. Plaintiff’s two motions are inextricably related: Defendant does not dispute that if the 7 Court grants the motion for joinder, remand is appropriate for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 8 See Dkt. No. 13 at 3–7. 9 II. MOTION FOR JOINDER 10 A. Legal Standard 11 “[I]f after removal the plaintiff seeks to join additional defendants whose joinder would 12 destroy subject matter jurisdiction, the court may deny joinder, or permit joinder and remand the 13 action to the State court.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e). The Court has discretion to grant or deny 14 joinder under such circumstances. See Newcombe v. Adolf Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686, 691 (9th Cir. 15 1998). In determining whether to permit joinder of non-diverse defendants, courts generally 16 consider whether: (1) the new defendants are needed for just adjudication and would be joined as 17 necessary parties under Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a); (2) the statute of limitations would preclude an 18 action against the new defendants in state court; (3) there has been unexplained delay in requesting 19 joinder; (4) joinder is intended solely to defeat federal jurisdiction; (5) the claims against the new 20 defendants appear valid; and (6) denial of joinder would prejudice the plaintiff. See IBC Aviation 21 Servs., Inc. v. Compania Mexicana de Aviacion, S.A. de C.V., 125 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1011 (N.D. 22 Cal. 2010) (collecting cases). “Any of the factors might prove decisive, and none is an absolutely 23 necessary condition for joinder.” Yang v. Swissport USA, Inc., No. C 09–03823 SI, 2010 WL 24 2680800, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 6, 2010). 25 B. Discussion 26 Necessary Parties. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a) requires joinder of persons 27 whose absence would preclude the grant of “complete relief” to existing parties, impede the 1 inconsistent obligations. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a); see also CP Nat. Corp. v. Bonneville Power 2 Admin., 928 F.2d 905, 912 (9th Cir. 1991) (describing necessary parties as those “having an 3 interest in the controversy, and who ought to be made parties, in order that the court may act on 4 that rule which requires it to decide on, and finally determine the entire controversy, and do 5 complete justice, by adjusting all the rights involved in it”). A party is necessary when he plays a 6 principal role in the claim and bears more than a “tangential” relationship to the cause of action. 7 See IBC, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 1012 (finding that a management employee who was the principal 8 person responsible for the acts underlying the plaintiff’s claim was necessary). 9 Here, Aramark contends that Messrs. Hall, Butler, and Bailey are not necessary parties 10 because Aramark as a large, publicly-traded company, can satisfy any money judgment that 11 Plaintiff obtains in this case. Dkt. No. 18 at 2–3. Ability to pay, however, is not the only 12 consideration under Rule 19(a). Plaintiff contends that Messrs. Hall, Butler, and Bailey harassed 13 Plaintiff because of his accent, retaliated against him for reporting safety concerns, and either 14 directly terminated him or failed to prevent his wrongful termination. See Dkt. No. 16 at 2. As 15 noted above, Plaintiff alleges that Mr. Bailey in particular did “everything in his personal power” 16 to get Plaintiff fired after he reported issues with the cleaning protocols at work. See Compl. at 17 ¶ 51. And at least as alleged, Mr. Bailey was the person who put Plaintiff on leave without a 18 formal reason. Id. In other words, Plaintiff asserts that Messrs. Hall, Butler, and Bailey played a 19 principal role in the alleged conduct, and have more than just a tangential relationship to the 20 causes of action in this case. See IBC, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 1012. In short, Aramark’s liability is 21 dependent on the alleged conduct of these individuals. 22 Statute of Limitations. Plaintiffs do not argue that a new action against Messrs. Hall, 23 Butler, or Bailey would be time-barred. 24 Unreasonable Delay. In determining whether to permit joinder, courts also consider 25 whether the plaintiff delayed in seeking amendment. See IBC, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 1012. Here, 26 Plaintiff filed his motion for joinder in June 2022, approximately three and a half months after he 27 filed the initial complaint, and just seven weeks after Defendant removed the action to federal 1 schedule, the Court has not set a deadline to seek leave to amend the complaint, and the parties do 2 not appear to have engaged in any formal discovery. Under the circumstances, the Court does not 3 find any unreasonable delay. Accord Lopez v. Gen. Motors Corp., 697 F.2d 1328, 1332 (9th Cir. 4 1983) (finding six months after removal not unreasonable delay). 5 Motive for Joinder. Adding a non-diverse defendant does not always signal an improper 6 motive. See IBC, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 1012. Courts have found that the more involved a new 7 defendant is in the events giving rise to the cause of action, the less likely it is that a plaintiff’s 8 motive is improper. See id. As discussed above, Plaintiff suggests that these individuals were 9 integral to the alleged wrongful conduct. Still, Aramark argues that Plaintiff’s only motive for 10 seeking joinder now is to defeat diversity jurisdiction since these defendants could have been 11 added sooner. See Dkt. No. 18 at 4–5. Aramark notes that Plaintiff only sought joinder after 12 defense counsel explained that complete diversity existed based on the operative complaint. See 13 id. at 5. 14 The Court understands Aramark’s view that Plaintiff must have known the identities of his 15 harassers, and thus could have included them in the initial complaint. See id. Plaintiff actually 16 included allegations regarding Mr. Bailey in the initial complaint. See Compl. at ¶¶ 50–53. 17 Plaintiff nevertheless suggests that at the time he “did not have sufficient information to flesh out 18 the claim fully or add the other two harassers, Don Hall and Will Butler,” and required “informal 19 discovery.” See Dkt. No. 17 at 2, 6. The Court does not find this conclusory assertion particularly 20 persuasive. Still, given the individuals’ central roles in the asserted claims, the Court finds that the 21 record is at best ambiguous with respect to Plaintiff’s true motive. 22 Validity of Claims. Aramark points out that Plaintiff has not formally alleged a claim 23 against Messrs. Hall, Butler, and Bailey in the complaint. See Dkt. No. 18 at 6–7. It further notes 24 that individuals cannot be held liable for discrimination or retaliation. See id. Plaintiff does not 25 dispute this, but instead argues that he intends to pursue harassment claims against these 26 individuals. See Dkt. No. 16 at 2; Dkt. No. 17 at 3–6; see also Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(j)(3) 27 (“An employee of an entity . . . is personally liable for any harassment prohibited by this section 1 (distinguishing harassment and discrimination claims). 2 However, Plaintiff has not filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint to add this new 3 claim. Nor does he provide any detail about the new allegations he intends to assert against 4 Messrs. Hall, Butler, and Bailey. The Court cannot assess the validity of such hypothetical claims. 5 In short, there are no valid claims currently asserted against these individuals, and at this point 6 there is no confirmation that there ever will be. 7 Prejudice. Lastly, the Court considers the prejudice to Plaintiff if it did not grant the 8 motion for joinder. A plaintiff suffers prejudice if denying joinder would force him to choose 9 between (1) engaging in redundant litigation in state court arising out of the same facts and 10 involving the same legal issues; or (2) foregoing his potential claims against the proposed party. 11 See IBC, 125 F. supp. 2d at 1013. Because there are no valid claims currently asserted against 12 Messrs. Hall, Butler, and Bailey, there does not appear to be any risk of redundant litigation. 13 * * * 14 As discussed above, Plaintiff offers little explanation as to why he did not include Messrs. 15 Hall, Butler, and Bailey when he initially filed the case. Given that they are his purported 16 harassers, the Court would assume Plaintiff had all the information necessary to bring causes of 17 action against them earlier. Plaintiff also offers little detail about the nature of the harassment 18 claims he intends to pursue against these individuals. Nevertheless, the Court notes that under 19 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15, courts “should freely give leave [to amend] when justice so 20 requires.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). If Plaintiff can allege valid harassment claims against 21 Messrs. Hall, Butler, and Bailey, then joinder would likely be appropriate under the 22 circumstances, which in turn would weigh strongly in favor of remand. 23 The Court therefore DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for joinder without prejudice. Plaintiff 24 may file a motion for leave to amend the complaint to add harassment claims against Messrs. Hall, 25 Butler, and Bailey if counsel can do so consistent with their Rule 11 obligations. 26 III. MOTION FOR REMAND 27 A. Legal Standard 1 in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be 2 removed” to federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). District courts have original jurisdiction over 3 civil actions between citizens of different states in which the amount in controversy exceeds 4 $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). To properly invoke diversity jurisdiction, the defendant 5 bears the burden of proving that the parties in the action are completely diverse, meaning that 6 “each plaintiff [is] of a different citizenship from each defendant.” Grancare, LLC v. Thrower by 7 & through Mills, 889 F.3d 543, 548 (9th Cir. 2018). If the district court lacks jurisdiction over an 8 action, a plaintiff may seek remand to state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). 9 B. Discussion 10 As noted above, the parties do not dispute that Messrs. Hall, Butler, and Bailey are 11 California residents, and if joined in this case, will destroy complete diversity. But because the 12 Court has denied the motion for joinder, complete diversity of citizenship still exists in this case. 13 The Court accordingly DENIES the motion to remand. 14 IV. CONCLUSION 15 The Court DENIES the motion for joinder and DENIES the motion to remand. Plaintiff 16 may file a motion for leave to amend the complaint to add harassment claims against the 17 individuals (including a proposed amended complaint), and a renewed motion for joinder, within 18 14 days of the date of this order. The Court further SETS a telephonic case management 19 conference on February 28, 2023, at 2:00 p.m. All counsel shall use the following dial-in 20 information to access the call: 21 Dial-In: 888-808-6929; 22 Passcode: 6064255 23 // 24 // 25 // 26 // 27 // 1 For call clarity, parties shall NOT use speaker phone or earpieces for these calls, and where 2 at all possible, parties shall use landlines. The Court DIRECTS the parties to meet and confer and 3 submit a joint case management statement by February 21, 2023. The parties shall be prepared to 4 || discuss how to move the case forward efficiently if it is not ultimately remanded. 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6 || Dated: 1/30/2023 7 7 A Bpurend 3b Md, □□□ □ HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR. 8 United States District Judge 9 10 11 12
© 15 16
= 17
Z 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28