Ohio Leather Co. v. Federal Trade Commission

45 F.2d 39, 7 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 102, 1930 U.S. App. LEXIS 3558
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
DecidedNovember 12, 1930
Docket5393
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 45 F.2d 39 (Ohio Leather Co. v. Federal Trade Commission) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ohio Leather Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 45 F.2d 39, 7 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 102, 1930 U.S. App. LEXIS 3558 (6th Cir. 1930).

Opinion

DENISON, Circuit Judge.

The petitioner, the leather company, began, in 1922, to- put upon the market a certain kind or brand of leather under the trade-name of “Kaffor-Kid,” 1 and, at the time of the filing of the complaint by the Commission, a large trade therein had been developed. This leather is made only from the skins of calves, not more than twelve days old and called “deacons,” which have been fed entirely on milk and have not begun to eat grass. The leather so made is softer in its texture and more delicate and pliable than that which is made from the skin of older calves—the standard “calfskin.” This leather is sold only to shoe manufacturers, and the shoes made therefrom by the various manufacturers are sent out to the retail trade. This trade-name “Kaffor-Kid” is used by the leather company in its trade journal advertising, and the rolls of leather sent to the shoe manufacturers have this name stamped upon the wrapper. Occasionally, though rarely, the shoe manufacturer has stamped the name upon the carton containing shoes made therefrom, and, in this way in a small degree, but mainly by the advertising and through salesmen, the name reaches the shoe retailer. The leather company has also put out display cards, intended to stand on tho retailer’s counters or in his *40 windows, containing the trade-name in an attractive form. Upon these display cards, as well as in practically all the advertising of the leather company, the article was further described as “a distinctive calf leather,” or by a more complete account of its advantages as a special type of calf.

Upon the request of manufacturers who thought their trade was injured by this practice, the Commission filed its complaint, alleging that the leather company was guilty of unfair competition with its competitors, in that the use of this trade-name induced the belief, that the leather was kid when, in fact, it was not., After answer and the taking of proofs, the Commission made its findings of fact, and an order that the leather company desist and refrain from the use of this name. The leather company filed in this court its petition to review and vacate, and the Commission filed an answer in the nature of a cross-bill, asking the enforcement of its order.

The ease is unique in some particulars, which appear as the history of the matter is examined. We assume from the record that originally kid leather and kid shoes were made from the skin of a young goat, properly called a “kid.” At an early period, when the skin of older goats, which were not kids, was used for this purpose, it was under names which were more or less arbitrary, as “Morocco,” “Dongola,” etc. In 1878, one Poerderer devised and patented a process, by which he could tan the older and tougher goat skins so as -to have the appearance and qualities of the true kid; and, giving this a glazed finish, he called it “Vici-kid.” After his patent monopoly expired, his competitors put out a similar product from the same skins and leather, which they called “glazed-kid.” These products met with a large adoption. During the war, and about 1918, the various manufacturers’ associations, making different kinds of leather, were brought together in one body, called the “Tanners’ Council,” and an endeavor was made to standardize products and nomenclature. It was then agreed among those so associated that they would consider as kid leather that which was made from the skin of a goat, young or old, and not that, made from any other animal. 2 The record shows also that those who buy leather— that is, the shoe manufacturers-—have adopted the same term, and, to them, “kid shoe,” is the proper descriptive name for shoes made from the skin of a goat, old or young (or some sheep). This is plainly not the primary, but rather a secondary meaning; but its adoption by tanners and shoe manufacturers has been general and long enough to justify it as the natural meaning to them. Whether this secondary meaning also prevails among the shoe buying publie—the ultimate consumers—is not shown by the record. Finding No. 7 contains the express statement that this meaning is known to and generally accepted by both the “shoe and leather trade,” and the “publie.” If by “publie” is meant the- shoe manufacturers who buy the leather, the finding is not to be challenged; if the shoe retailer is intended to be included, the finding is supported by evidence, though there is much conflict; but if by this phrase is meant the ultimate buying public who purchase the shoes over the counter, the finding is to that extent not supported by any substantial evidence, and cannot be accepted. We have examined the record with care with this point in mind, and we find nothing indicating that any ultimate consumer understands that kid leather may be, and most of it 'is, made from the skins of animals which are not kids. 3 There is much tending to the contrary. (See note 6.) Certainly the initial presumption must be that the purchaser at: a retail store, when he buys kid shoes, or kid gloves, would suppose that he was getting precisely what the word indicated and not something else; but if, in the absence of any proof, this initial presumption is not to prevail, we find much to indicate that the ordinary purchasers, of ordinary intelligence, would have in mind chiefly tire appearance, feel, and quality of the leather, and would understand that they were asking for these qualities rather than for any specific skin ancestry. There well may be a common, if not general, understanding among the shoe wearers that the leather on the market called “kid” is made from many different raw materials, and that its proper designation depends upon the methods of treatment and manufacture. Reference may be had to “kid gloves.” The cases, are not parallel, but there is close analogy. It would seem that the publie understanding and opinion as to the materials to be found in kid gloves' and in kid slippers, or-shoes, would take similar form; and yet there is considerable available information, though it is summarily covered by casual references in the record, to- the effect that the retail buying public under *41 stands well enough that the ordinary grades of so-called kid g'loves on the market are not kid at all, or even goat, but are made of different leathers, subjected to manufacturing processes which give them the feel and quality of kid, and that when it asks for “kid gloves” it is indifferent as to the origin of the leather. (Note 6 at end of opinion.)

Upon this subject—what the retail shoe buying public understands by “kid,” and whether it is, in fact, misled to its prejudice by the use of this term “Kaffor-Kid”—the record is very unsatisfactory; and we think no final disposition of the controversy should be based upon it. The order cannot be sustained in the absence of an affirmative findim-' based upon substantial evidence, to the effect that the consuming public, asking for kid shoes, desires and expects to get shoes made from the skin of a kid, or of a goat, as the case may be. The present record being insufficient, it should be remanded, in order that all parties interested may take further proofs and have a finding made, if, indeed, the proof's may then justify any definite conclusion.

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Bluebook (online)
45 F.2d 39, 7 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 102, 1930 U.S. App. LEXIS 3558, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ohio-leather-co-v-federal-trade-commission-ca6-1930.