DENISON, Circuit Judge.
The petitioner, the leather company, began, in 1922, to- put upon the market a certain kind or brand of leather under the trade-name of “Kaffor-Kid,”
and, at the time of the filing of the complaint by the Commission, a large trade therein had been developed. This leather is made only from the skins of calves, not more than twelve days old and called “deacons,” which have been fed entirely on milk and have not begun to eat grass. The leather so made is softer in its texture and more delicate and pliable than that which is made from the skin of older calves—the standard “calfskin.” This leather is sold only to shoe manufacturers, and the shoes made therefrom by the various manufacturers are sent out to the retail trade. This trade-name “Kaffor-Kid” is used by the leather company in its trade journal advertising, and the rolls of leather sent to the shoe manufacturers have this name stamped upon the wrapper. Occasionally, though rarely, the shoe manufacturer has stamped the name upon the carton containing shoes made therefrom, and, in this way in a small degree, but mainly by the advertising and through salesmen, the name reaches the shoe retailer. The leather company has also put out display cards, intended to stand on tho retailer’s counters or in his
windows, containing the trade-name in an attractive form. Upon these display cards, as well as in practically all the advertising of the leather company, the article was further described as “a distinctive calf leather,” or by a more complete account of its advantages as a special type of calf.
Upon the request of manufacturers who thought their trade was injured by this practice, the Commission filed its complaint, alleging that the leather company was guilty of unfair competition with its competitors, in that the use of this trade-name induced the belief, that the leather was kid when, in fact, it was not., After answer and the taking of proofs, the Commission made its findings of fact, and an order that the leather company desist and refrain from the use of this name. The leather company filed in this court its petition to review and vacate, and the Commission filed an answer in the nature of a cross-bill, asking the enforcement of its order.
The ease is unique in some particulars, which appear as the history of the matter is examined. We assume from the record that originally kid leather and kid shoes were made from the skin of a young goat, properly called a “kid.” At an early period, when the skin of older goats, which were not kids, was used for this purpose, it was under names which were more or less arbitrary, as “Morocco,” “Dongola,” etc. In 1878, one Poerderer devised and patented a process, by which he could tan the older and tougher goat skins so as -to have the appearance and qualities of the true kid; and, giving this a glazed finish, he called it “Vici-kid.” After his patent monopoly expired, his competitors put out a similar product from the same skins and leather, which they called “glazed-kid.” These products met with a large adoption. During the war, and about 1918, the various manufacturers’ associations, making different kinds of leather, were brought together in one body, called the “Tanners’ Council,” and an endeavor was made to standardize products and nomenclature. It was then agreed among those so associated that they would consider as kid leather that which was made from the skin of a goat, young or old, and not that, made from any other animal.
The record shows also that those who buy leather— that is, the shoe manufacturers-—have adopted the same term, and, to them, “kid shoe,” is the proper descriptive name for shoes made from the skin of a goat, old or young (or some sheep). This is plainly not the primary, but rather a secondary meaning; but its adoption by tanners and shoe manufacturers has been general and long enough to justify it as the natural meaning to them. Whether this secondary meaning also prevails among the shoe buying publie—the ultimate consumers—is not shown by the record. Finding No. 7 contains the express statement that this meaning is known to and generally accepted by both the “shoe and leather trade,” and the “publie.” If by “publie” is meant the- shoe manufacturers who buy the leather, the finding is not to be challenged; if the shoe retailer is intended to be included, the finding is supported by evidence, though there is much conflict; but if by this phrase is meant the ultimate buying public who purchase the shoes over the counter, the finding is to that extent not supported by any substantial evidence, and cannot be accepted. We have examined the record with care with this point in mind, and we find nothing indicating that any ultimate consumer understands that kid leather may be, and most of it 'is, made from the skins of animals which are not kids.
There is much tending to the contrary. (See note 6.) Certainly the initial presumption must be that the purchaser at: a retail store, when he buys kid shoes, or kid gloves, would suppose that he was getting precisely what the word indicated and not something else; but if, in the absence of any proof, this initial presumption is not to prevail, we find much to indicate that the ordinary purchasers, of ordinary intelligence, would have in mind chiefly tire appearance, feel, and quality of the leather, and would understand that they were asking for these qualities rather than for any specific skin ancestry. There well may be a common, if not general, understanding among the shoe wearers that the leather on the market called “kid” is made from many different raw materials, and that its proper designation depends upon the methods of treatment and manufacture. Reference may be had to “kid gloves.” The cases, are not parallel, but there is close analogy. It would seem that the publie understanding and opinion as to the materials to be found in kid gloves' and in kid slippers, or-shoes, would take similar form; and yet there is considerable available information, though it is summarily covered by casual references in the record, to- the effect that the retail buying public under
stands well enough that the ordinary grades of so-called kid g'loves on the market are not kid at all, or even goat, but are made of different leathers, subjected to manufacturing processes which give them the feel and quality of kid, and that when it asks for “kid gloves” it is indifferent as to the origin of the leather. (Note 6 at end of opinion.)
Upon this subject—what the retail shoe buying public understands by “kid,” and whether it is, in fact, misled to its prejudice by the use of this term “Kaffor-Kid”—the record is very unsatisfactory; and we think no final disposition of the controversy should be based upon it. The order cannot be sustained in the absence of an affirmative findim-' based upon substantial evidence, to the effect that the consuming public, asking for kid shoes, desires and expects to get shoes made from the skin of a kid, or of a goat, as the case may be. The present record being insufficient, it should be remanded, in order that all parties interested may take further proofs and have a finding made, if, indeed, the proof's may then justify any definite conclusion.
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DENISON, Circuit Judge.
The petitioner, the leather company, began, in 1922, to- put upon the market a certain kind or brand of leather under the trade-name of “Kaffor-Kid,”
and, at the time of the filing of the complaint by the Commission, a large trade therein had been developed. This leather is made only from the skins of calves, not more than twelve days old and called “deacons,” which have been fed entirely on milk and have not begun to eat grass. The leather so made is softer in its texture and more delicate and pliable than that which is made from the skin of older calves—the standard “calfskin.” This leather is sold only to shoe manufacturers, and the shoes made therefrom by the various manufacturers are sent out to the retail trade. This trade-name “Kaffor-Kid” is used by the leather company in its trade journal advertising, and the rolls of leather sent to the shoe manufacturers have this name stamped upon the wrapper. Occasionally, though rarely, the shoe manufacturer has stamped the name upon the carton containing shoes made therefrom, and, in this way in a small degree, but mainly by the advertising and through salesmen, the name reaches the shoe retailer. The leather company has also put out display cards, intended to stand on tho retailer’s counters or in his
windows, containing the trade-name in an attractive form. Upon these display cards, as well as in practically all the advertising of the leather company, the article was further described as “a distinctive calf leather,” or by a more complete account of its advantages as a special type of calf.
Upon the request of manufacturers who thought their trade was injured by this practice, the Commission filed its complaint, alleging that the leather company was guilty of unfair competition with its competitors, in that the use of this trade-name induced the belief, that the leather was kid when, in fact, it was not., After answer and the taking of proofs, the Commission made its findings of fact, and an order that the leather company desist and refrain from the use of this name. The leather company filed in this court its petition to review and vacate, and the Commission filed an answer in the nature of a cross-bill, asking the enforcement of its order.
The ease is unique in some particulars, which appear as the history of the matter is examined. We assume from the record that originally kid leather and kid shoes were made from the skin of a young goat, properly called a “kid.” At an early period, when the skin of older goats, which were not kids, was used for this purpose, it was under names which were more or less arbitrary, as “Morocco,” “Dongola,” etc. In 1878, one Poerderer devised and patented a process, by which he could tan the older and tougher goat skins so as -to have the appearance and qualities of the true kid; and, giving this a glazed finish, he called it “Vici-kid.” After his patent monopoly expired, his competitors put out a similar product from the same skins and leather, which they called “glazed-kid.” These products met with a large adoption. During the war, and about 1918, the various manufacturers’ associations, making different kinds of leather, were brought together in one body, called the “Tanners’ Council,” and an endeavor was made to standardize products and nomenclature. It was then agreed among those so associated that they would consider as kid leather that which was made from the skin of a goat, young or old, and not that, made from any other animal.
The record shows also that those who buy leather— that is, the shoe manufacturers-—have adopted the same term, and, to them, “kid shoe,” is the proper descriptive name for shoes made from the skin of a goat, old or young (or some sheep). This is plainly not the primary, but rather a secondary meaning; but its adoption by tanners and shoe manufacturers has been general and long enough to justify it as the natural meaning to them. Whether this secondary meaning also prevails among the shoe buying publie—the ultimate consumers—is not shown by the record. Finding No. 7 contains the express statement that this meaning is known to and generally accepted by both the “shoe and leather trade,” and the “publie.” If by “publie” is meant the- shoe manufacturers who buy the leather, the finding is not to be challenged; if the shoe retailer is intended to be included, the finding is supported by evidence, though there is much conflict; but if by this phrase is meant the ultimate buying public who purchase the shoes over the counter, the finding is to that extent not supported by any substantial evidence, and cannot be accepted. We have examined the record with care with this point in mind, and we find nothing indicating that any ultimate consumer understands that kid leather may be, and most of it 'is, made from the skins of animals which are not kids.
There is much tending to the contrary. (See note 6.) Certainly the initial presumption must be that the purchaser at: a retail store, when he buys kid shoes, or kid gloves, would suppose that he was getting precisely what the word indicated and not something else; but if, in the absence of any proof, this initial presumption is not to prevail, we find much to indicate that the ordinary purchasers, of ordinary intelligence, would have in mind chiefly tire appearance, feel, and quality of the leather, and would understand that they were asking for these qualities rather than for any specific skin ancestry. There well may be a common, if not general, understanding among the shoe wearers that the leather on the market called “kid” is made from many different raw materials, and that its proper designation depends upon the methods of treatment and manufacture. Reference may be had to “kid gloves.” The cases, are not parallel, but there is close analogy. It would seem that the publie understanding and opinion as to the materials to be found in kid gloves' and in kid slippers, or-shoes, would take similar form; and yet there is considerable available information, though it is summarily covered by casual references in the record, to- the effect that the retail buying public under
stands well enough that the ordinary grades of so-called kid g'loves on the market are not kid at all, or even goat, but are made of different leathers, subjected to manufacturing processes which give them the feel and quality of kid, and that when it asks for “kid gloves” it is indifferent as to the origin of the leather. (Note 6 at end of opinion.)
Upon this subject—what the retail shoe buying public understands by “kid,” and whether it is, in fact, misled to its prejudice by the use of this term “Kaffor-Kid”—the record is very unsatisfactory; and we think no final disposition of the controversy should be based upon it. The order cannot be sustained in the absence of an affirmative findim-' based upon substantial evidence, to the effect that the consuming public, asking for kid shoes, desires and expects to get shoes made from the skin of a kid, or of a goat, as the case may be. The present record being insufficient, it should be remanded, in order that all parties interested may take further proofs and have a finding made, if, indeed, the proof's may then justify any definite conclusion.
The misleading of' the ultimate public to its prejudice dobs not, of course, depend upon whether the substitute is equally as good as the original; the purchaser is entitled to get what ho asks for, oven if he is put off with something as good or better;
but the qualities of the two articles are not immaterial in determining the purchaser’s real intention and desire. It is said hero that the leather in question, made from a very young calf, closely eoifesponds to the true kid leather in every quality—more closely than do many of the goat skins, sold by the leather company’s competitors under the name of kid. The Commission has not thought this to be material, and has not made findings thereon; but if the purchaser expects to get only a certain type of leather, then the correspondence in qualities becomes important.
The misleading of the ultimate purchaser depends upon his understanding, and is, in this case, vital; the lack of proof or finding cannot be overlooked. All witnesses agree that, while the leathers are very similar in most qualities—perhaps in all essential qualities—there is a difference in the grain, or appearance, which a leather or shoe expert would notice at onee. It therefore is conceded that no shoe manufacturer or shoe dealer has ever been in any way misled, but that, in every instance, he has fully understood that he was buying a particular and special tannage of calfskin; and it is equally clear that no such manufacturer or dealer will be so misled in the future. There is, therefore, no basis for any charge of unfairness, excepting as the' mere use of the name “Kaffor-Kid” may cany to the nonexpert, the final purchaser, a false implication that the. material is not what he understands by the term “kid.”
The petitioner, leather company, urges that, even if tlio ultimate purchaser is induced to buy calfskin when he intends to get that something else which he believes is indicated by the term “kid,” yet the petitioner’s connection is too remote to justify compelling it
to
discard the
name.
If
there
is misrepresentation to the final buyer in the use of “kid” for this leather, and in connection with any noncorreetive word, it is inherent in the very term. In our recent opinion in Berkey & Gay Co. v. F. T. C., 42 F.(2d) 427, we found that the use by the manufacturer of the word “walnut” carried no implication that the wood was solid walnut rather than laminated; there was no inherent misrepresentation to bo put before the final purchaser; the manufacturer was not to be held for any intentionally false statement the retail salesman might make. Here, if the final purchaser does not understand that to say a shoe is “kid” means that it is goat skin, no case is made out; if he does so understand, then misrepresentation would be implied in the name; and if that name, unexplained, is intended to and does reach
the
typical retail customer,
the
manufacturer of the leather who puts out the article with that name must carry the responsibility. So much depends upon what the ultimate consumers understand—if anything—by the word “kid” in connection with footwear, that we are not inclined to consider, upon,this l’eeord, whether or not sufficient precautions have been taken, or may ho taken, to prevent or make improbable any serious misleading of this class.
There is in this record no worthwhile proof of any actual deception of the purchaser by the retailer;5 **
but that may not be necessary; the inherent tendency and opportunity may be enough, if the tendency exisls and the opportunity is left effectively open.
We must also accept the Commission’s conclusion that the differences between the “Kaffor-End” and that goatskin leather, which is said to be rightly called “kid,” are not sharp and plain enough to insure that the ordinary shoe purchaser would recognize each for what it is—calf, or goat. Perhaps the pre-i ponderance of evidence is against this conclusion. It is supported by the personal judgment of a few selected individuals, who may or may not be fairly representative of the class of ordinary purchasers; it is opposed by the opinion of a large number of retailers, who ought to know the general view of buyers; but the physical exhibits before the Commission and the leather company’s claims of similar qualities must also be considered. Undoubtedly there is substantial evidence supporting the finding; and we can look no further. Winsted Hosiery Case, 258 U. S. 483, 491, 42 S. Ct. 384, 66 L. Ed. 729.
We recently had occasion to reaffirm our belief that there is no jurisdiction in the Commission to make an order of this kind unless there is a legitimate trade which equitably deserves protection in order that the defendant’s unfair methods may not tend to restrain the trade of the fair and- legitimate competitors. Raladam Co. v. F. T. C., 42 F. (2d) 430, 435, certiorari now allowed 51 S. Ct. 86, 75 L. Ed.-. The present record presents this question in a peculiar form. The manufacturers of what they call kid leather, and possibly, in some measure, the manufacturers of calfskin, may suffer from this method of competition—the former, if trade is diverted from the goatskin by the supposition that “Kaffor-Kid” is the same thing, and the latter, if trade is diverted from the regular calfskin by advertising something as if better but perhaps at the same price. We do not suppose that the Commission’s typical order to desist and refrain is made an inappropriate remedy, merely because some of a respondent’s trade competitors are using the same unfair method which is charged against it; the Commission could not stop all these things at onee; but, in that aspect of the Commission’s, future action in this ease which may rest upon the theory that the ultimate purchaser supposes that kid is kid, and that kid shoes are made from kid leather which is made from kid skins, and thus is misled because the defendant is tacking the name to leather not made of those skins at all, we find that the entire associated trade, which is complaining and which the Commission is intending to protect, is also misleading the ultimate purchaser in a similar way. Lacking any proof that the purchaser did know anything about the secondary meaning which prevails among the experts, the, result, would be that the Commission stops the defendant from misleading the purchaser, and does so with the sole purpose and sole result of aiding and abetting a much greater volume of misleading practice by the rest of the trade. We can confidently say that no such result, coming from such construction of the act, can have been intended by Congress. Upon that other aspect of this ease which may rest on the supposition that the shoe users think “kid” means “goat,” this comment just made would of course not be justified.
The order will he 'that the “desist and refrain” order of the Commission be vacated, without prejudice to its further future orders in the matter, that the prayer of the cross-bill-answer be denied, and that the ease be remanded to the Commission for the taking of further proofs, and, if the Commission desires, further findings—all in accordance with this opinion.