Ohio ex rel. National Life Ass'n v. Matthews

58 Ohio St. (N.S.) 1
CourtOhio Supreme Court
DecidedMarch 1, 1898
StatusPublished

This text of 58 Ohio St. (N.S.) 1 (Ohio ex rel. National Life Ass'n v. Matthews) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ohio ex rel. National Life Ass'n v. Matthews, 58 Ohio St. (N.S.) 1 (Ohio 1898).

Opinion

Bradbury, J.

These two actions were brought in this court by the respective relators, against the superintendent of insurance of this state to compel him to issue to them, respectively, a certificate authorizing each of them to transact the business of life insurance within this state under section 3630<?, Revised Statutes, that prescribes the conditions upon which life insurance companies, organized under the laws of other states, etc., may be permitted to transact the business of life insurance on the assessment plan within this state. The superintendent of insurance, contending that the method of insurance, pursued by these companies, respectively, was not according’ to the assessment plan, declined to issue the certificate demanded of nim.

In respect of the National Life Association of Hartford, Conn., the refusal to grant a certificate rests on the additional ground that it had refused to pay the taxes, which the superintendent of insurance claimed were assessable against it by virtue of section 2745, Revised Statutes. This section of the statute expressly authorizes the superintendent of insurance in ease “such company refuse to pay said tax, after demand therefor has been made” * * * to “ revoke the license of such company to do business in this state.” If, upon this ground, he may revoke a license previously issued, it would seem to, unquestionably, follow that he may also, upon such ground, refuse to issue or renew such license to the defaulting company. An action brought by the superintendent of insurance to recover this tax is pending in the court of common pleas of Franklin county. This effort, however, to recover, according to the ordinary course of justice, through the instrumentality of the [4]*4courts, the amount claimed to be due from the relator as taxes, does not suspend the power of revocation explicitly given by the section above cited. Even if this power of suspension should be regarded simply as an additional and summary remedy for such default, it ought not, in the absence of a legislative intention to that effect, to be held to require the state, through its officer, to elect between the two remedies. And certainly there' is nothing in the statute or the nature of the proceedings in the courts to recover the amount already payable, to indicate that the legislature intended that the authority thus conferred on the superintendent of insurance should be held in abeyance during the pendency of such action. However, as the taxes claimed to be due from the relator rests on the assumption that it is not engaged in the business of insurance on the assessment plan, the right to revoke its license must stand or fall upon the determination of that question. If it is transacting business on the assessment plan, then the taxes in controversy were not legally assessable against it, and'its refusal to pay them would not justify a revocation of, or refusal to renew, its license.

Both relators are bodies corporate; the first named, The National Life Association, being organized under the laws of the state of Connecticut, the other under the laws of the state of Michigan. An inspection of their respective charters show that their schemes of organization widely differ.

The charter of The National Life Association, is as far as material to the consideration of any matter before the court reads as follows: “Section 2. The capital stock of said corporation shall not be less than one hundred thousand dollars, and [5]*5may be increased as herein provided, from time to time hereafter, at the pleasure of said corporation, to any further sum not exceeding five hundred thousand dollars; and each share of said capital stock shall be one hundred dollars * * * provided that no stockholder shall be liable to said corporation for any claims against the same, nor shall the stockholders, or any of them, be'liable in any event beyond the amount of their stock owned by them respectively for any losses whatever. ” * * *

Section 3. ‘‘The capital stock of said corporation shall be personal property, and transferable on the books of said association in conformity with its by-laws.”

Section 5. “ * * * The affairs of said corporation shall be managed and conducted by not less than seven nor more than eighteen directors, a majority of whom shall reside in this state, and shall be elected on the second Tuesday in January in each year by the stockholders from among their number. * * * Every officer or director shall be a tona fide stockholder of at least five shares of said capital stock before he shall be qualified to act as such officer or director. ’ ’

Section 6. ‘ ‘ Notice of every stockholders ’ meeting shall be given ten days previous to such meeting in one or more newspapers printed in the city of Hartford. At all such stockholders’ meet ings no business transacted shall be legal unless a majority of the stock is represented. Each stockholder shall be entitled to one vote for each share of stock held by such stockholder.” * * *

These provisions of its charter show conclusively that it is a corporation created for profit; it has a capital stock of one hundred thousand dollars, divided into shares of one hundred dollars [6]*6each, which capital stock may be increased to five hundred thousand dollars and similarly divided; these shares are declared to be personal property transferable on the books of the “association in conformity with its by-laws the ultimate power to manage its affairs is lodged in its stockholders to the entire exclusion of its policy holders, for the right to attend corporate meetings as well as to elect its officers is vested solely in the former; whatever net profits may accrue from its business will ultimately' go to its stockholders, the policy holders having no interest therein; the rights of the latter being measured by the contract evidenced by their respective policies. It is true that, in an agreed statement of facts submitted to the court, it is stated that: ‘ ‘ The plaintiff pays a dividend of six per cent, per annum on the amount of stock actually paid into its treasury ; the same being paid out of moneys raised and used by it for expense purposes, and the amount thereof being $3,000.00 per annum.” Wedo not see how this bears upon the question of the character or nature of the concern. There is nothing in its charter to prevent the payment of a larger dividend if the earnings of the company at any time would warrant it, or to prevent its setting aside or investing its accumulation in any way it may choose for -the eventual benefit of its stockholders.

Counsel for defendant strenuously contends that a corporation of the character of the relator, that is one possessed of a capital stock and created for the profit of the holder thereof, cannot transact the business of life insurance in Ohio on the assessment plan. This contention, he rests on a fundamental distinction, claimed to exist between the different classes of life insurance [7]*7companies. The object of one class — that to which the relator belongs — being to make profit for its stockholders, while the other class composed of those doing business on the assessment plan, so-called, is not designed for profit at all, and in fact can have no stockholders among which to divide profits.

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Bluebook (online)
58 Ohio St. (N.S.) 1, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ohio-ex-rel-national-life-assn-v-matthews-ohio-1898.