OHC Liquidation Trust v. Credit Suisse (In re Oakwood Homes Corp.)

356 F. App'x 622
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Third Circuit
DecidedDecember 16, 2009
DocketNo. 08-4445
StatusPublished

This text of 356 F. App'x 622 (OHC Liquidation Trust v. Credit Suisse (In re Oakwood Homes Corp.)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
OHC Liquidation Trust v. Credit Suisse (In re Oakwood Homes Corp.), 356 F. App'x 622 (3d Cir. 2009).

Opinion

OPINION

SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.

This appeal challenges the District Court’s grant of partial summary judgment based upon the New York in pari delicto doctrine. Because the parties have settled all remaining issues, the matter is ripe for appeal. For the reasons stated below, we will affirm.

I.

Oakwood Homes Corporation (“Oak-wood”) produced and sold manufactured homes, the purchasers of which were often low-income individuals with poor credit. In the 1990s, Oakwood expanded its business to include mortgage financing. Oak-wood retained Merrill Lynch to securitize the payment streams on the mortgage loans that it financed. Securitization is a process by which expected payment streams are pooled together and restructured into securities, which are then sold to investors. By securitizing the payment streams, Oakwood was able to obtain liquidity to fund its operations. In 1994, Oakwood retained Appellee Credit Suisse (“Credit Suisse”) to perform future periodic securitizations. Oakwood accomplished the securitizations in the ordinary course of business with the tacit approval of its Board of Directors, which was comprised of legal and business professionals from real estate development companies, law firms, and investment banks. By the late 1990s, Oakwood’s annual revenue grew to nearly $1 billion.

Oakwood’s business deteriorated in 1999 when the market for manufactured housing collapsed and purchasers began to default on their loans. Oakwood incurred costs in repossessing, refurbishing, and refinancing the homes. Meanwhile, investor demand for Oakwood’s securities was waning, and Oakwood had a surplus of unsold home inventory at its sales centers and factories. Oakwood’s Chief Financial Officer “emphasized [unfavorable] current market conditions ... and uncertainty with regard to [Oakwood] existing in the marketplace.” App. at 774-75. Ratings agencies questioned Oakwood’s creditworthiness and downgraded its credit rating. Oakwood announced operating losses in its SEC filings and in press releases.

Facing a liquidity shortage, Oakwood contacted Credit Suisse in late 1999 and proposed a stop-gap financing transaction that would provide Oakwood with immediate liquidity. In assessing the proposed transaction, James Xanthos of Credit Suisse prepared an internal memorandum (the “Xanthos Memo”) that summarized Oakwood’s credit risk. The Xanthos Memo discussed the deteriorating market conditions, mentioned the risk of bankruptcy, and recommended against the transaction. The Xanthos Memo was consistent with the market’s unfavorable perception of Oakwood: its stock was trading at about a quarter of its book value. Oak-wood was not given a copy of the Xanthos Memo, a fact it emphasizes in its brief. However, the proposed transaction discussed in the Xanthos Memo never materialized.

At the end of 2000, Credit Suisse was “the only game in town” that was willing to provide stop-gap financing for Oakwood. App. at 2141. Oakwood negotiated a financing package with Credit Suisse. [625]*625Douglas Muir, who had been an Oakwood officer with responsibility over Oakwood’s securitization program, testified that the financing package “was in [Oakwood’s] best interests,” and that Oakwood’s Board agreed. App. at 2141. The financing enabled Oakwood to maintain “business as usual,” i.e., to continue its periodic securiti-zations. App. at 1557. As one of Oak-wood’s Board members described, “[t]he securitization program had been an integral part of [Oakwood’s] operation for a long time.... [T]he [B]oard was fully aware of how the [securitization] program operated, how it was doing and at no time undertook to mandate the discontinuance of it.” App. at 1391.

In 2001, Oakwood turned to Credit Suisse again to facilitate a short-term financing transaction. Oakwood “ultimately closed a transaction that was — that worked for everyone,” according to Muir. App. at 2136. Later that year, Credit Suisse negotiated a different transaction to re-securitize and sell some of Oakwood’s most subordinated securities at a fraction of their par value. “It was the unanimous consensus of [Oakwood’s] Board that the transaction be completed.” App. at 810. Oakwood tried to stem the rising tide of defaults by diverting loans into its existing loan assumption program, but the effort resulted in “significant adverse liquidity effects.” App. at 891. Although Credit Suisse “on occasion” corresponded with Oakwood and its attorneys regarding various transactions and issues, Credit Suisse did not control Oakwood or tell it what to do. App. at 1535. Indeed, Oakwood did not formally engage Credit Suisse as its financial adviser until after the events at issue.

On November 15, 2002, Oakwood filed for bankruptcy under 11 U.S.C. §§ 101, et seq. It stated that it did so “based primarily upon the continued poor performance of loans originated, the extremely weak conditions in the manufactured housing industry and the deteriorating financial terms in the asset-backed securitization market,” in addition to “the general economic recession.” App. at 445-46. Oakwood moved for permission in the Bankruptcy Court to continue engaging in the securitizations and other financing transactions with Credit Suisse. In support thereof, Oak-wood asserted that “[historically, securiti-zation transactions have provided the most effective and least expensive financing technique for satisfying [Oakwood’s] tremendous liquidity needs.” App. at 182. “In fact,” Oakwood noted, “[Oakwood] historically made a material profit on its secu-ritization transactions,” and “[a]lthough that profit has been reduced or even eliminated, the securitization transactions ... still remain the least expensive method for financing [Oakwood’s] operations.” App. at 182. The court granted Oakwood’s motion.

On November 13, 2004, Oakwood’s successor-in-interest (a liquidation trust, which is the Appellant in this appeal) objected to proofs of claim filed by Credit Suisse in the Bankruptcy Court and asserted, inter alia, counterclaims of common law negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of implied contract.1 [626]*626Oakwood alleged, and continues to allege, that Credit Suisse knew the transactions it was structuring were “value-destroying” and “would eventually drive Oak-wood into bankruptcy,” and that Credit Suisse “never bothered to undertake further due diligence about the effects of those transactions, never conveyed its superior understanding of the transactions to Oakwood, and never behaved in accordance with the fiduciary position it had assumed by refusing to participate in further value destruction.” Appellant’s Br. at 6. Oakwood sought $50 million for the diminution in the value of its assets and $21 million in fees that it paid to Credit Suisse for the transactions. The Bankruptcy Court held that Oakwood was entitled to a jury trial on these claims, see In re Oakwood Homes Corp., 378 B.R. 59, 73 (Bankr.D.Del.2007), and the bankruptcy reference was withdrawn so that the ease could be heard in the District Court.

In the District Court, Credit Suisse filed a motion for partial summary judgment which the Court granted based on the in pari delicto doctrine. The bankruptcy claims were referred back to the Bankruptcy Court, where the parties reached a settlement. Oakwood brought this appeal challenging the District Court’s grant of partial summary judgment on the common law claims.2

II.

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Bluebook (online)
356 F. App'x 622, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ohc-liquidation-trust-v-credit-suisse-in-re-oakwood-homes-corp-ca3-2009.