OFFICIAL COMMITTEE OF UNSECURED CREDITORS v. Vagenas

CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, D. Delaware
DecidedSeptember 5, 2025
Docket23-50590
StatusUnknown

This text of OFFICIAL COMMITTEE OF UNSECURED CREDITORS v. Vagenas (OFFICIAL COMMITTEE OF UNSECURED CREDITORS v. Vagenas) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Delaware primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
OFFICIAL COMMITTEE OF UNSECURED CREDITORS v. Vagenas, (Del. 2025).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE In re: Chapter 11

Pack Liquidating, LLC (f/k/a Packable Case No. 22-10797 (CTG) Holdings, LLC), et al., (Jointly Administered) Debtors.

Official Committee of Unsecured Adv. Proc. No. 23-50590 (CTG) Creditors of Pack Liquidating, LLC, et al., derivatively, on behalf of the debtors’ Related Docket No. 101 estate, Plaintiff, v. Andrew Vagenas, et al., Defendants. MEMORANDUM OPINION This action involves claims that have been made against various entities and individuals associated with Quality King Distributors. The claims arise out of the defendants’ relationship with Packable and its affiliates, which are the debtors in the underlying bankruptcy case.1 The debtors’ business involved selling health and wellness products through various e-commerce platforms. The business grew

1 This Memorandum Opinion is limited to addressing the motion to strike [D.I. 101] and the motion to dismiss [D.I. 51] filed by one group of defendants who are affiliated with Quality King. “Quality King” refers to Quality King Distributors, Inc. The defendants who have brought these motions are Quality King, Glenn Nussdorf, Quality King Fragrances, Inc., Olla Beauty Supply, LLC, Pro’s Choice Beauty Care, Inc., and Deborah International Beauty Ltd. “QK Entities” refers to these defendants other than Nussdorf. substantially in the period from its founding in 2014 until its implosion in 2022. But despite the growth in revenues, it never achieved profitability. After an effort to raise capital via a proposed SPAC merger fell through in late 2021, the company ultimately

spiraled into bankruptcy. In addition to being a supplier of the debtors, Quality King was also an early investor. As a result of its equity holdings, Quality King’s principal, Glenn Nussdorf, sat on the debtors’ board of directors. The complaint asserts something of a hodgepodge of bankruptcy and common law causes of actions in an effort to hold the defendants responsible for the ultimate demise of the debtors’ business. The Court concludes that these efforts are generally unsuccessful.

As an initial matter, the Committee (which has obtained standing to assert estate causes of action) filed a second amended complaint without obtaining consent or seeking leave of court. While they advance an argument about why Rule 15 permits them to do this, the argument is a weak one. That said, the violation is ultimately a no-harm/no-foul situation, as their alternative argument for leave to file the amended complaint ultimately lands us in the same place we would have been

had leave to file been permitted – assessing the question whether the complaint as amended states a claim for which relief can be granted. So either way, the question before the Court is whether the second amended complaint states a claim. The answer is that it mostly does not. The complaint does properly assert preference claims with respect to certain payments that were made within 90 days of the bankruptcy filing. And because it states a valid preference claim, the complaint also states a valid claim to disallow the proofs of claim, under § 502(d), asserted by those defendants who are alleged to be recipients of transfers within the 90 days. The rest of the complaint, however, fails to state a claim and will therefore be dismissed.

The actual fraudulent conveyance claims fail because the complaint does not allege fraud with particularity, as required under Rule 9(b). The constructive fraudulent conveyance claims relating to transfers alleged to have occurred before the end of 2021 fail because there is no non-conclusory factual allegation of the debtors’ insolvency before that time. And the constructive fraudulent conveyance claims relating to transfers that occurred after that time fail because there is no allegation that the debtors did not receive reasonably equivalent value in exchange

for the transfers in question. The various common law causes of action are unsuccessful because, in connection with loans that Quality King made to the debtors in 2022, the debtors granted valid releases to the Quality King defendants. The Committee’s preference claims relating to transfers made more than 90 days before the bankruptcy fail because the complaint does not allege that the

recipients of those transfers are insiders – either on the ground that they exercised control over the debtors or that they are “non-statutory” insiders on account of non- arm’s-length transactions between the parties. The claims for equitable subordination are unsuccessful in the absence of an otherwise sufficient allegation of wrongdoing; and the effort to recharacterize the loans as equity also fail. Accordingly, while the claims for preference and § 502(d) disallowance are sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss, the rest of the complaint is not. Factual Background

Pharmapacks was founded in 2010 by Andrew Vagenas, Bradley Tramunti, and James Mastronardi as an e-commerce venture selling health and wellness products.2 1. Quality King investment (2014) In 2014, as part of an effort to raise capital, the founders formed a holding company, known as Packable Holdings.3 Each of the founders originally held a one- third interest in the holding company. In August 2014, Jonathan Webb, Adam

Berkowitz, and Quality King collectively paid $500,000 for 50 percent of the equity of the holding company.4 Quality King is alleged to be a “retail diverter” – a company that purchases products that are intended for a particular retail channel and sells those products into an alternative channel.5 At the same time that it acquired equity in the holding

2 D.I. 98 ⁋⁋ 59-60. The description of the facts set forth herein is based on the allegations made in the second amended complaint, which allegations are taken as true for the purposes of the present motion. 3 The entity originally known as Entourage Commerce LLC later became Packable Holdings, LLC. That entity has since been renamed Pack Liquidating LLC. D.I. 98 ¶ 21. 4 D.I. 98 ¶ 67. 5 Id. ⁋ 68 (“Retail Diverters operate at the fringe of the mainstream distribution channels and ‘divert’ the sale of merchandise intended for a particular, premium distribution channel into another, alternate distribution channel, often at steep discounts.”) company, Quality King made a revolving loan to the debtors under which it provided up to $9 million in financing.6 That capital fueled rapid revenue growth – from $17.5 million in 2013, to $31

million in 2014, and $66.6 million in 2015.7 But despite the growth in revenues, Pharmapacks remained unprofitable, recording net losses of $1.7 million in 2015.8 Over the next several years, the net losses of the debtors persisted and the debt obligations to Quality King continued to grow, reaching a balance of $33 million by the end of 2018. At that point, Quality King refused to extend further credit.9 2. Investments by suppliers (2018) In need of additional capital, Pharmapacks then turned to its existing

suppliers. The company raised $32.5 million in Series A preferred equity in 2018 from Reckitt, McKesson, Sealed Air, and Emerson, a portion of which was used to reduce the outstanding Quality King Loan by $6 million.10 As a result of the change in the company’s ownership structure, the Holdings LLC Agreement was amended to expand the board of managers to nine members – one of whom was Glenn Nussdorf, the CEO of Quality King. 11

6 Id. ⁋ 71. 7 Id. ⁋ 72. 8 Id. 9 Id. ⁋ 90. 10 D.I. 98 ⁋ 93. 11 Id. ⁋ 94. 3. MGG loan (2019) In 2019, the company conducted a further refinancing, securing a $75 million credit facility from an entity known as MGG Investment Group, the proceeds of which were used to repay the Quality King loan in its entirety.12 Quality King, however,

retained its equity interest and Nussdorf remained on the company’s board. 4.

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OFFICIAL COMMITTEE OF UNSECURED CREDITORS v. Vagenas, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/official-committee-of-unsecured-creditors-v-vagenas-deb-2025.