Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Nathan E. DeLadurantey

2023 WI 17, 985 N.W.2d 788, 406 Wis. 2d 62

• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court
• Decided: March 3, 2023
• Docket: 2020AP001616-D
• Status: Published

Opinion

2023 WI 17

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN CASE NO.: 2020AP1616-D

COMPLETE TITLE: In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings Against Nathan E. DeLadurantey, Attorney at Law:

Office of Lawyer Regulation, Complainant-Appellant, v. Nathan E. DeLadurantey, Respondent-Respondent.

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST DELADURANTEY

OPINION FILED: March 3, 2023 SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: ORAL ARGUMENT:

SOURCE OF APPEAL: COURT: COUNTY: JUDGE:

JUSTICES: Per curiam. ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., filed a concurring opinion. NOT PARTICIPATING:

ATTORNEYS: 2023 WI 17 NOTICE This opinion is subject to further editing and modification. The final version will appear in the bound volume of the official reports. No. 2020AP1616-D

STATE OF WISCONSIN : IN SUPREME COURT

In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings Against Nathan E. DeLadurantey, Attorney at Law:

FILED Office of Lawyer Regulation, MAR 3, 2023 Complainant-Appellant, Sheila T. Reiff v. Clerk of Supreme Court

Nathan E. DeLadurantey,

Respondent-Respondent.

ATTORNEY disciplinary proceeding. Attorney publicly

reprimanded.

¶1 PER CURIAM. The Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR)

appeals Referee Robert E. Kinney's report, as amended,

recommending that the court dismiss the remaining charges in the

disciplinary complaint filed against Attorney Nathan E.

DeLadurantey alleging that Attorney DeLadurantey violated the

Attorney's Oath in Supreme Court Rule (SCR) 40.15,1 which is

1SCR 40.15 (Attorney's Oath) provides in relevant part: "I will abstain from all offensive personality . . . ." No. 2020AP1616-D

enforced via SCR 20:8.4(g),2 by failing to abstain from

"offensive personality."

¶2 This court issued an initial opinion in this case on

July 8, 2022. As explained below, because we were unaware of

the referee's submission of errata pages for his report that

eliminated much of the legal basis for our initial opinion, we

withdrew that opinion by order dated July 12, 2022. The

discovery of those errata pages caused us to further review the

basis upon which the parties had requested the referee to accept

Attorney DeLadurantey's no-contest plea and upon which the

referee had made factual findings in his report. Having asked

for and received responses from the parties regarding their

agreement as the factual basis for the plea, and having

reconsidered the record in this matter, we now issue this

revised opinion. We conclude that Attorney DeLadurantey did

engage in "offensive personality" in one incident that he

admits, and we determine that the appropriate discipline for

that misconduct is a public reprimand. We also determine that Attorney DeLadurantey should be required to pay costs of this

disciplinary proceeding in the amount of $17,570.10.

¶3 In order to review the legal conclusion in the

referee's amended report, we first need to clarify the

procedural context in which this case comes to us on appeal

because that informs what we are reviewing and how we can

2SCR 20:8.4(g) provides: "It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to violate the attorney's oath."

2 No. 2020AP1616-D

proceed. This further requires us to provide some background on

the use of no-contest pleas in attorney disciplinary cases, and

the procedural history of the proceedings before the referee in

this case.

¶4 Supreme Court Rule 22.14(2)3 contemplates that in a

respondent attorney's answer to a complaint filed by the OLR,

the attorney may "plead no contest to allegations of misconduct

in the complaint." Although this rule speaks only in terms of

pleading no contest in the respondent's answer, we have

regularly upheld the entry of a no-contest plea entered at any

stage of the proceedings before the referee, even if the

respondent attorney's answer initially denied some or all of the

complaint's factual allegations and claims of misconduct. See,

e.g., In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hammis, 2019 WI 55,

386 Wis. 2d 719, 927 N.W.2d 525 (no-contest pleas entered

pursuant to stipulation after respondent attorney filed answers

to original and amended complaints); In re Disciplinary

Proceedings Against Hudec, 2019 WI 39, 386 Wis. 2d 371, 925 N.W.2d 540 (no-contest pleas entered pursuant to stipulation

after respondent attorney filed unsuccessful motion to dismiss

and an answer that denied all allegations of misconduct); In re

3SCR 22.14(2) provides: "The respondent may by answer plead no contest to allegations of misconduct in the complaint. The referee shall make a determination of misconduct in respect to each allegation to which no contest is pleaded and for which the referee finds an adequate basis in the record. In a subsequent disciplinary or reinstatement proceeding, it shall be conclusively presumed that the respondent engaged in the misconduct determined on the basis of a no contest plea."

3 No. 2020AP1616-D

Disciplinary Proceedings Against Heins, 2017 WI 93, 378 Wis. 2d

27, 902 N.W.2d 257 (referee construed stipulation entered after

completion of discovery and just prior to final evidentiary

hearing to be entry of no-contest pleas to all counts in

complaint).

¶5 In the criminal context, a circuit court has

discretion whether to accept a plea, be it a guilty plea or a

no-contest plea. State v. Martin, 162 Wis. 2d 883, 904, 470

N.W.2d 900 (1991) (". . . a court has discretion whether or not

to officially receive or accept [guilty or no-contest] pleas . .

."); State v. Erickson, 53 Wis. 2d 474, 476, 192 N.W.2d 872

(1972) ("The trial court earlier rejected a plea of nolo

contendere [i.e., no contest], but it was within its discretion

to do just that."); State v. La Pean, 247 Wis. 302, 308, 19

N.W.2d 289 (1945) ("The right of the court to refuse to accept a

plea is an inherent power of all criminal courts."); Brozosky

v. State, 197 Wis. 446, 222 N.W.2d 311, 313 (1928) (a plea of

nolo contendere "is received at the discretion of the court"). Although an attorney disciplinary proceeding is a civil action,

rather than a criminal case, we see no reason why this rule

would not also apply to a referee in an attorney disciplinary

proceeding. First, referees in such matters generally have the

powers of a circuit court judge trying a civil action.

Moreover, our rules both explicitly authorize the entry of no-

contest pleas in attorney disciplinary proceedings and use

language that tracks the rules for accepting pleas in criminal cases. See SCR 22.16(1) ("The referee has the powers of a judge 4 No. 2020AP1616-D

trying a civil action . . . ."); SCR 22.14(2) (authorizing entry

of no-contest pleas and providing requirements for accepting

such pleas). Thus, it is logical to interpret the plea entry

rule in disciplinary proceedings to give the referee the same

discretion in deciding whether to accept a plea that a circuit

court possesses in a criminal case.

¶6 Rule 22.14(2) states that when a no-contest plea is

included in the answer (or offered later in the proceeding), the

referee "shall make a determination of misconduct in respect to

each allegation to which no contest is pleaded," but only if

"the referee finds an adequate factual basis in the record" to

support the plea. Id. This tracks the language in the statute

that governs the entry of pleas in criminal cases, Wis. Stat.

§ 971.08(1)(b), which requires a circuit court, before accepting

a guilty or no-contest plea, to "[m]ake such inquiry as

satisfies it that the defendant in fact committed the crime

charged."

¶7 We have said in the criminal context that how a plea- taking judge makes that inquiry and what the judge uses in the

record as the factual basis is left to the judge's discretion.

See, e.g., State v. Thomas, 2000 WI 13, ¶¶19-22, 232 Wis. 2d

714, 605 N.W.2d 836. However the plea-taking judge makes the

inquiry and whatever portion of the record the judge ultimately

relies on, the judge must satisfy the two purposes of the

factual basis requirement: (1) that the defendant is aware of

the elements of the crime, and (2) that the defendant's conduct, as established by the record, meets those elements. Id., ¶22. 5 No. 2020AP1616-D

Moreover, the plea-taking judge "must ensure that a defendant

realizes that his or her conduct does meet the elements of the

crime charged." Id., ¶21 (citing McCarthy v. United States, 394

U.S. 459, 467 (1969)). We see no reason why those statements of

the law of pleas in the criminal context would not apply to the

requirement to find a "factual basis" for a no-contest plea in

an attorney disciplinary proceeding. The use of similar

language in the disciplinary rule regarding the need to

establish a "factual basis" for a no-contest plea by an attorney

supports this conclusion.

¶8 With this background in mind, we now turn to the facts

of this case. Attorney DeLadurantey was admitted to practice

law in Wisconsin in 2007. Since 2008, he has been the owner of

DeLadurantey Law Office, LLC in Brookfield. Since 2013, the

primary focus of Attorney DeLadurantey's law firm has been

consumer litigation. Attorney DeLadurantey has not previously

been disciplined.

¶9 The OLR's complaint in this proceeding focused on the relationship between Attorney DeLadurantey and H.M., the

grievant, during the time period that H.M. worked as an

associate attorney for Attorney DeLadurantey's law firm.

Attorney DeLadurantey and H.M. graduated from the same law

school and met at an alumni function. Attorney DeLadurantey

subsequently hired H.M., and her employment with his law firm

extended from February 2012 until October 2017.

¶10 The OLR's complaint alleged that the law firm's growing consumer litigation practice required H.M. and Attorney 6 No. 2020AP1616-D

DeLadurantey to work evenings and weekends, and to often travel

together for interviews, depositions, and court proceedings.

The complaint further alleged that over the course of H.M.'s

employment, Attorney DeLadurantey and H.M. "established a

friendship outside the office, including going to a gym to work

out, playing online games, sharing meals together when working,

and participating in social activities while traveling for Firm

business such as snorkeling, going to the beach, and watching

Netflix." The complaint alleged, however, that during this time

period Attorney DeLadurantey had "engaged in a pattern of

behavior that was inappropriate and at times constituted sexual

harassment." The OLR's complaint proceeded to allege a number

of incidents and statements that were a part of the alleged

pattern of inappropriate and harassing behavior. The complaint

alleged multiple violations of two ethical rules arising from

"each instance" of subjecting H.M. to physical contact, sexual

advances, and comments regarding her physical appearance: (1)

violations of SCR 20:8.4(i) (harassment),4 and (2) violations of the "offensive personality" clause in the Attorney's Oath in SCR

40.15. In other words, the complaint alleged that each instance

of such conduct summarized in the complaint had violated both of

those ethical rules. Consequently, although the OLR's complaint

listed only a single count and the parties and the referee have

4 SCR 20:8.4(i) provides: "It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to harass a person on the basis of sex, race, age, creed, religion, color, national origin, disability, sexual preference or marital status in connection with the lawyer's professional activities."

7 No. 2020AP1616-D

often spoken of a single charge under each ethical rule in this

case, the OLR's complaint actually alleged multiple counts of

misconduct under each of two separate rules. We will therefore

refer to "charges" in the plural for each rule.

¶11 Attorney DeLadurantey's answer to the complaint

admitted that the two attorneys had worked together on evenings

and weekends and had often traveled together. His answer denied

that he had engaged in harassment prohibited by SCR 20:8.4(i)

and that he had violated the "offensive personality" clause of

the Attorney's Oath. With the exception of what we will

reference as the "San Francisco incident," which we will

describe in detail below, Attorney DeLadurantey's answer and

subsequent deposition testimony denied at least some portion of

the allegations surrounding each of the various incidents or

comments described in the complaint. Given the nature of the

proceedings for the taking of Attorney DeLadurantey's no-contest

plea and his denial of many of the allegations of the complaint,

we will not set forth in detail those other alleged incidents and comments. We will include in the factual recitation only

facts that are uncontested.

¶12 It is undisputed that while H.M. was employed by

Attorney DeLadurantey's law firm, Attorney DeLadurantey and H.M.

traveled together on a number of business trips. On some of

those trips, the two stayed in a two-bedroom, Airbnb

accommodation, with each occupying their own bedroom. It is

undisputed that one such trip occurred in February 2016, when the two attorneys traveled to San Francisco for depositions. 8 No. 2020AP1616-D

¶13 Five paragraphs of the OLR's complaint (¶¶17-21)

addressed the San Francisco incident. Attorney DeLadurantey's

answer admitted some portions of those paragraphs, but denied

some portions. In his deposition testimony, however, he

clarified that he had only vague and generalized recollections

of the events of that evening because he had been highly

intoxicated. He therefore essentially indicated that he could

not dispute the allegations of the complaint about the San

Francisco incident, which had been based on H.M.'s statements to

the OLR. Also, in the statement of facts in Attorney

DeLadurantey's appellate brief, he says that he conceded before

the referee at the plea hearing that "his conduct relating to

the San Francisco incident referred to in the complaint

constituted offensive personality." His brief then quoted the

five paragraphs of the complaint addressing the San Francisco

incident in his statement of facts, indicating that he does not

dispute those factual allegations for purposes of this case,

although he also included an extended excerpt from his deposition setting forth his limited recollection of the events

of that evening. Consequently, we use the allegations of

paragraphs 17-21 of the complaint to describe the events of the

San Francisco incident.

¶14 On the evening of February 3, 2016, H.M. was in a

common space watching television. Attorney DeLadurantey

approached her and began to rub her back, arms, and legs in a

suggestive manner. H.M. left the common area and went to her

9 No. 2020AP1616-D

bedroom. H.M. was upset and afraid, to the extent that she felt

physically ill.

¶15 Attorney DeLadurantey subsequently texted H.M. and

attempted to explain his inappropriate behavior. In the ensuing

text exchange between the two, Attorney DeLadurantey asked if he

could "try and fix the awkwardness." H.M. responded, "I'm

pretty sure I'm going to throw up shortly – I'm struggling not

to."

¶16 Later in the evening, H.M. and Attorney DeLadurantey

had a face-to-face conversation in the kitchen of the rental

unit. Despite H.M.'s earlier expression of being upset due to

Attorney DeLadurantey's suggestive conduct, during the

conversation Attorney DeLadurantey told H.M. that he wanted to

"take her upstairs to her bedroom and hold her." H.M. told

Attorney DeLadurantey that would not happen. She also told him

during the conversation that she may have to leave Attorney

DeLadurantey's law firm.

¶17 At the end of the conversation, Attorney DeLadurantey left the kitchen, went upstairs, and got into the bed in H.M.'s

bedroom. When she discovered Attorney DeLadurantey in her bed,

H.M. told him that she was not going to share a bed with him.

He then left the bedroom.

¶18 The next morning, Attorney DeLadurantey admitted to

H.M. that his actions the prior evening had been inappropriate,

and he apologized for them.

¶19 Although we will not comment on specific alleged incidents, it is undisputed that the working relationship 10 No. 2020AP1616-D

between H.M. and Attorney DeLadurantey subsequently deteriorated

and that H.M. left Attorney DeLadurantey's law firm in October

2017.

¶20 As noted above, Attorney DeLadurantey denied many of

the allegations in the OLR's complaint about other incidents, at

least in part. He continued to deny those allegations in his

deposition testimony.

¶21 The parties appeared before the referee for the

evidentiary hearing in this matter on May 17, 2021. The referee

noted that there were a number of pending motions in limine that

needed to be resolved.5 Before doing so, however, the referee

met with the attorneys representing the OLR and Attorney

DeLadurantey. The result of that off-the-record discussion was

an apparent agreement that the OLR would dismiss the charges6 of

harassment on the basis of sex under SCR 20:8.4(i) and that

Attorney DeLadurantey would plead no-contest to the charges7 of

engaging in offensive personality under SCR 40.15 and 20:8.4(g),

5The referee noted that he had received and read copies of the parties' voluminous trial exhibits, except for the deposition transcripts of Attorney DeLadurantey and H.M., which counsel for the parties had asked him not to read in advance of the evidentiary hearing. 6As noted above, the OLR's complaint alleged that "each instance" of physical contact, sexual advance, or comment about H.M's appearance constituted a separate violation of SCR 20:8.4(i). 7The OLR's complaint also alleged that "each instance" of physical contact, sexual advance, or comment about H.M's appearance constituted a violation of the offensive personality clause of the Attorney's Oath and therefore of SCR 20:8.4(g).

11 No. 2020AP1616-D

with the parties jointly requesting the imposition of a private

reprimand.

¶22 Unfortunately, neither the attorneys nor the referee

specified on the hearing transcript precisely what facts the

referee was to use as the factual basis for Attorney

DeLadurantey's plea. It is not even clear whether they fully

understood precisely what was within the scope of their

agreement. Counsel for the OLR initially said that Attorney

DeLadurantey's no-contest plea would be "supported by the

allegations of the complaint." In response, however, counsel

for Attorney DeLadurantey responded that while he did not have

an objection to the description of the agreement described by

OLR's counsel, he said that there were "other provisions of the

agreement" that should also be placed onto the record,

indicating that the OLR's counsel had not described the full

agreement of the parties. Specifically, Attorney DeLadurantey's

counsel stated that the referee should consider the record in

the case as a whole, which would include the proposed hearing exhibits and the deposition transcripts of Attorney DeLadurantey

and H.M.8 OLR's counsel did not dispute this clarification.

This meant that the parties asked the referee to rely not only

on the factual allegations of the complaint, but also on a

8Actually, Attorney DeLadurantey's proposed hearing exhibits included the transcript of an interview that H.M. gave to an OLR investigator that was not under oath. Attorney DeLadurantey's counsel asked that the transcript of H.M.'s deposition be substituted for that interview transcript. There was no objection by OLR's counsel to this substitution.

12 No. 2020AP1616-D

record that contained express denials of allegations in the

complaint and competing affirmative assertions of fact.

¶23 The referee then initiated a plea colloquy with

Attorney DeLadurantey. As part of that colloquy, the referee

noted that, in order to accept Attorney DeLadurantey's no-

contest plea, he was required to find an adequate factual basis

for the plea and he clearly indicated that he found such an

adequate factual basis in the record as a whole, not just in the

allegations of the complaint:

The rule that I alluded to a minute ago requires that I find that there is "adequate factual basis" in the record, unquote, to support your plea. And I want to make sure that it's clear that I have reviewed hundreds of pages of discovery materials, and I have no difficulty finding that there is an adequate factual basis to support the plea of no contest to that charge. Having also found that the plea was knowing, intelligent, and

voluntary, the referee accepted the plea. The parties agreed to

submit simultaneous legal memoranda in support of their sanction

request.

¶24 After receiving the parties' sanction memoranda, the

referee prepared his report and recommendation. Although he had

accepted Attorney DeLadurantey's no-contest plea to the

"offensive personality" charges at the plea hearing, he

13 No. 2020AP1616-D

concluded in his report that the "offensive personality" charges

should be dismissed.9

¶25 The referee's conclusion of no "offensive personality"

violations stemmed from his subordinate legal conclusion that in

order to engage in "offensive personality" in the context of

allegations of sexual conduct, the OLR was required to prove at

least one element of a sexual harassment employment

discrimination claim—that Attorney DeLadurantey's sexual

advances to H.M. and alleged comments about her appearance were

"unwelcome," which the referee characterized as the "gravamen"

of any sexual harassment claim. See Meritor Savings Bank, FSB

v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986).

¶26 In his report, the referee did not consider just the

allegations of the OLR's complaint. Consistent with the

parties' agreement expressed at the plea hearing, he reviewed

the totality of the record, including photographs of the two

attorneys together, communications between them, and their

testimony about their various interactions, which he discussed in a section of his report entitled "Additional Facts." From

some of that record evidence, which he believed to be not in

dispute, the referee found that the two attorneys had a platonic

personal relationship as well as a professional one. From his

findings about their personal relationship, the referee further

9 Alternatively, the referee stated that if the court disagreed with his conclusion and found a violation of the Attorney's Oath, he recommended that the court impose a private reprimand and that the case file should be sealed "for the benefit of both parties."

14 No. 2020AP1616-D

found that the OLR would have been unlikely to have proven that

Attorney DeLadurantey's conduct during the San Francisco

incident or in the other instances alleged in the complaint was

objectively "unwelcome," as that term is used in sexual

harassment law. Since he concluded that a reasonable person in

Attorney DeLadurantey's position would not have known that his

conduct was "unwelcome," the referee further concluded that the

same conduct could not be "offensive" under the Attorney's Oath.

Thus, he determined that the remaining "offensive personality"

charges should be dismissed.

¶27 The OLR appealed from the referee's report and

recommendation. In the Statement of Facts portion of the OLR's

appellate brief, it did not cite to the complaint as the source

of its factual statements. It did, however, repeatedly cite to

Attorney DeLadurantey's and H.M.'s deposition transcripts as

support for its factual assertions.10 Indeed, in at least one

instance, the OLR's brief described an incident as Attorney

DeLadurantey had done in his deposition, rather than as the OLR had alleged in its complaint, indicating its belief that the

entire record, not just the complaint, was to be considered in

reviewing the referee's report.

¶28 The heading for the first argument in the OLR's

appellate brief was that "[t]he record supports by clear,

10In the factual section of the brief, which occupied roughly five pages, the OLR cited Attorney DeLadurantey's deposition transcript 16 times and it cited H.M.'s deposition transcript four times. It cited the complaint zero times. It followed this same pattern in the argument section of its brief.

15 No. 2020AP1616-D

satisfactory and convincing evidence that [Attorney]

DeLadurantey engaged in offensive personality and violated the

Attorney's Oath." OLR Brief at 12 (emphasis added). In that

section the OLR essentially urged the court to find or rely on a

sizable number of "facts" from the record that the referee had

not found in his report, but which the OLR contended support a

conclusion that Attorney DeLadurantey engaged in multiple acts

of "offensive personality."

¶29 The OLR also argued in its brief that the referee had

made an error of law in concluding that the ethical rule against

sexual harassment is violated only by proving a violation of

federal employment law against sexual harassment in the

workplace. Similarly, the OLR argued that the referee legally

erred in concluding that because H.M. had occasionally requested

non-sexual physical contact (shoulder rubs), Attorney

DeLadurantey's request for more intimate and sexual contact

during the San Francisco incident was not "unwelcome" under both

federal law and Wisconsin's ethical rules. ¶30 As noted above, Attorney DeLadurantey's response brief

indicated, at least implicitly, that his agreement to plead no-

contest was primarily based on the allegations of the portion of

the complaint relating to the San Francisco incident. He

argued, however, that his no-contest plea did not prevent the

referee from making a recommendation to dismiss the offensive

personality charges that was based on the referee's review of

the record as a whole. Moreover, he further asserted that the referee's recommended dismissal of the remaining "offensive 16 No. 2020AP1616-D

personality" charges was based on the referee's factual findings

from the record which were not clearly erroneous.

¶31 Our initial opinion in this matter focused on what

appeared to be a clear contradiction in the referee's report.

Although the ultimate conclusion and recommendation of the

report was that the evidence did not support a determination

that Attorney DeLadurantey had engaged in "offensive

personality," the second page of the report, as initially filed,

contained a Finding of Fact #3 that the complaint did contain an

adequate factual basis for Attorney DeLadurantey's no-contest

plea to the charges of "offensive personality." That page also

contained a single "conclusion of law" that Attorney

DeLadurantey "did engage in the misconduct charged,

specifically, he did not abstain from all offensive personality"

(emphasis added). This factual finding and this legal

conclusion appeared to conflict with the report's subsequent

"additional facts," legal analysis, and recommendation that the

"offensive personality" charges should be dismissed. We adopted the initial Finding of Fact #3 and accepted the initial

conclusion of law in the referee's report, treating the

referee's report as having confirmed the acceptance of Attorney

DeLadurantey's no-contest plea and affirming the referee's

initial determination at the plea hearing that there was a

sufficient factual basis in the complaint as a whole for

Attorney DeLadurantey's no-contest plea. We essentially

concluded that the remainder of the referee's report was factually and legally faulty, and we therefore disregarded it. 17 No. 2020AP1616-D

¶32 When we issued the initial opinion, however, we were

not aware of the fact that the referee had submitted errata

pages for his report, which had deleted both Finding of Fact #3

and the legal conclusion on page two of the report.11 In the

cover letter accompanying the errata pages, the referee

explained that after writing the first few pages of his report,

including Finding of Fact #3 and the initial legal conclusion on

page two, he had engaged in further review and research, which

had led him to conclude ultimately that Attorney DeLadurantey

had not engaged in "offensive personality." This explanation

clarified that, although the referee had initially accepted

Attorney DeLadurantey's no-contest plea, he had ultimately

rejected the no-contest plea in his final report because he had

concluded that the facts in the record as a whole showed that

Attorney DeLadurantey's actions toward H.M. were not

"unwelcome," as that term is used in employment sexual

harassment statutes and case law.

¶33 The referee's deletion of Finding of Fact #3 and the initial legal conclusion on page two of his report eliminated

the basis for our initial opinion, which implicitly upheld

Attorney DeLadurantey's no-contest plea. Our further review of

the plea hearing transcript, the referee's report, and the

The referee's cover letter accompanying the errata pages 11

directed that the attached errata pages be substituted for pages two, six, and 22 of the referee's report. The clerk's office, however, did not substitute those pages as requested by the referee. It simply filed the referee's submission as a letter, leaving the report unchanged.

18 No. 2020AP1616-D

parties' appellate briefs demonstrated that there was confusion

among the referee and the parties as to what the parties had

agreed should be the factual basis for the no-contest plea and

therefore what should be the factual basis for this court's

opinion.

¶34 The changes to the referee's report in the errata

raised a number of questions. If the referee determined that he

needed to withdraw his interlocutory acceptance of Attorney

DeLadurantey's no-contest plea, on what basis did he make

factual findings in his report, since there was no evidentiary

hearing at which he could weigh the credibility of witnesses?

Did the parties agree that the allegations of the entire

complaint (and only those allegations) could serve as the

factual basis for the plea? Did they agree, as Attorney

DeLadurantey's appellate brief implies, that only the five

paragraphs of the complaint regarding the San Francisco incident

constituted the factual basis for his plea? Alternatively, did

they agree that both the allegations of the complaint and the record as a whole should be used by the referee as the factual

basis for Attorney DeLadurantey's no-contest plea? If the last

of those scenarios was accurate, what was the effect of the fact

that parts of the record (e.g., Attorney DeLadurantey's answer

and his deposition testimony) disputed many of the allegations

of the complaint, at least in part, and the fact that Attorney

DeLadurantey never withdrew his denials?

¶35 Given these questions, we ordered the parties to submit supplemental legal memoranda addressing the issue of what 19 No. 2020AP1616-D

they had agreed should serve as the factual basis for the no-

contest plea, as well as the issue of whether the matter should

be remanded to the referee for further proceedings. The OLR's

supplemental memorandum initially claimed that only the

complaint had served as the factual basis for the no-contest

plea, but it subsequently acknowledged that the referee had been

asked at the plea hearing to review the record as a whole.

Attorney DeLadurantey's supplemental memorandum indicated that

he had agreed that the five paragraphs of the complaint relating

to the San Francisco incident, which he acknowledged he could

not materially dispute in his deposition testimony, could be

used as the factual basis for the plea, along with the record as

a whole. Both parties urged this court not to remand the matter

to the referee for further proceedings, given the additional

time and expense that would result.

¶36 Ordinarily, when we review a referee's report that is

prepared following the entry of a comprehensive stipulation of

facts or following a full evidentiary hearing, we affirm a referee's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous,

and we review a referee's legal conclusions on a de novo basis.

In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Inglimo, 2007 WI 126, ¶5,

305 Wis. 2d 71, 740 N.W.2d 125. If we conclude that the

attorney has engaged in professional misconduct, we then

determine the appropriate level of discipline to impose given

the particular facts of each case, independent of the referee's

recommendation, but benefiting from it. In re Disciplinary

20 No. 2020AP1616-D

Proceedings Against Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660

N.W.2d 686.

¶37 In this case, however, there was no comprehensive

stipulation of facts or an evidentiary hearing at which the

referee could weigh credibility. There was a no-contest plea.

If the referee had continued to accept that plea and had

submitted a report based on that plea, we would review whether

the referee had properly exercised his discretion in accepting

the plea. Cf. State v. Schmidt, 2021 WI 65, ¶12, 397 Wis. 2d

758, 960 N.W.2d 888 (circuit court's denial of a motion to

withdraw a plea in a criminal case is reviewed under an

erroneous exercise of discretion standard); White v. State, 85

Wis. 2d 485, 491, 271 N.W.2d 97 (1978) (same).12

¶38 In this case, however, it is clear from the referee's

report, as amended, that he reconsidered his acceptance of

Attorney DeLadurantey's no-contest plea and ultimately refused

to accept that plea because he concluded that the

The usual procedural path of pleas in criminal cases is 12

different from the path in attorney disciplinary cases. In most instances, there is no appellate review of the circuit court's acceptance of a guilty or no-contest plea. What is reviewed normally on appeal is a circuit court's denial of a defendant's request to withdraw a plea. In the attorney disciplinary context, however, this court reviews every case in which a plea is entered, whether or not the respondent attorney subsequently sought to withdraw the plea or appealed from the referee's report following the acceptance of the plea. Thus, when the respondent attorney does not seek plea withdrawal and the referee's report confirms the acceptance of the plea, we review the acceptance of the plea for an erroneous exercise of discretion.

21 No. 2020AP1616-D

"uncontroverted" facts he found from the record as a whole

demonstrated that Attorney DeLadurantey's conduct did not

constitute "offensive personality" in violation of the

Attorney's Oath and SCR 20:8.4(g) because his conduct was not

objectively "unwelcome." His ultimate report is therefore more

in the nature of a report in a case where no plea is entered,

and we will utilize the standards of review for such cases, as

summarized above.

¶39 There are two primary problems with the referee's

report, which preclude us from accepting the referee's findings

or legal conclusions.

¶40 First, the case was presented to the referee as being

resolved through a no-contest plea. The referee initially

followed the proper procedure for the entry of that plea and

exercised his discretion to accept it. He then reconsidered the

entry of the plea and determined that it should not be accepted.

This is permissible in an attorney disciplinary proceeding.

Referees in attorney disciplinary proceedings generally have the powers of a judge trying a civil action. SCR 22.16(1). This

would include the ability to reconsider an interlocutory

decision, such as in this case accepting a no-contest plea to a

charge of misconduct, and then, after further consideration,

reaching the opposite conclusion in a subsequent report.

Although it is unusual, this is not the first time it has

happened. See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Clark,

2016 WI 36, 368 Wis. 2d 409, 878 N.W.2d 662 (following attorney's entry of a no-contest plea to a charge in a 22 No. 2020AP1616-D

disciplinary complaint, the referee concluded that the OLR had

failed to meet its burden of proof with respect to that charge).

¶41 What we do find troubling is that, once the referee

determined that the no-contest plea should not be accepted, he

proceeded to make findings of fact that served as the basis for

his ultimate legal conclusion of no "offensive personality"

violations. As an initial matter, it is clear from the record

of this case, both before the referee and on appeal, that the

parties and the referee were not on the same page as to

precisely what was the universe of facts that should serve as

the factual basis for the plea. That would have been

problematic even if the referee had continued to accept the

plea.13

This case is a cautionary tale for referees and lawyers 13

who appear in attorney disciplinary proceedings. When a respondent attorney decides to enter a no-contest plea, the lawyers and the referee need to be clear regarding what universe of facts will serve as the factual basis for the plea, especially when the record contains disputes as to the underlying events or the context of those events. Moreover, one cannot agree to have one set of facts (e.g., the allegations of the complaint) serve as the factual basis for a no-contest plea and then ask the referee to consider a broader set of conflicting factual assertions (e.g., the record as a whole) in making a recommendation as to the appropriate level of discipline. In the context of a no-contest plea, a referee cannot make factual findings from disputed record evidence to support a discipline recommendation without a hearing at which the referee can assess witness credibility, especially when those factual findings conflict with the facts used to support the plea. Finally, both referees and practicing lawyers need to understand that clarity as to the facts relied on by referee to accept a no-contest plea is necessary to permit this court to review the referee's acceptance of the plea and to write a full opinion deciding the case.

23 No. 2020AP1616-D

¶42 Once the referee rejected the plea, however, there was

no express stipulation of the parties as to any facts. The case

at that point reverted to the status of any other case prior to

an evidentiary hearing. There was a complaint containing many

factual allegations, and there was an answer that disputed many

of those factual allegations. There were also deposition

transcripts for H.M. and Attorney DeLadurantey, but both of

those consisted of out-of-court declarations that the referee

had not observed in order to make credibility determinations.

Moreover, the deposition testimony of both of those witnesses

was certainly not the full testimony that those witnesses would

have presented at an evidentiary hearing. H.M. and Attorney

DeLadurantey answered only those questions that were asked by

opposing counsel, and those questions did not cover every aspect

of the various incidents alleged in the complaint. Moreover,

even with respect to the documentary exhibits that the parties

submitted and asked the referee to review, H.M. and Attorney

DeLadurantey were not given the opportunity to explain their contents or put them in context. This case was not about the

language of a contract or an insurance policy or a deed, which

could be interpreted on its face by a referee or by this court

on review; it involved various interactions between two people,

some of which were captured in paper form (e.g., printouts of

text messages), but many of which depended on the testimony of

H.M. and Attorney DeLadurantey, as well as any other third party

who might have witnessed their interactions.

24 No. 2020AP1616-D

¶43 In this situation, we cannot see how the referee could

make the large number of factual findings that he did about

various aspects of the relationship between Attorney

DeLadurantey and H.M. Once there was no longer an accepted no-

contest plea to resolve the case, the referee should have

proceeded either to obtain a comprehensive stipulation of facts

from the parties or to conduct an evidentiary hearing, at which

he could observe the demeanor of the witnesses and make

credibility determinations. At that point, he could then have

made factual findings based either on the stipulation or on the

testimony and exhibits presented at the hearing.

¶44 While the referee stated that he was making only

factual findings that were "uncontroverted," it is clear that

there were still many disputes of fact about a wide range of

incidents. The OLR's appellate brief included a statement of

facts that was very different from the factual recitation in the

referee's report. Given the presence of ongoing factual

disputes and the lack of a basis for the referee to make factual findings in the absence of an opportunity to weigh the

credibility of the witnesses, we cannot accept the referee's

"additional" findings of fact in his report. The failure to

follow the proper procedure for making findings of fact was an

error of law, which invalidates those additional factual

findings.

¶45 The second foundational problem with the referee's

report is another error of law. Although the referee stated in his report that a charge of "offensive personality" is "neither 25 No. 2020AP1616-D

a watered-down version of sexual harassment nor a lesser

included offense of it," it is clear that he conflated sexual

harassment under SCR 20:8.4(i) and engaging in "offensive

personality" under SCR 20:8.4(g). He began the discussion

section of his report with an extended discussion of what

constitutes sexual harassment under employment discrimination

law, stated that the "gravamen" of a claim of sexual harassment

is whether the conduct at issue was "unwelcome," and then

reasoned that conduct that would not be considered "unwelcome"

under sexual harassment law also cannot be "offensive" under the

"offensive personality" clause of the Attorney's Oath. Indeed,

he analyzed whether both Attorney DeLadurantey's sexual advances

during the San Francisco incident and his alleged comments about

H.M.'s appearance at other times were "unwelcome," concluding

from what he believed to be the context of their personal, as

well as professional, relationship that neither type of conduct

was objectively unwelcome.

¶46 Although it is possible that the same conduct could constitute both harassment on the basis of sex and "offensive

personality," they are separate ethical violations. The

requirement to "abstain from all offensive personality" is one

of a number of standards to which attorneys must conform when

they enter the practice of law in this state. Such standards

apply not only to the direct practice of law, but also to the

business of law, and to the lawyer's conduct beyond the practice

or business of law. See, e.g., SCR 20:4.1 (requiring a lawyer to avoid knowingly making a false statement of a material fact 26 No. 2020AP1616-D

or law to a third party when representing a client); SCR

20:4.4(a) (when representing a client, a lawyer may not use

means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass,

delay, or burden a third party); SCR 20:6.1 (every lawyer has a

professional responsibility to provide legal services to those

unable to pay); SCR 20:8.4(b) (lawyer has duty to avoid

committing any criminal act that reflects adversely on the

lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer,

whether or not the act occurs during the provision of legal

services); SCR 20:8.4(c) (lawyer has duty to avoid engaging in

conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or

misrepresentation). Similarly, the duty to abstain from

"offensive personality" can apply to conduct that occurs outside

the direct practice of law. See In re Disciplinary Proceeding

Against Johann, 216 Wis. 2d 118, 574 N.W.2d 218 (1998). This

does not mean, however, that all personal conduct of a lawyer

that is "offensive" violates the Attorney's Oath. The

prohibition in SCR 20:8.4(g) against engaging in "offensive personality" applies to offensive conduct that reflects

adversely on the lawyer's fitness to practice law. Id. at 122.

When offensive conduct reflects adversely on a lawyer's fitness

to practice law, this court, on behalf of the state, has a

legitimate interest in prohibiting such actions and disciplining

attorneys who engage in such conduct in order to protect the

public and the administration of justice.

¶47 Contrary to the referee's conflation of the charges of "offensive personality" and employment discrimination through 27 No. 2020AP1616-D

sexual harassment, we have previously held that inappropriate

language and conduct may constitute offensive personality in

violation of the Attorney's Oath in a number of situations

involving sexual conduct that did not constitute employment

discrimination. See, e.g., In re Disciplinary Proceedings

Against Beatse, 2006 WI 115, 297 Wis. 2d 292, 722 N.W.2d 385

(using state's email system to send and receive sexually

explicit email messages and making inappropriate comments to a

county employee who was not the attorney's subordinate in a work

environment); In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Bruckner,

161 Wis. 2d 385, 467 N.W.2d 780 (1991) (trading surreptitiously

taken photographs of nude minors without their consent); see

also In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Heilprin, 168 Wis.

2d 1, 482 N.W.2d 908 (1992) (although the court indicated that

repeatedly asking divorce clients explicit questions about their

sexual behavior qualified as "offensive personality," it relied

on the attorney's disobedience of a prior court order against

such conduct as an alternative basis for finding such actions to be professional misconduct). Consequently, the referee's legal

analysis that relied on the "welcomeness" element of employment

sexual harassment claims was legally erroneous, which

invalidates his legal conclusion of no "offensive personality"

violation and his ultimate rejection of Attorney DeLadurantey's

no-contest plea.

¶48 Having concluded that the referee made errors of law

in ultimately rejecting Attorney DeLadurantey's no-contest plea, the question becomes what should the next step be in this case. 28 No. 2020AP1616-D

Ordinarily, because the decision to accept a no-contest plea is

a discretionary one initially committed to a referee and there

is a need for an evidentiary basis for the referee to make

affirmative factual findings (as opposed to finding an adequate

factual basis for a plea in an agreed-upon set of facts), we

would remand the matter back to the referee for further

proceedings—either a new plea based on a more specifically

defined set of facts or a full evidentiary hearing.

¶49 In this unique instance, however, we choose not

to do so. First, the parties have urged us not to remand the

matter in light of the additional time and expense that would be

involved. Second, there is a set of agreed-upon facts here that

permit us to render a proper judgment. Sending the matter back

to the referee for further proceedings would not change those

particular facts and would not change the ultimate outcome in

this proceeding. Thus, in this unique circumstance, it is

proper for us to proceed at this time with rendering a final

decision in this disciplinary proceeding. ¶50 Specifically, although we do not address the other

incidents alleged in the complaint because there are still

disputes as to some portion of those incidents in the record as

a whole, Attorney DeLadurantey has admitted that he cannot

contest the allegations of the complaint regarding the events of

the San Francisco incident because his intoxication at the time

has left him with no real memory of those events.

¶51 As summarized above, there is no dispute that while on a business trip, a senior lawyer and employer, while 29 No. 2020AP1616-D

intoxicated, made repeated sexual advances toward a subordinate

attorney employee that were clearly and repeatedly rebuffed.

Indeed, even after H.M. told Attorney DeLadurantey that his

physical contact had made her physically ill and then had

refused his request to go to her bedroom, Attorney DeLadurantey

still went into H.M.'s bedroom and crawled into her bed, which

can be interpreted only as a persistent demand for sexual

activity despite H.M.'s refusal to consent. We have no

hesitation in holding that such conduct constituted "offensive

personality" that not only reflected adversely on Attorney

DeLadurantey's professional judgment and fitness to be a member

of the legal profession, but also reflected adversely on the

reputation and integrity of the legal profession generally.

Regardless of any personal relationship that had developed, H.M.

was a subordinate attorney whose professional success and

continued employment were, in large part, subject to Attorney

DeLadurantey's control. This was not a matter solely of

Attorney DeLadurantey's private affairs and personal morality. Consequently, Attorney DeLadurantey's offensive conduct in

pressuring a subordinate employee to engage in unwanted sexual

activity during the San Francisco incident constituted a clear

violation of the Attorney's Oath and SCR 20:8.4(g).

¶52 We now turn to the question of the appropriate

sanction for Attorney DeLadurantey's professional misconduct.

We weigh the seriousness, nature, and extent of the misconduct;

the level of discipline needed to protect the public; the need to impress upon the attorney the seriousness of the misconduct; 30 No. 2020AP1616-D

and the need to deter other attorneys from similar misconduct.

In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Eisenberg, 2004 WI 14,

269 Wis. 2d 43, 675 N.W.2d 747. Sources of guidance in

determining appropriate sanctions are: prior case law;

aggravating and mitigating factors; and the American Bar

Association (ABA) Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. In

re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Arthur, 2005 WI 40, 279

Wis. 2d 583, 694 N.W.2d 910.

¶53 Both Attorney DeLadurantey and the OLR have requested

a private reprimand in this proceeding, and the referee agreed

that a private reprimand would be the appropriate level of

discipline if we reject his legal conclusion that the "offensive

personality" charges should be dismissed. In prior cases, a

lawyer's sexually offensive language and conduct has often

received a private or public reprimand, unless it was coupled

with other misconduct. See, e.g., Beatse, 297 Wis. 2d 292,

¶¶16-17 (public reprimand); Private Reprimand No. 1991-6

(consensual private reprimand imposed on lawyer who, while awaiting the return of a jury, approached a female law

enforcement officer at a courthouse and made statements that she

interpreted as sexually aggressive, subsequently grabbed her

shoulders and attempted to embrace her, and later approached a

different female officer, pushed her against a wall and made

suggestive and disparaging remarks); Private Reprimand No. 2008-

38 (consensual private reprimand imposed on attorney who made

sexually suggestive comments to a co-worker over a period of several years and, on one occasion, kissed the co-worker without 31 No. 2020AP1616-D

consent); Private Reprimand No. 2015-2 (imposing consensual

private reprimand on attorney who grabbed the breast of a female

employee of a bar, made several sexually suggestive comments to

her, followed her from the bar, was arrested, and completed a

deferred prosecution agreement after being charged with fourth-

degree sexual assault). We note that the private reprimands

cited above were consensual reprimands that were issued by

referees without this court's review pursuant to our rules.

While we recognize that similarly situated respondents should

receive comparable levels of discipline, we take this

opportunity to advise members of the bar that we are applying

increasing scrutiny to attorneys' sexual misconduct. Compare In

re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Ritland, 2021 WI 36, 396

Wis. 2d 509, 957 N.W.2d 540. We do so because sexual harassment

comes at a heavy price for victims who can suffer significant

psychological effects as well as job-related costs, including

job loss, reputational harm, impairment of professional

opportunities, and irreparable damage to interpersonal relationships at work. Attorneys should be on notice that

sexual misconduct by attorneys, whether directed toward fellow

lawyers, clients, or others, is not taken lightly. Ritland, 396

Wis. 2d 509, ¶39.

¶54 This court has the responsibility to oversee the

practice of law in this state. Consequently, it is our

responsibility to determine what is the appropriate level of

discipline in an attorney disciplinary proceeding. While the facts of each case are unique, in light of existing precedent, 32 No. 2020AP1616-D

we conclude that Attorney DeLadurantey should be publicly

reprimanded. His misconduct is at least as serious as the

conduct in Beatse, where we also imposed a public reprimand on

an attorney who downloaded pornographic images onto a work

computer, sent and received sexually explicit messages on a work

email system, and made inappropriate sexual comments to female

government employees. Here, a supervising lawyer engaged in

unwanted sexually suggestive physical contact with a subordinate

employee, repeatedly asked the employee for sexual activity even

in the face of clear refusals, and then escalated the situation

by climbing into the employee's bed. A private reprimand would

unduly depreciate the seriousness of such misconduct. Moreover,

we conclude that a public reprimand is necessary to put other

members of the bar on notice that such actions will not be

tolerated.

¶55 We next address the question of costs, which were

$20,530.47 as of November 4, 2021, at the completion of

appellate briefing. Attorney DeLadurantey filed an objection to costs, arguing that SCR 22.24(1m) supports a reduction of the

costs imposed on him. Supreme Court Rule 22.24(1m) articulates

six factors we consider when evaluating a costs challenge.

First, we consider the number of counts charged, contested, and

proven. In Attorney DeLadurantey's view, the OLR's "major

focus" was the sexual harassment charges that the OLR eventually

dismissed. He argues that because the OLR dismissed these

charges, no costs should be assessed in connection with the OLR's pursuit of these alleged violations. Second, we consider 33 No. 2020AP1616-D

the nature of the misconduct. Attorney DeLadurantey says that

had the "offensive personality" charges been the only alleged

violations from the outset of this matter, the costs incurred

would have been substantially lower. Third, we consider the

level of discipline sought by the parties and recommended by the

referee. The parties ultimately requested a private reprimand,

and the referee recommended a dismissal of the remaining

charges. Fourth, we consider Attorney DeLadurantey's

cooperation with the disciplinary process. It is undisputed

that Attorney DeLadurantey cooperated throughout the

disciplinary process. Fifth, we consider prior discipline.

Attorney DeLadurantey has no prior disciplinary record.

Finally, we consider "other relevant circumstances." Attorney

DeLadurantey contends that the "sexual harassment claim was

poorly based in fact from the start and all costs in furtherance

of the OLR's attempts to satisfy that claim should not be

assessed." He suggests we impose ten percent of the total

costs, or $2,053.05. ¶56 The OLR maintains that the sexual harassment and

offensive personality claims were intertwined, meaning that the

OLR's counsel's time was spent concurrently pursuing both. The

OLR reminds us that, traditionally, costs are not reduced even

when a respondent prevails on some, but not all, counts, and it

cites several cases in support of this assertion.

¶57 We generally agree with the OLR on this issue. We

decline to deviate from our long-standing disinclination to apportion costs based solely on the number of counts proven or 34 No. 2020AP1616-D

unproven.14 We note, moreover, that the referee found the pre-

appellate costs to be both reasonable in amount and necessarily

incurred, stating:

Having read and made notes on the hundreds of pages of exhibits provided by both counsel, and having performed many hours of research, I am in a good position to assess the work that went into this case. I find that the sum of $18,311.47 is reasonable, and the costs enumerated were necessarily incurred by the [OLR] in this matter. ¶58 We acknowledge that Attorney DeLadurantey has, by all

accounts, cooperated completely with this disciplinary

investigation and proceeding. He ultimately entered a no-

contest plea to the "offensive personality" charges, but the

referee undertook a lengthy analysis and issued a problematic

report, resulting in the OLR's appeal. The referee billed

$5,920.74 for the time spent writing his report which,

unfortunately, complicated this matter. We therefore reduce the

costs billed for writing the report by 50 percent ($2,960.37).

This matter has also been made unnecessarily complex by the

parties' lack of precision in specifying what facts could serve

as the factual basis for the no-contest plea. This lack of

clarity required us to order the parties to submit supplemental

14See, e.g., In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Eisenberg, 144 Wis. 2d 284, 423 N.W.2d 867 (1988) (declining respondent's request to apportion costs according to the number of misconduct counts that resulted in determinations of professional misconduct); In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Konnor, 2005 WI 37, 279 Wis. 2d 284, 694 N.W.2d 376 (rejecting argument that costs not be assessed because he would have agreed to a public reprimand, which the referee ultimately recommended as discipline).

35 No. 2020AP1616-D

legal memoranda. Because this was caused in part by the OLR and

was not corrected by the referee, we do not require Attorney

DeLadurantey to pay the OLR's costs of preparing its

supplemental legal memorandum. Consequently, we direct Attorney

DeLadurantey to pay costs of $17,570.10.

¶59 Finally, we reject the referee's unsupported

recommendation that we "seal" the record in this case. Our

rules require that once a disciplinary complaint is filed, the

disciplinary proceeding and all papers filed in it are public

documents, except where a specific rule or other law mandates

confidentiality, or where the court determines that sealing or

redaction of a document in a disciplinary proceeding is

necessary. SCR 22.40(1).15 There is nothing in this proceeding

that mandates that the record be sealed. It is true that the

filings in this proceeding may be embarrassing for everyone

involved, but that is not a legal basis for sealing a case

record. We recognize that keeping the record in the case open

to the public may cause distress to H.M., but the public has a

15 SCR 22.40(1) provides: "Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, all papers, files, transcripts, and communications relating to an allegation of attorney misconduct, an investigation pursuant to SCR Chapters 10, 22, and 31, and monitoring compliance with conditions, suspension, or revocation imposed by the supreme court, are to be held in confidence by the director and staff of the office of lawyer regulation, the members of the district committees, special investigators, the members of the special preliminary review panel, and the members of the preliminary review panel. Following the filing of a complaint or petition, the proceeding and all papers filed in it are public, except where expressly provided otherwise in this chapter, by court order, or by law."

36 No. 2020AP1616-D

right to learn and understand the process by which this court

renders decisions in attorney disciplinary proceedings and we

have attempted to minimize the impact of this published opinion

by using her initials. There is nothing in this case that

overcomes the public's right to observe its government in

action.

¶60 IT IS ORDERED that, as discipline for his professional

misconduct and violation of SCR 40.15, enforced via

SCR 20:8.4(g), Nathan E. DeLadurantey is publicly reprimanded.

¶61 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date

of this order, Nathan E. DeLadurantey shall pay to the Office of

Lawyer Regulation $17,570.10 for the costs of this proceeding.

37 ¶62 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. (concurring). Although I do not

join the per curiam opinion, I concur with the level of

discipline it imposes.